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I. Developments
A. IRC § 170(h) and Treasury Regulations
IRC § 170(h) (attached as Appendix A), which authorizes a federal charitable income tax
deduction for the donation of a conservation easement meeting specific requirements, was
enacted in 1980. Treasury Regulations interpreting § 170(h) (attached as Appendix B) were
issued in 1986. The Treasury Regulations are based, in large part, on the detailed Senate
Report describing § 170(h) (the legislative history).1
B. Washington Post Articles
In May 2003, the Washington Post published a series of articles questioning some of the
practices of The Nature Conservancy.2 In December of that same year, the Washington
Post published a follow-up article describing allegedly abusive conservation easement
donation transactions involving “wildly exaggerated” easement appraisals and developers
who received “shocking” tax deductions for donating conservation easements encumbering
golf course fairways or otherwise undevelopable land.3
In December 2004, the Washington Post published a second series of articles alleging
abuses in the facade easement donation context.4 The articles described a surge in facade
easement donations that coincided with the emergence of for-profit facilitators and
nonprofit organizations that have “taken in millions of dollars for processing paperwork
and monitoring the easements.” The articles also noted that facade easements often merely
duplicate restrictions already imposed by local law and fail to decrease the value of the
buildings they encumber, making tax deductions based on a 10% to 15% reduction in the
value of the properties unwarranted. One promoter reportedly told property owners they
would receive tax breaks for a drop in their property values, but stressed that there would
be no actual decline; that "[i]t's a paper concept."5
C. IRS Notice 2004-41
In June 2004, the IRS issued Notice 2004-41,6 which states that the IRS is aware that
taxpayers who transfer conservation easements to charitable organizations or make
payments to charitable organizations in connection with a purchase of real property from
the organization may be improperly claiming charitable deductions under § 170. The
1

S. Rep. No. 96-1007 (1980), 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1980, 1980-2 C.B. 599, available at 1980 IRB LEXIS 2362 or 1980
WL 12915.
2
See David B. Ottaway & Joe Stephens, Nonprofit Land Bank Amasses Billions, WASH. POST, May 4, 2003, at A1; Joe
Stephens & David B. Ottaway, How a Bid to Save a Species Came to Grief, WASH. POST, May 5, 2003, at A1; Joe
Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Nonprofit Sells Scenic Acreage to Allies at a Loss; Buyers Gain Tax Breaks with Few
Curbs on Land Use, WASH. POST, May 6, 2003, at A1.
3
Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Developers Find Payoff in Preservation, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2003, at A1.
4
See Joe Stephens, For Owners of Upscale Homes, Loophole Pays; Pledging to Retain the Facade Affords a Charitable
Deduction, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2004, at A1 [Loophole Pays]; Joe Stephens, Local Laws Already Bar Alterations;
Intervention by Trusts Is Rare for Preservation, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2004, at A15; Joe Stephens, Tax Break Turns Into
Big Business, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2004, at A1.
5
See Loophole Pays, supra note 4.
6
Available at https://www.irs.gov/irb/2004-28_IRB#NOT-2004-41.
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Notice warned that the IRS intends to disallow improper deductions and impose penalties
and excise taxes on taxpayers, promoters, and appraisers involved in such transactions.
D. 2005 JCT Report
In January 2005, the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) issued a report to Congress
recommending, among other things, that:
1. the federal charitable contribution deduction offered to conservation easement
donors be eliminated with respect to easements encumbering property on which the
donor maintains a personal residence,
2. the deduction be substantially reduced in all other cases, and
3. new standards be imposed on appraisers and appraisals with regard to the
valuation of easements.7
E. Proposal to Penalize Charities that Fail to Enforce Restrictions
In March 2005, the JCT published a Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the
President’s Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Proposal, one of which was to impose significant
penalties on a charity that removes or fails to enforce conservation easement restrictions,
or transfers an easement without ensuring that the conservation purposes will be protected
in perpetuity.8
F. 2005 SFC Report
In June 2005, the Senate Finance Committee (SFC) held a hearing on the federal tax
incentives available with respect to conservation easement donations. In connection with
that hearing, the SFC issued a report in which it recommended numerous reforms,
including:
1. revocation of the tax-exempt status of conservation organizations that regularly
and continuously fail to monitor the conservation easements they hold (or the
suspension of the ability of such organizations to accept tax-deductible
contributions),
2. implementation of an accreditation program for conservation organizations
acquiring easements,
3. limiting charitable contribution deductions for certain small easement donations
and providing the IRS with the authority to pre-approve deductions for such
donations, and
4. IRS issuance of guidance regarding how a conservation organization can
establish that it is appropriately monitoring the easements it holds.9

7
Options to Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures, prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation, JCS2-05, 281 (Jan. 27, 2005).
8
Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the President’s Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Proposal, prepared by Joint
Committee on Taxation, JCS-3-05, 239–41 (March 2005).
9
Report of Staff Investigation of The Nature Conservancy (Volume I), U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Executive
Summary 10-11 (June 2005), available under “Library,” then “Committee Prints” at http://finance.senate.gov/.
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The Senate Finance Committee report also expresses concern regarding amendments to
conservation easements. The report explains that “[m]odifications to an easement held by
a conservation organization may diminish or negate the intended conservation benefits, and
violate the present law requirements that a conservation restriction remain in perpetuity.”10
The report notes that modifications made to correct ministerial or administrative errors are
permitted under present federal tax law.11 But the report expresses concern with regard to
“trade-off” amendments, which both negatively impact and further the conservation
purpose of an easement, but on balance are arguably either neutral with respect to or
enhance such purpose.12 The report provides, as an example, an amendment to an easement
that would permit the owner of the encumbered land to construct a larger home in exchange
for restrictions further limiting the use of the land for agricultural purposes.13 The report
explains that trade-off amendments “may be difficult to measure from a conservation
perspective,” and that the “weighing of increases and decreases [in conservation benefits]
is difficult to perform by [the holder] and to assess by the IRS.”14
G. 2005 IRS Testimony Before SFC
In his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee in June 2005, then IRS
Commissioner of the Tax-Exempt and Government Entities Division discussed steps the
IRS was taking to enforce the law in this area, including:
1. modifications to IRS Forms 1023, 990, and 8283,
2. the formation of a special cross-functional team to “attack all aspects of the
problem of conservation easements,” and
3. increased audits of easement donors.15
H. Pension Protection Act of 2006
To combat abuses, the Pension Protection Act of 2006,16 among other things:
1. revised the rules in § 170(h) with respect to contributions of certain types of
façade easements,
2. provided statutory definitions of the terms “qualified appraiser” and “qualified
appraisal” in IRC § 170(f)(11), and
3. lowered the thresholds for accuracy-related penalties and made the gross
valuation misstatement penalty with regard to charitable contributions a strict
liability penalty.
At the same time, the Pension Protection Act increased the tax benefits offered to
conservation easement donors for donations made in 2006 and 2007 by making the
percentage limitations and carry-forward periods applicable to resulting charitable
10

Id., Executive Summary 9.
Id., Executive Summary 9, n. 20.
12
See id., at Pt. II 5.
13
See id.
14
Id.
15
The testimony is available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=e821cece-d9eb-1c66-4b9eb4a6602a54f4.
16
Pub. L. No. 109–280, 120 Stat. 780.
11
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deductions more favorable. 17 These enhanced incentives were repeatedly temporarily
extended and then made permanent in 2015.18
I. DOJ Suit Against Trust For Architectural Easements
In June 2011, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit against the Trust for
Architectural Easements (“TAE”).19 The lawsuit alleged, among other things, that TAE
made false and fraudulent statements to prospective donors about the tax benefits available
for donating façade easements, steered donors to appraisers who had been coached by it to
go along with its questionable practices, helped donors to claim deductions before
donations were final, and allowed donors to terminate easements they had already
granted.20 In July 2011, a U.S. District Court Judge issued a permanent injunction against
TAE settling the case.21 The injunction permanently prohibits TAE from engaging in what
the federal government said were abusive and illegal practices. The injunction bars TAE
from, among other things:
1. representing to prospective donors and others that the IRS has established a “safe
harbor” for the value of a donated façade easement equal to 10 to 15% of the subject
building’s value,
2. participating in the appraisal process for a conservation easement in any regard,
including recommending or referring donors to an appraiser or TAE’s preferred list
of appraisers,
3. accepting easements that lack a conservation purpose or do not satisfy the
“protected in perpetuity” requirement of § 170(h), and
4. requesting fees or cash donations tied to a percentage of the estimated value of
the easement or the deduction to be claimed with regard to the easement’s donation.
TAE was also ordered to pay an independent monitor for two years to ensure that it
complied with the injunction.22

17
Before 2006, as a general rule, a property owner could claim the deduction generated by an easement donation to the
extent of 30% of the property owner’s adjusted gross income (AGI) in each of the year of the donation and the following
five years. Based on changes made in 2006, which were temporary and repeatedly extended temporarily, easement donors
were permitted to claim the resulting deduction to the extent of 50% of the donor’s AGI in the year of the donation and
the following 15 years, or, for qualifying farmer and rancher donations, 100% of the donor’s AGI for the 16-year period..
See Technical Explanation Of H.R. 4, The "Pension Protection Act Of 2006," prepared by the Joint Committee on
Taxation, JCX-38-06 (August 3, 2006) [hereinafter JCT Explanation of Pension Protection Act of 2006].
18
For guidance on deductions by individuals for qualified conservation contributions, see IRS Notice 2007-50.
19
Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, U.S. v. McClain, Civ. No. 11-1087 (U.S. Dist. Ct. D.C. June 14,
2011). TAE was formerly known as the National Architectural Trust or “NAT.”
20
Id. See also Janet Novack, Feds Sue Trust Over Historic Easement Tax Breaks, Taxing Matters, FORBES, June 16,
2011.
21
Stipulated Order of Permanent Injunction, U.S. v. McClain, Civ. No. 11-1087 (U.S. Dist. Ct. D.C. July, 15, 2011) (TAE
agreed to the settlement without admitting any wrongdoing).
22
Id. See also D.C. Federal Court Bars Company from Promoting Alleged Tax Scheme Involving Improper Easements
on Historic Buildings, Department of Justice Press Release (July 18, 2011); Joe Stephens, Judge bars D.C. charity from
promoting ‘façade easement’ tax deductions, WASH. POST, July 19, 2011.
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J. IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide
The IRS issued a Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide in 2012 (last revised in
Jan. 2018).23 The Guide is not an official pronouncement of the law or the position of the
IRS, and it cannot be used, cited, or relied upon as such. The Guide nonetheless provides
a detailed summary of many of the requirements that must be met to be eligible for a
deduction for the donation of a conservation easement under § 170(h) and includes
numerous examples. The Guide also alerts readers to various issues that IRS Examiners
will consider when reviewing a taxpayer’s tax return claiming a § 170(h) deduction.
K. IRS Form 990 Disclosures
IRC § 501(c)(3) organizations—as most land trusts are—must file an IRS Form 990
(Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax) each year. Schedule D to IRS Form
990 requires a charitable organization holding a conservation easement to provide certain
information, including:
1. the total number of conservation easements held at the end of the year;
2. the total acreage restricted by such easements;
3. the number of easements modified, transferred, released, or extinguished, by the
organization during the taxable year;
4. whether the organization has a written policy regarding the monitoring and
enforcement of easements;
5. the total number of hours devoted to monitoring, enforcing, and inspecting
conservation easements during the tax year; and
6. the expenses incurred during the tax year to monitor, inspect, and enforce
easements.
For each easement modified, transferred, released, or extinguished, in whole or in part, the
organization must explain the changes in a Supplemental Statement to Schedule D. The
Instructions for Schedule D explain:
1. an easement is released, extinguished, or terminated when, among other things,
all or part of the property subject to the easement is removed from the protection of
the easement in exchange for cash or the protection of some other property;
2. the use of synonyms does not avoid the application of the reporting requirement
(e.g., calling an action a “swap” or a “boundary line adjustment” does not mean the
action is not also a modification, transfer, or extinguishment); and
3. “[t]ax exemption may be undermined by the modification, transfer, release,
extinguishment, or termination of an easement.”

23
The IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide is available at https://www.irs.gov/businesses/smallbusinesses-self-employed/audit-techniques-guides-atgs.
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L. Obama Administration Calls for Reform
In its Revenue Proposals for fiscal year’s 2013 through 2017,24 the Obama Administration
proposed a variety of reforms to curb abuses in the conservation easement deduction
context, including:
1. elimination of the charitable deduction for contributions of conservation
easements on golf courses;
2. disallowance of the deduction for the value of a façade easement associated with
forgone upward development above a historic building;
3. requiring all conservation easements to further a clearly delineated Federal or
authorized state or tribal governmental policy and yield a significant public benefit;
4. requiring donors to provide detailed information about the conservation purposes
and public benefit of contributed easements;
5. requiring donees to meet minimum standards, attest to the accuracy of donor
representations to the IRS, and electronically report information about donated
easements, and
6. subjecting donees to loss of “eligible donee” status and donees and their
managers to penalties for overvalued easements or easements that do not further
eligible conservation purposes.
The Administration also proposed to pilot a new tax credit for conservation easement
donations “as an alternative” to the § 170(h) deduction.
M. IRS General Information Letter on Swaps
In a March 2012 Information Letter, the IRS advised that conservation easements that are
subject to swaps other than in the very limited situation of a swap that meets the
extinguishment and proceeds requirements of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6) are
not deductible. 25 A “swap” is defined as the removal of some or all of the originally
protected property from the terms of the original deed of conservation easement in
exchange for either the protection of some other property or the payment of cash.

24
See General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2013 Revenue Proposals, Treas. Dep’t 140 (February
2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2013.pdf;
General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2014 Revenue Proposals, Treas. Dep’t 161-162 (April 2013),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2014.pdf;
General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2015 Revenue Proposals, Treas. Dep’t 193-196 (March 2014),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2015.pdf;
General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2016 Revenue Proposals, Treas. Dep’t 188-192 (Feb. 2015),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2016.pdf;
General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals, available at
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2017.pdf.
25
Information Letter from Karin Goldsmith Gross, Senior Technician Reviewer, IRS (March 5, 2012), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/12-0017.pdf.
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N. IRS General Information Letter on Extinguishment
In a September 2012 Information Letter, the IRS advised that, while state law may provide
a means for extinguishing a conservation easement for state law purposes, the requirements
of § 170(h) and the Treasury Regulations, including Treasury Regulation §1.170A-14(g)(6)
(the judicial extinguishment and division of proceeds regulation), must nevertheless be
satisfied for a contribution to be deductible for federal income tax purposes.26
O. DOJ Suit Against Façade Easement Appraiser
In January 2013, the United States filed a complaint in District Court against an appraiser
and the company he owned with his wife.27 The complaint alleged, among other things,
that the appraiser had appraised more than ninety conservation easements for purposes of
the deduction under § 170(h) and had repeatedly and continually made material and
substantive errors, distorted data, and provided misinformation and unsupported personal
opinions in the appraisals to significantly inflate the value of the easements for federal
deduction purposes. The complaint also alleged that the appraiser attempted to obstruct
IRS enforcement efforts by claiming not to have any work files for his appraisal reports,
which professional standards require that an appraiser maintain. “This sort of abuse of a
high-dollar charitable contribution deduction,” stated the complaint, “inspires contempt for
the system of honest, voluntary income tax reporting.”
In February 2013, the District Court issued an Agreed Order of Permanent Injunction that,
among other things, (i) barred the appraiser and the company from preparing any kind of
appraisal report or otherwise participating in the appraisal process for any property relating
to federal taxes and (ii) ordered the appraiser and the company to provide to counsel for
the United States a list of clients for whom they prepared appraisal reports for tax purposes
on or since November 1, 2009.28
P. IRS CCA on Conservation Easement Valuation
In August 2012, the IRS Office of Chief Counsel published helpful guidance on valuing
conservation easements in accordance with some of the more technical requirements of
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i).29 The Chief Counsel Advice (CCA) specifically
addresses the “contiguous parcel” and “enhancement” rules, and provides twelve examples
illustrating the application of those rules.

26

Information Letter from Karin Goldsmith Gross, Senior Technician Reviewer, IRS (Sept. 18, 2012), available at
http://bit.ly/1VMfimR.
27
Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, U.S. v. Ehrmann et al., Civ. No. 1:13-cv-214 (N.D. Ohio, Jan.
30, 2013).
28
Agreed Order of Permanent Injunction, U.S. v. Ehrmann, Civ. No. 1:13-cv-00214-DAP (N.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2013) (the
appraiser and company agreed to the settlement without admitting any wrongdoing). See also Ohio Federal Court Bars
Appraiser of Historic-Preservation Easements, Department of Justice Press Release (Feb. 13, 2013).
29
IRS Chief Counsel Advice 201334039 (released Aug. 23, 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irswd/1334039.pdf. See also IRS on Conservation Easement Valuation, at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/nonprofit/2014/09/irs-on-conservation-easement-appraisals.html.

7
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384360

Q. IRS Bars Appraisers from Valuing Easements for Five Years
In March 2014, the IRS announced that its Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)
had entered into a settlement agreement with a group of appraisers from the same firm
accused of aiding in the understatement of federal tax liabilities by overvaluing facade
easements for charitable donation purposes.30 To value facade easements, the appraisers
had simply multiplied the “before” value of the subject property by a fixed percentage,
generally 15%. Under the settlement agreement, the appraisers admitted to violating
relevant sections of Circular 230. According to the Director of OPR:
Appraisers need to understand that they are subject to Circular 230, and must
exercise due diligence in the preparation of documents relating to federal tax
matters. Taxpayers expect advice rendered with competence and diligence that goes
beyond the mere mechanical application of a rule of thumb based on conjecture and
unsupported conclusions.
The appraisers agreed to a five-year suspension of valuing facade easements and
undertaking any appraisal services that could subject them to penalties under the Internal
Revenue Code. The appraisers also agreed to abide by all applicable provisions of Circular
230.
R. Enhanced Incentives Made Permanent
On December 18, 2015, President Obama signed into law the Protecting Americans from
Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (the PATH Act). 31 Before the PATH Act, as a general rule, a
property owner could claim the deduction generated by an easement donation to the extent
of 30% of the property owner’s adjusted gross income (AGI) in each of the year of the
donation and the following five years. Based on changes made in 2006, which were
temporary and repeatedly extended temporarily, easement donors were permitted to claim
the resulting deduction to the extent of 50% of the donor’s AGI in the year of the donation
and the following 15 years, or, for qualifying farmer and rancher donations, 100% of the
donor’s AGI for the 16-year period. The PATH Act made these favorable rules for
easement donations permanent. In addition, beginning in 2016, the Act allows an Alaska
Native Corporation donating a conservation easement with respect to certain lands to claim
the resulting deduction to the extent of 100% of taxable income in the year of the donation
and the following 15 years. Accordingly, farmers, ranchers, and Alaska Native
Corporations that make qualifying easement donations can potentially avoid paying any
federal income tax for up to 16 years. The PATH Act made the enhanced incentives

30

IRS, IRS Bars Appraisers from Valuing Facade Easements for Federal Tax Purposes for Five Years, IR-2014-31
(March 19, 2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Bars-Appraisers-from-Valuing-FacadeEasements-for-Federal-Tax-Purposes-for-Five-Years.
31
See Technical Explanation of the Protecting Americans From Tax Hikes Act of 2015, prepared by the Joint Committee
on Taxation, JCX-144-15 (Dec. 17, 2015).
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permanent without implementing any reforms proposed by the Treasury or others to curb
abuses.32
The incentives for conservation easement donations are complex. It is important to have a
competent tax professional who has up to date software estimate the potential tax benefits.
Neither the donor nor the donee should attempt to guess or estimate the potential benefits.
S. Appraiser and CPA Summonses Enforced
In April 2016, a U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia granted the IRS’s
petition to enforce a summons served on an appraiser.33 The summons requested, among
other things, all documents reflecting the customers for whom the appraiser prepared or
approved conservation or historic easement appraisals during the period beginning January
1, 2010, through the present, and all appraisal work files for such appraisals. The judge
found that the summons had a legitimate purpose (to determine whether the appraiser had
improperly appraised conservation easements), the summons was not overbroad, and the
IRS was not acting in bad faith.
In June 2016, a U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia granted the IRS’s
petition to enforce a summons served on a certified public accountant (CPA).34 Among
other things, the IRS was seeking client files, tax returns, and supporting documentation
for federal tax returns prepared by the CPA for tax years 2010-2012 that were either
conservation easement partnership returns or federal income tax returns where the client
claimed a charitable deduction arising from a conservation easement. Quoting the Eleventh
Circuit, which was quoting the Supreme Court, the judge explained, in part, that:
“[T]he Government depends upon the good faith and integrity of each potential
taxpayer to disclose honestly all information relevant to tax liability.... The purpose
of ... [a summons] is not to accuse, but to inquire. Although such investigations
unquestionably involve some invasion of privacy, they are essential to our selfreporting system, and the alternatives could well involve far less agreeable
invasions of house, business, and records.”
32

See, e.g., Roger Colinvaux, Conservation Easements: Design Flaws, Enforcement Challenges, and Reform, 2013 UTAH
LAW REVIEW 755; Wendy C. Gerzog, Alms to the Rich: The Façade Easement Deduction, 34 VA. TAX REV. 229 (2014);
Daniel Halperin, Incentives for Conservation Easements: The Charitable Deduction or a Better Way, 74 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (2011); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements and the Valuation Conundrum, 19 FLA.
TAX REV. 225 (2016); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Extinguishing and Amending Tax-Deductible Conservation Easements:
Protecting the Federal Investment After Carpenter, Simmons, and Kaufman, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 217 (2012); Jeff Pidot,
Reinventing Conservation Easements: A Critical Examination and Ideas for Reform (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy
2005). See also Nancy A. McLaughlin, Tax-Deductible Conservation Easements and the Essential Perpetuity
Requirements, 37 Va. Tax Rev. 1 (2017).
33
U.S. v. Clower, 2016 WL 3144048 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 29, 2016), adopting Judge’s Report and Recommendation in U.S.
v. Clower, 2016 WL 3129451 (N.D. Ga. March 22, 2016), aff’d U.S. v. Clower, 666 Fed.Appx. 869 (11th Cir. 2016)
(unpublished). See also U.S. v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that IRS summons seeking production of
appraiser’s work file was issued in good faith and the file was not protected from disclosure by the work-product doctrine,
but remand was required to determine whether some of the contents of file were protected by attorney-client privilege);
Stern v. U.S., 2010 WL 7096092 (D. Idaho 2010).
34
U.S. v. Greenberger, 2016 WL 3912060 (N.D. Ga. June 21, 2016), adopting Judge’s Report and Recommendation in
U.S. v. Greenberger, 2016 WL 391206 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2016). See also Greenberger v. IRS, 283 F.Supp.3d 1354 (N.D.
Ga. 2017), in which the court denied Greenberger’s FOIA request seeking the IRS’s investigation file concerning him.
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T. Treasury’s 2016-2017 Priority Guidance Plan
The Treasury’s 2016–2017 Priority Guidance Plan contained projects that were priorities
for allocation of the resources of its offices from July 2016 through June 2017.35 One of
the listed projects was “[g]uidance under §170 regarding charitable contributions of
conservation easements.”
U. Syndicated Conservation Easement Transactions
In December 2016, the IRS issued Notice 2017-10, which identifies certain conservation
easement donation transactions involving pass-through entities as “listed” (or tax
avoidance) transactions and requires certain parties to such transactions to make
disclosures to the IRS. The Notice identifies the following transactions and those
substantially similar thereto as “listed” transactions: if an investor received oral or written
promotional materials that offered prospective investors in a pass-through entity the
possibility of a deduction that equals or exceeds two and one-half times the investor’s
investment. Donees described in § 170(c) are not treated as parties to, participants in, or
material advisors with respect to such transactions for purposes of the Notice.36
In May 2017, an economist at the Brookings Institution published a report discussing
problems and abuses in the conservation easement donation context, including grossly
inflated easement appraisals and easements that do not fulfill bona fide conservation
purposes.37 In December 2017, the economist published a follow-up piece on abuses that
explains that the deduction program is costing billions of dollars annually in terms of lost
revenue and now ranks among the largest federal environmental and land management
programs in the U.S. budget.38
In September 2018, the IRS announced Syndicated Conservation Easement Transactions
as one of its compliance campaigns.39
In December 2018, the DOJ filed a complaint in U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia seeking an order to shut down certain promoters of syndicated donation

35
Department of the Treasury, 2016–2017 Priority Guidance Plan, available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/20162017_pgp_initial.pdf.
36
See also Notice 2017-29; Notice 2017-58.
37
Adam Looney, Charitable Contributions of Conservation Easements, Brookings Institution 5 (May 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/looney_conservationeasements.pdf.
38
Adam Looney, Estimating the Rising Costs of a Surprising Tax Shelter: The Syndicated Conservation Easement,
Brookings Institution (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/12/20/estimating-the-rising-costof-a-surprising-tax-shelter-the-syndicated-conservation-easement/. For additional reporting on syndicated transactions,
see,
e.g.,
Peter
Elkind,
The
Billion-Dollar
Loophole,
ProPublica
(Dec.
20,
2017),
https://www.propublica.org/article/conservation-easements-the-billion-dollar-loophole; Richard Rubin, Thousands of
Investors Got Big Tax Breaks for Land-Rights Donations, IRS Finds, Wall St. J. (Mar. 14, 2018).
39
See IRS Announces the Identification and Selection of Five Large Business and International Compliance Campaigns
(Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/irs-announces-the-identification-and-selection-of-five-large-businessand-international-compliance-campaigns-0. This campaign is intended to encourage taxpayer compliance and ensure
consistent treatment of similarly situated taxpayers by ensuring the easement contributions meet the legal requirements
for a deduction and the fair market values are accurate.
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transactions operating out of Georgia and require them to disgorge all profits related to
such transactions, plus interest.40
In March 2019, the IRS announced that syndicated deals are on their annual “Dirty Dozen”
list of Tax Scams to avoid.41 The Senate Finance Committee launched an investigation into
the potential abuse of syndicated conservation easement transactions. 42 In addition, a
bipartisan bill was introduced into Congress that would limit deductions under § 170(h) for
certain easement contributions made by partnerships.43 The bill is designed to curb abuses
by promoters of syndicated deals, while still allowing partners in family or other legitimate
conservation partnerships to benefit from the deduction.
V. Case Law
Since 2005, the courts have decided more than 70 cases involving challenges to deductions
claimed with respect to easement donations. More than 100 opinions have been issued in
these cases, some of which were appealed, had a motion for reconsideration filed, or
resulted in opinions addressing different issues. Appendix C lists the cases and opinions as
of April 2019. The cases and opinions are referred to in this outline by case name and
numerical designation (e.g., Belk III, Carpenter I, Palmer Ranch II).

40
See DOJ, Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Sues to Shut Down Promoters of Conservation Easement Tax
Scheme Operating out of Georgia (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-shut-downpromoters-conservation-easement-tax-scheme-operating-out; Complaint, U.S. v. Zak et al., Case 1:18-cv-05774-AT
(N.D. Ga., Dec. 18, 2018). See also Jay Adkisson, DOJ Sues to Shut Down Conservation Easement Tax Shelter
Promoters, Forbes, Personal Finance (Dec. 20, 2018), https://goo.gl/FD5vSP.
41
IRS, Abusive tax shelters, trusts, conservation easements make IRS’ 2019 "Dirty Dozen" list of tax scams to avoid,
(March 19, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/abusive-tax-shelters-trusts-conservation-easements-make-irs-2019dirty-dozen-list-of-tax-scams-to-avoid.
42
U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Grassley, Wyden Launch Probe of Conservation Tax Benefit Abuse, March 27,
2019,
https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/grassley-wyden-launch-probe-of-conservation-tax-benefitabuse.
43
U.S. Congressman Mike Thompson, Thompson and Kelly Introduce Legislation to Help Stop Abuse of Conservation
Tax Incentive, March 28, 2019, https://mikethompson.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/thompson-and-kellyintroduce-legislation-to-help-stop-abuse-of-conservation.

11
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384360

II. Filing a Tax Return Package to Minimize Risk of Audit
•
•
•
•
•
•

Correctly Drafted Conservation Easement Deed
IRS Form 8283 & Supplemental Statement
Qualified Appraisal
Contemporaneous Written Acknowledgment
Correct and Timely Baseline Documentation
Correct and Timely Lender Agreement (if applicable)

A. Correctly Drafted Conservation Easement Deed
1. File Copy of Recorded Conservation Easement Deed. A copy of the correctly
drafted and recorded conservation easement deed should be either (i) filed with IRS
Form 8283, Section B (the appraisal summary) or (ii) if the easement is valued at
more than $500,000, included in the qualified appraisal filed with IRS Form 8283.
a. Best practice is to either (i) file the date stamped copy of the recorded
easement deed with the Form 8283 or (ii) have the appraiser include the
date stamped copy of the recorded easement deed in the appraisal.
b. It is imperative that the appraiser values the easement as described in the
final recorded easement deed rather than in an earlier draft.
c. As noted in the discussion of IRS Form 8283 in Part II.B below, the IRS
has informally suggested that a copy of the qualified appraisal be included
in the package filed with the federal income tax return on which a deduction
for the easement donation is first claimed even if the appraised value of the
easement is $500,000 or less.
Façade easements on buildings in registered historic districts are subject to special
rules. The taxpayer must include with the taxpayer’s return for the year of the
contribution, in addition to the Form 8283: (i) a qualified appraisal, (ii) photos of
the entire exterior of the building, and (iii) a description of all restrictions on the
development of the building.44 A date stamped copy of the recorded easement deed
should be included with these items. If the deduction claimed is more than $10,000,
it will be allowed only if the taxpayer also includes a $500 filing fee.45
2. Include Extensive Recitals. The conservation easement deed should include
extensive recitals clearly indicating the conservation or historic values of the
property that are worthy of protection.
3. “Exclusively for Conservation Purposes” Requirements. To be eligible for a
deduction, the donation of a conservation easement must, among other things, be a
contribution made “exclusively” for one of more of the four “conservation
44
45

See IRC § 170(h)(4)(B)(iii).
See IRC § 170(f)(13); IRS Form 8283-V.
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purposes” enumerated in § 170(h).46 The contribution will not be treated as made
exclusively for conservation purposes unless the conservation purpose is “protected
in perpetuity.” 47 Satisfying the “protected in perpetuity” requirement requires
satisfying all of the following requirements:48
a. the eligible donee requirement,49
b. the restriction on transfer requirement,50
c. the no inconsistent uses requirement, 51
d. the general enforceable in perpetuity requirement, 52
e. the mortgage subordination requirement,53
f. the mineral extraction restrictions requirement,54
g. the baseline documentation, donee notice, donee access, and donee
enforcement requirements,55 and
h. the extinguishment and proceeds requirements.56
Analysis by the IRS and the courts of the “exclusively for conservation purposes”
requirement generally has not been systematic, making the cases somewhat
difficult to categorize. Areas of focus have included whether the purpose is
“protected in perpetuity” despite reserved rights or inconsistent uses, satisfaction
of the conservation purposes test generally, whether the extinguishment and
division of proceeds requirements were satisfied, and whether the mortgage
subordination requirement was satisfied.
4. Extensive Reserved Rights. In Glass, Butler, and Pine Mountain II, the IRS
argued unsuccessfully that, at full exercise of all reserved rights, the conservation
purposes of the easements at issue would not be protected in perpetuity. For
discussion of reserved development rights and the siting of building areas, see Part
II.A.6, 7, and 8 below.

46
IRC § 170(h)(1)(C), (h)(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(a), - 14(d). The four conservation purposes are protection of
habitat, protection of open space, historic preservation, and preservation of land for outdoor recreation by or education
of the general public.
47
IRC § 170(h)(1)(C), (5)(A).
48
See IRC § 170(h)(5)(B) (addressing surface mining); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(1) (“To meet the requirements of
this section, a donation must be exclusively for conservation purposes. See paragraphs (c)(1) and (g)(1) through (g)(6)(ii)
of this section.”). In addition, in explaining the “protected in perpetuity” requirement, the Senate Finance Committee
provided instructions that were incorporated into the regulations as the restriction on transfer and no inconsistent use
requirements of Treasury Regulation §§ 1.170A-14(c)(2) and -14(e)(2). See S. Rep. No. 96-1007, 1980-2 C.B.
49
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1).
50
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(2).
51
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(2), (3).
52
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(1).
53
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(2) (applicable only if the property is subject to a mortgage at the time of the donation).
54
IRC § 170(h)(5)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(4).
55
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i) and (ii). These requirements are applicable only if the “donor reserves rights the
exercise of which may impair the conservation interests associated with the property.” However, that will almost always
be the case. Moreover, it is common practice and recommended that these requirements be satisfied with regard to every
conservation easement donation because they help to ensure the holder will have the information as well as the notice,
access, and enforcement rights needed to properly enforce the easement.
56
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i) and (ii).
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a. Glass. In Glass, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s holding that
two conservation easements protecting small portions of a ten-acre parcel
located along the shoreline of Lake Michigan satisfied the “exclusively” for
habitat protection “conservation purposes” requirement. The IRS argued,
among other things, that the easements failed to satisfy this requirement
because (i) the protected properties were too small, (ii) the taxpayers
reserved too many rights in the easements, and (iii) there were no limits on
building on neighboring properties. The Sixth Circuit rejected those
arguments, finding that (i) neither § 170(h) nor the Treasury Regulations
require that the subject property be a minimum size, 57 (ii) although the
easements reserved various use rights to the taxpayers, both also contained
an overarching restriction prohibiting “[a]ny activity on or use of the
Property that is inconsistent with the purpose of this Conservation
Easement,” and provided that the easement “shall be liberally construed in
favor of the purpose of [the easement, the land trust holder, and the state
conservation easement enabling statute],” and (iii) neither § 170(h) nor the
Treasury Regulations require consideration of neighboring property
owners’ building rights when assessing the deductibility of a conservation
easement. The taxpayers in Glass also provided credible testimony at trial
indicating that exercise of the reserved rights would not be inconsistent with
the habitat protection purpose of the easements, while the IRS failed to
provide any evidence to the contrary. For more on Glass, see Part II.A.5
below.
b. Butler. In Butler, the IRS asserted that the rights retained by the
landowners in the conservation easement deeds meant that the habitat and
open space protection conservation purposes of the easements were not
“protected in perpetuity.” The Tax Court disagreed, finding that the habitat
protection conservation purpose test would still be satisfied even if the
properties were developed to the fullest extent permitted by the easement
deeds.58 However, the holding in Butler should not be viewed as a green
light for retaining extensive development and use rights in a conservation
easement deed for a number of reasons.
(i) The burden of proof regarding satisfaction of the conservation
purposes test, which normally falls on the taxpayer, had shifted to
the IRS.
(ii) The parties disagreed about whether the conservation easement
deeds restricted the location of the building sites. The donors argued
that the deeds incorporated the baseline documentation by reference,
and the baseline included a map stipulating the placement of the
57
For a critique of the Sixth Circuit’s holding on this point, see Jonathan M. Burke, A Critical Analysis of Glass v.
Commissioner: Why Size Should Matter for Conservation Easements, 61 TAX LAWYER 599 (2008).
58
Because the court found that the easements satisfied the habitat protection conservation purposes test it did not address
the open space conservation purposes test.
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building sites in locations consistent with the preservation of the
conservation purposes. The court found that, under Georgia law,
reference in the recorded deeds to the baseline effectively made the
baseline (including the map) part of the recorded deeds, and the
restrictions on the location of the lots in the map were therefore
binding.
(iii) The donors offered some (albeit “sparse”) evidence in the form
of testimony of environmental consultants to support their
contention that the reserved rights were not inconsistent with the
conservation purposes of the easements and, as in Glass, the IRS
failed to introduce any evidence to the contrary.
c. Additional Case Law. After Butler was decided, the IRS informally
indicated that in future cases it intended to hire its own environmental
experts to testify as to whether the conservation purpose of an easement
would be protected in perpetuity upon full exercise of all reserved rights.
As discussed in Part II.A.5 below, the IRS hired its own environmental
experts in Atkinson, PBBM-Rose Hill, and Champions Retreat and was able
to establish that the easements at issue did not satisfy habitat protection
conservation purpose test due, in part, to the reserved rights in the deeds.59
However, in Pine Mountain II, as discussed in Part II.A.6 below, the IRS
again lost the argument that extensive reserved rights in an easement
permitted the subject property to be used in ways inconsistent with the
conservation purposes of the donation because the taxpayer provided expert
testimony (in the form of the land trust’s biologist) that this was not the
case, and the IRS failed to provide any evidence to the contrary.
d. Overarching Restriction. To prevent uses inconsistent with the
conservation purposes of the donation, a conservation easement should
(1) specifically reserve to the grantor (and the grantor’s successors) only
those rights that, even if fully exercised, would be consistent with the
conservation purpose of the easement, (2) specifically prohibit activities
that are inconsistent with the conservation purpose of the easement (such as
subdivision, mining, and industrial uses), and (3) because it is impossible at
the time of conveyance to specify in the deed every conceivable variation
of use, activity, or practice that in the future might have an adverse impact
on the conservation purpose of the easement, include an overarching
restriction prohibiting any activities that are inconsistent with the
conservation purpose of the easement or the perpetual protection of the
property’s conservation values. The overarching restriction is necessary to
prevent the present or a future landowner from claiming that she has the
right to do anything not specifically prohibited by the easement even if it
59

See also IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide, supra note 23, at 18 (“The Tax Court’s reliance on the
Service’s expert reports and testimony in Atkinson demonstrates the importance of expert evidence in these types of
‘protecting natural habitat’ cases.”).
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would be inconsistent with the purpose of the easement or continued
protection of the property’s conservation values.60
e. Liberal Construction Provision. A conservation easement should also
include a provision stating that the parties to the easement (and their
successors) affirmatively agree and intend that, notwithstanding any general
rule of construction to the contrary, the easement shall be liberally construed
in favor of permanently protecting the property’s conservation values and
carrying out the conservation purposes of the easement.61 In the absence of
such a provision, there is a danger that ambiguous terms in the easement
will be construed in favor of free use of land and that the conservation
purposes of the easement will not be deemed “protected in perpetuity” as
required by § 170(h).62
Some state conservation easement enabling statutes mandate that
conservation easements be liberally construed in favor of effecting their
conservation purposes.63 However, given that statutes are subject to change
at any time, every conservation easement deed should nonetheless include
a liberal construction provision.
5. Conservation Purposes Test. Satisfaction of the conservation purposes test was
an issue in Turner, Glass, RP Golf I, Atkinson, PBBM-Rose Hill I and II, Champions
Retreat, Carroll, Herman I, Partita Partners I.64
a. Turner. In Turner, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of
deductions claimed with respect to the donation of a conservation easement
because the donation did not satisfy either the open space or historic
60

See Glass; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200836014.
See, e.g., BYERS & PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK 376, 466-67 (2d ed. 2005).
62
See Wetlands America Trust v. White Cloud Nine Ventures, 782 S.E.2d 131 (Va. 2016), in which the court held that
the common law rule of construction requiring land use restrictions to be interpreted in favor of free use of land applied
to the conservation easement at issue and the enabling statutes in Virginia do not abrogate that rule of construction. There
was a strong dissent:
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the common law principle of strict construction in favor of free use of
land no longer applies to conservation easements. The strict construction principle was applied under the
common law because easements in gross, including negative easements in gross, were disfavored as a matter
of public policy. Today, and for at least the last four decades, Virginia public policy strongly favors the
conservation of land and open spaces…. The oft-stated policy of the Commonwealth in favor of conservation
easements such as the type at issue here could not be a clearer rejection of the common law strict construction
principle.
See id. See also Nancy A. McLaughlin, Interpreting Conservation Easements, 29 PROB. & PROP. 30 (2015) (explaining
why conservation easements should be interpreted in favor of carrying out their public-benefiting conservation purposes
rather than in favor of free use of land), available at http://bit.ly/1KSyi2U.
63
See 32 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5055(c)(2) (“Any general rule of construction to the contrary notwithstanding, conservation
or preservation easements shall be liberally construed in favor of the grants contained therein to effect the purposes of
those easements and the policy and purpose of this act”); W. VA. CODE § 20-12-5(b) (“Notwithstanding provision of law
to the contrary, conservation and preservation easements shall be liberally construed in favor of the grants contained
therein to effect the purposes of those easements and the policy and purpose of this article”).
64
See also Patel v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 395 (2012) (while contribution of a taxpayer’s house to a volunteer fire department
for destruction by burning during training exercises serves to further the protection of property by providing valuable
training experience for volunteer firefighters, it does not satisfy the conservation purpose test of § 170(h)).
61
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preservation conservation purposes tests. Turner involved a purported
donation to Fairfax County, Virginia, of a conservation easement
encumbering a 29.3-acre parcel located in a historic overlay district.65 The
subject property is in the general vicinity of Mount Vernon, President
George Washington’s 500-acre residential estate; adjacent to President
Washington's Grist Mill; and in close proximity to the Woodlawn
Plantation, which was built in 1805 on land owned by President
Washington. In obtaining an appraisal of the easement, the donor (an
attorney whose practice concentrated on real estate transactions)
represented that 60 residences could be built on the 29.3-acre parcel and
that the easement reduced the number of permitted residences to 30. In
reality, however, zoning regulations already limited development to 30
residences because slightly more than half of the parcel (15.04 acres) was
situated within a designated 100-year floodplain.66
The Tax Court held that the easement did not satisfy the open space
conservation purpose test because it did not limit the size of the residences
that could be built on the 15 acres (either in square footage or height) and
did not contain any provisions to protect the views from the nearby historic
sites. The easement also did not satisfy the historic preservation
conservation purpose test because it did not preserve a historic structure or
historically important land area. The court explained:
Here there has been no preservation of open space. Nor [has the
donor] preserved anything that is historically unique about the
property or the surrounding historical areas. [The donor] simply
developed the property to its maximum yield within the property's
zoning classification.67
b. Glass. In Glass, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s holding that
two conservation easements protecting small portions of a ten-acre parcel
located along the shoreline of Lake Michigan satisfied the habitat protection
conservation purposes test. The IRS argued that the easements failed to
satisfy this test because, among other things, threatened species had not
actually been sighted living on the properties. The Sixth Circuit rejected that
argument, finding that (i) the habitat protection conservation purposes test
can be satisfied if the easement protects property that is potential habitat for
rare, threatened, or endangered species, and (ii) one of the taxpayers and the
executive director of the donee land trust credibly testified that the property
65

The donation is referred to as “purported” because Fairfax County did not sign or acknowledge the conservation
easement deed or sign the Form 8283.
66
Although the donor could have attempted to obtain approval to rezone the parcel, the court noted that obtaining such
approval would have been time-consuming and costly, and success was not guaranteed.
67
See also Joe Stephens, IRS Gets ‘First Big Win’ in Push to Stem Abuse of Conservation Tool, WASH. POST A01 (June
4, 2006) (describing the transaction as a $3.1 million donation that promised not to overdevelop scenic land once owned
by George Washington and located down the road from Mount Vernon, but developers clear-cut acres of trees on the
property and erected 29 sprawling homes that preservationists today deride as ‘McMansions.’”).
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was a “famous roosting spot” for bald eagles and that there were threatened
plant species on the properties. As explained in Part II.A.4 above, the Sixth
Circuit also rejected the IRS’s arguments that the easements failed to satisfy
the habitat protection conservation purposes text because (i) the protected
properties were too small, (ii) the taxpayers reserved too many rights in the
easements, and (iii) there were no limits on building on neighboring
properties.
c. RP Golf I. In RP Golf I, the IRS asserted that the conservation easement
donation at issue was not made “exclusively for conservation purposes,” in
part because the Missouri conservation policy the taxpayer referenced in the
easement deed was limited to certain areas of the state and there was no
evidence that the subject property was located in such an area on the date of
the donation. The taxpayer was forced to concede that the easement was not
made pursuant to a “clearly delineated governmental conservation
policy.”68
d. Atkinson. In Atkinson, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of
$7.88 million of deductions claimed with regard to the conveyance of
conservation easements encumbering land on and adjacent to golf courses
located in a gated and guarded residential community in North Carolina.
The court determined that the easements, which were conveyed to the North
American Land Trust, did not satisfy either the habitat or open space
protection conservation purposes tests. The properties subject to the
easements consisted of noncontiguous tracts (i.e., fairways, greens, teeing
grounds, ranges, roughs, ponds, and wetland areas); residential lots
bordered most of the tracts; and a concrete golf cart path winded its way
through the tracts. The taxpayers argued that each of the subject properties
had independent conservation significance and contributed to the ecological
viability of surrounding conservation areas. The IRS focused on the
operation of the golf courses and argued that the rights retained in the
easements negated any purported conservation purpose.
Unlike in Glass and Butler, in Atkinson both the taxpayers and the IRS
presented expert environmental testimony to establish their respective
positions regarding the habitat protection conservation purposes test. In
holding that the conservation easements did not satisfy this test, the Tax
Court noted, among other things, that the most significant ecological
features on the subject properties—the longleaf pine “remnants”—were not
maintained in a relatively natural state worthy of conservation and were not
protected in any event because the easements permitted cutting and removal
of the trees; very few of the ponds had a natural edge and the few edges that
68
The court found that material facts regarding the easement’s preservation of a natural habitat continued to be in dispute.
The court ultimately did not rule on that issue because it sustained the IRS’s disallowance of the deduction on the ground
that the taxpayer failed to obtain mortgage subordination agreements at the time of the easement’s donation. See Part
II.F.2 below.
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existed were regularly sprayed with pesticides; there were no natural fruits
and seeds for foraging on the properties; the properties provided no cover
for animals; and animal migration was deterred by the residential
development surrounding each of the noncontiguous tracts, the level of
human activity, and the frequent watering. In addition, the only birds the
IRS’s environmental expert observed on one of the properties were geese,
which the community attempted to “control” (i.e., drive away) using a
border collie. The court also found that the use of pesticides and other
chemicals in the operation of the golf course injured the ecosystems on the
subject properties and, thus, violated the “no inconsistent use” requirement
of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(e)(2). The court concluded that
wildlife and plants were not “most likely” to be found and did not “normally
live” on the properties subject to the easements, but declined to decide
whether operating a golf course is inherently inconsistent with the
conservation purpose of protecting relatively natural habitat.
With regard to the open space conservation purposes test, the Tax Court
noted that the taxpayers did not mention or provide any analysis of
governmental conservation policies in their briefs, and the court deemed
that argument abandoned. The taxpayers also failed to establish that
preservation of the subject properties was for the scenic enjoyment of the
general public. Since the golf courses were in a gated and guarded
community and ringed by houses, the court found that the general public
did not have visual access to the properties. The taxpayers argued that the
general public had visual access because most of the population of the Town
of St. James lived within the gated community. The court, however, did not
deem the population of one town to constitute “the general public.”69
e. PBBM-Rose Hill. In PBBM-Rose Hill I, the Tax Court, in a Bench
Opinion, sustained the IRS’s disallowance of a $15.16 million deduction
claimed by the PBBM-Rose Hill partnership for the conveyance of a
conservation easement encumbering a 27-hole golf course interspersed
among houses in a gated and guarded residential community in South
Carolina. Among other things, the court determined that the easement,
which was conveyed to the North American Land Trust, did not satisfy the
habitat protection, open space protection, or outdoor recreation for the
general public conservation purposes tests.
Unlike in Glass and Butler, both the taxpayer and the IRS presented expert
environmental testimony to establish their respective positions regarding
the habitat protection conservation purposes test. In determining that the
easement failed that test, the Tax Court explained that the IRS’s expert
testified credibly that, among other things, most of the encumbered property
consisted of the golf course, which was dominated by non-native grasses,
69
For media coverage, see Richard Rubin, IRS Tees Off on Golf Courses’ Green Tax Claims, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14, 2016).
Atkinson is on appeal in the Fourth Circuit.
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required continued application of fungicides and pesticides, and was not
conducive to wildlife; the quality of the ponds on the property was similar
to that of waterways in urban areas; and many of the trees on the property
were in isolated patches or thin strips.
In finding that the easement failed the open space conservation purposes
test, the Tax Court explained that the easement (i) did not preserve the
property for the scenic enjoyment of the general public because it mainly
benefited the homeowners in the gated and guarded residential community
and (ii) did not preserve the property pursuant to a clearly delineated
governmental conservation policy because the relevant policies addressed
ecological preservation and the IRS’s expert testified that the ecological
value of the easement was low.
In finding that the easement failed to preserve the property for the outdoor
recreation of the general public, the Tax Court noted that (i) there were
conflicting provisions in the easement regarding public access and (ii) the
owner of the property (the homeowners association) had converted a
significant portion of the property into a private park.
The case was appealed, and in PBBM-Rose Hill II, while affirming the
denial of the deduction,70 the Fifth Circuit held that the easement satisfied
the outdoor recreation for the general public conservation purposes test71
because (i) the provision in the easement requiring that the property remain
open for substantial and regular outdoor-recreation use by the general public
was deemed to be “specific” and thus given greater weight than the
conflicting provision that stated that nothing in the deed shall be construed
to create any right of public access to the property, which was deemed to be
“general,” and (ii) in determining whether the public-access requirement is
satisfied, the focus should generally be on the terms of the deed and not on
the actual use of the land after the easement’s donation. As the Fifth Circuit
noted, however: “The public does not have access to the park; a sign on the
road to the park states ‘[p]roperty owners, residents & guests only beyond
this point.’” Accordingly, the IRS and the South Carolina Attorney General
could seek to sanction the North American Land Trust for failing to enforce
the “specific” public access provision of the easement given that such
failure benefits the homeowners in the gated and guarded community (i.e.,
provides a private benefit). It also would be helpful for the IRS to provide
guidance regarding what is meant by “substantial and regular use by the
general public” to help ensure that only easements that actually provide a
significant benefits to the general public are subsidized through the § 170(h)
deduction.
70

As discussed in Part II.A.12, the Fifth Circuit determined that the clause included in the easement deed providing for
the payment of a share of the proceeds to the holder following extinguishment did not comply with the proceeds
requirement in Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) and, thus, the partnership was not entitled to a deduction. The
Fifth Circuit also agreed with the Tax Court that the easement had a value of only $100,000.
71
This was the only conservation purposes test at issue on appeal.
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f. Champions Retreat. In Champions Retreat, the Tax Court sustained the
IRS’s disallowance of a $10.427 million deduction claimed by the
Champions Retreat LLC for the conveyance of a conservation easement
encumbering most of a 27-hole golf course interspersed among houses in a
gated and guarded residential community in Evans, Georgia. The court
determined that the easement, which was conveyed to the North American
Land Trust, did not satisfy the habitat or open space protection conservation
purposes tests.
Unlike in Glass and Butler, both the taxpayer and the IRS presented expert
environmental testimony to establish their respective positions regarding
the habitat protection conservation purposes test. In determining that the
easement failed that test, the Tax Court noted, among other things, that:
(i) the golf course property had very little plant species diversity and the
wetland, forested, and open pond areas that had survived the golf course
development accounted for only a little over 16% of the property,
(ii) environmentally hazardous fungicides, herbicides, and insecticides were
applied to the property, the staff members applying these chemicals were
required to wear protective gear including gloves and respirators, and some
of the holes were specifically designed to drain into the creeks, ponds, and
remaining wetland and forested areas on the property, (iii) the streams on
the property exhibited little variety of aquatic life and one emitted a
sulfurous odor and had an oily sheen, and (iv) while the LLC argued that
the property provided a habitat for several species of conservation concern,
including the southern fox squirrel and the denseflower knotweed, the
squirrel was still legally hunted in Georgia (hunters could kill up to 12 per
day during the six-month hunting season), and the bottomland forest areas
that could provide habitat for the denseflower knotweed constituted less
than 17% of the property and were used as drainage for the holes, thus
subjecting those areas to the chemicals used on the course.
In finding that the easement failed the open space conservation purposes
test, the Tax Court explained that the easement did not preserve the property
for the scenic enjoyment of the general public because the property was
physically accessible only to members and their guests through a gate
manned 24 hours a day, visual access to the property was very limited, and
the annual charity events held at the golf club did not provide sufficient
physical access to public. In addition, the court determined that the
easement did not preserve the property pursuant to a clearly delineated
governmental conservation policy because the policies cited by the LLC did
not satisfy the Treasury Regulation requirements and one of the policies was
focused on development rather than conservation.
g. Carroll. In Carroll, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of
deductions claimed with regard to the donation of a conservation because
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the easement contained a noncompliant “proceeds” clause.72 However, the
court also held that the easement satisfied the open space conservation
purpose test under § 170(h)(4)(A)(iii)(II), which requires that preservation
of the property be “pursuant to a clearly delineated Federal, State, or local
governmental conservation policy” and “yield a significant public benefit.”
The easement, which encumbers a 21-acre property located in a historic
district in Maryland, was granted to the Maryland Environmental Trust
(MET) and the Land Preservation Trust (LPT), as joint holders. MET is a
quasi-public entity that the Maryland legislature established in 1967 to
conserve the environment; it is both a unit of the Maryland Department of
Natural Resources and governed by a board of trustees. LPT is a charitable
conservation organization.
In interpreting the governmental conservation policy requirement, Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(iii)(B) provides that:
Acceptance of an easement by an agency of the Federal Government
or by an agency of a state or local government (or by a commission,
authority, or similar body duly constituted by the state or local
government and acting on behalf of the state or local government)
tends to establish the requisite clearly delineated governmental
policy, although such acceptance, without more, is not sufficient.
The more rigorous the review process by the governmental agency,
the more the acceptance of the easement tends to establish the
requisite clearly delineated governmental policy. For example, in a
state where the legislature has established an Environmental Trust
to accept gifts to the state which meet certain conservation purposes
and to submit the gifts to a review that requires the approval of the
state’s highest officials, acceptance of a gift by the Trust tends to
establish the requisite clearly delineated governmental policy.
However, if the Trust merely accepts such gifts without a review
process, the requisite clearly delineated governmental policy is not
established.
In finding that the easement in Carroll satisfied the open space conservation
purpose test, the Tax Court explained that the thoroughness of MET’s
easement-review process, combined with the fact that Maryland’s highest
officials (the Governor, the Comptroller, and the Treasurer of Maryland)
approved the easement, established that the easement preserves open space
pursuant to a clearly delineated governmental conservation policy. The Tax
Court also determined that preservation of the 21-acre property yielded a
significant public benefit because (i) the property was in a highly desirable
area under development pressure, (ii) the property was subject to a
restrictive type of zoning established to foster and protect agricultural lands
in certain areas, (iii) the valley in which the property was located was
72

See Part II.A.12 below.
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specifically designated in the county’s Master Plan as an agricultural
preservation area, and (iv) four properties adjacent to the property were
encumbered by conservation easements held by MET or a state agency.
h. Herman I. In Herman I the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance
of a $21.8 million deduction for the conveyance in 2003 of a facade
easement to the National Architectural Trust. The easement encumbered
10,000 unspecified square feet of the approximately 22,000 square feet of
unused development rights (UDRs) above a certified historic structure (or
45 percent of the UDRs). 73 The easement did not, however, prevent
alteration or demolition of the structure or prohibit the building of six stories
over any half (front, back, or side) of the structure. Accordingly, the court
found that the easement did not protect either the structure or the historic
significance of the underlying land and, thus, did not satisfy the historic
preservation conservation purposes test. In 2006, § 170(h) was amended to
expressly require that, to be deductible, a façade easement with respect to a
building in a registered historic district must preserve the entire exterior of
the building (including the front, sides, rear, and height of the building).74
i. Partita Partners I. In Partita Partners I, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York sustained the IRS’s disallowance of a $4.186
million deduction for the conveyance in 2008 of a façade easement to the
Trust for Architectural Easements (formerly the National Architectural
Trust). The easement did not preserve the entire exterior of the building as
required by § 170(h). Partita Partners LLC argued that, because any
construction would require the approval of the Trust for Architectural
Easements, alteration of the exterior of the building was unlikely. The court
rejected that argument, explaining that § 170(h) requires a restriction that
preserves the entire exterior of the building, not a conditional restriction that
delegates to the grantee future decisions regarding development of the
exterior.
6. Extinguishments (Including Swaps) Require a Judicial Proceeding;
Building Areas; Amendment Clauses. The conservation easement deed should
include provisions satisfying the restriction on transfer and extinguishment
requirements of Treasury Regulation §§ 1.170A-14(c)(2) and -14(g)(6), which are
related.75 Sample “Restriction on Transfer” and “Extinguishment” Provisions are
included in Part II.A.11 below.
a. Carpenter I. In Carpenter I, the Tax Court held that conservation
easements extinguishable by mutual agreement of the parties, even if
73
The certified historic structure was an eleven-story apartment building located on Fifth Avenue in New York City that
had been designed by the late Henry Otis Chapman in 1923 in the neo-Italianate Renaissance style of architecture.
74
See IRC § 170(h)(4)(B)(i). See also JCT Explanation of Pension Protection Act of 2006, supra note 17, at 294-95.
75
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(2). In the last sentence of this regulation, the cross-reference to (b)(3) should be to
(b)(2), and the cross-reference to (g)(5)(ii) should be to (g)(6); the Treasury failed to update the cross-references when it
finalized the proposed regulations in 1986.
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subject to a standard such as “impossibility,” fail as a matter of law to satisfy
the judicial extinguishment requirements in Treasury Regulation § 1.170A–
14(g)(6)(i).
(i) In support of its holding, the Tax Court explained:
Extinguishment by mutual consent of the parties does not
guarantee that the conservation purpose of the donated
property will continue to be protected in perpetuity. As at
least one commentator has noted, the “restrictions [in a deed]
are supposed to be perpetual in the first place, and the
decision to terminate them should not be [made] solely by
interested parties. With the decision-making process pushed
into a court of law, the legal tension created by such judicial
review will generally tend to create a fair result.” Small,
Federal Tax Law of Conservation Easements 16–4 (1986).
The court referenced this passage again in reaffirming and
supplementing its opinion in Carpenter II.
(ii) With regard to federal and state law interaction, the court in
Carpenter I explained:
To determine whether the conservation easement deeds
comply with requirements for the…deduction under Federal
tax law, we must look to State law to determine the effect of
the deeds. State law determines the nature of the property
rights, and Federal law determines the appropriate tax
treatment of those rights.76
(iii) The court in Carpenter I also held that the “so-remote-as-to-benegligible” standard of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(3) does
not modify the extinguishment requirements of Treasury Regulation
§ 1.170A–14(g)(6)(i). Accordingly, failure to comply with the
extinguishment requirements cannot be cured by a showing that the
possibility of extinguishment is so remote as to be negligible.
b. Carpenter II. In Carpenter II, the Tax Court confirmed that
“extinguishment by judicial proceedings is mandatory.” 77 The court
76
See also Patel v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 395 (2012) (State law determines only which sticks are in a person’s bundle. . . .
Once property rights are determined under State law, as announced by the highest court of the State, the tax consequences
are decided under Federal law).
77
See also IRS General Information Letter on extinguishment, supra note 26 and accompanying text. The Land Trust
Alliance’s 2007 amendment report instructs:
If the conservation easement was the subject of a federal income tax deduction, then Internal Revenue Code
Section 170(h) and the Treasury Regulations Section 1.170A-14 apply…. The easement must be transferable
only to another government entity or qualified charitable organization that agrees to continue to enforce the
easement. The easement can only be extinguished by the holder through a judicial proceeding, upon a finding
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specifically rejected the taxpayers’ arguments that the Treasury Regulations
contemplate alternatives to judicial extinguishment and that the judicial
proceeding requirement is “merely a safe harbor.”
The court also rejected the taxpayers’ argument that the First Circuit’s
decision in Kaufman III was an intervening change in the law that required
the court to reconsider its holding in Carpenter I. The court explained that,
not only is Kaufman III not binding in the Tenth Circuit (to which Carpenter
would have been appealed), Kaufman III addressed legal issues different
from those present in Carpenter.78 The court also noted that it does not read
Kaufman III as sanctioning “putting into the hands of the parties to a
conservation agreement the authority to determine when to extinguish the
conservation easement so long as the donee organization gets its shares of
the proceeds of a subsequent sale.”
c. Mitchell II. In Mitchell II, the Tax Court similarly rejected the argument
that Kaufman III was an intervening change in the law requiring it to
reconsider its holding in Mitchell I.79 The court explained that, not only is
Kaufman III not binding in the Tenth Circuit (to which Mitchell was
appealed and affirmed), Kaufman III addressed legal issues different from
those present in Mitchell.80 The court reiterated that Treasury Regulation
1.170A-14(g)(6) is not “merely...a safe harbor,” and the specific provisions
of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(1) through (g)(6) “are mandatory
and may not be ignored.” The court further rejected the taxpayer’s argument
that the court should “draw a general rule” with respect to the in-perpetuity
requirement of § 170(h)(5)(A) and Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)
from the analysis in Kaufman III. The taxpayer had asserted: “The
regulation emphasizes perpetuating an easement’s purpose as opposed to
the conservation easement itself. The proceeds are protected which is the
goal of the law.” The Tax Court disagreed, stating: “Nowhere in Kaufman
III did the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit state a general rule that
protecting the proceeds from an extinguishment of a conservation easement
would satisfy the in-perpetuity requirements of section § 1.170A-14(g)...
generally.” In other words, the court held that § 170(h) requires perpetuation
of the conservation easement itself, not conservation purposes generally.

that continued use of the encumbered land for conservation purposes has become “impossible or impractical,”
and with the payment to the holder of a share of proceeds from a subsequent sale or development of the land
to be used for similar conservation purposes. To the extent an amendment amounts to an extinguishment, the
land trust must satisfy these requirements.
Land Tr. Alliance, Amending Conservation Easements: Evolving Practices and Legal Principles 24 (2007).
78
Kaufman III involved interpretation of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(1) (the “general enforceable in perpetuity”
requirement) and Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) (the “proceeds” requirement). Carpenter, on the other hand,
involved interpretation of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A- 14(g)(6)(i) (the “extinguishment” requirement)).
79
In Mitchell I the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of a deduction for an easement donation because the
taxpayer failed to obtain a mortgage subordination agreement at the time of the gift. See Part II.F.2.
80
Mitchell involved interpretation of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(2) (the “mortgage subordination”
requirement).
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Mitchell was appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed the Tax Court
(see Part II.F.2 below).
d. Belk. In Belk III, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court in holding
that a conservation easement that authorizes the parties to agree to
“substitutions” or “swaps” (i.e., to remove some or all of the original
protected land from the easement, or unencumber that land, in exchange for
the protection of similar contiguous land upon the approval of the donee
land trust) is not eligible for a deduction. The Fourth Circuit explained that
such an easement is not “a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use
which may be made of the real property” as required under § 170(h)(2)(C).
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court that, to be eligible for a
deduction under § 170(h), a donor must grant an easement with regard to a
“single, immutable” or “defined and static” parcel.
(i) The Easement. The easement at issue in Belk encumbers a 184acre semi-private golf course located in a high-end residential
development near Charlotte, North Carolina. The Belks donated the
easement to the Smoky Mountain National Land Trust and claimed
a $10.5 million deduction. 81 The easement deed authorizes the
landowner to remove land from the easement in exchange for adding
an equal or greater amount of contiguous land, provided that, in the
opinion of the grantee:
• the substitute property is of the same or better ecological
stability,
• the substitution will have no adverse effect on the
conservation purposes of the easement, and
• the fair market value of the “easement interest” placed on the
substitute land will be at least equal to or greater than the fair
market value of the “easement interest” extinguished with
regard to the land removed from the easement.
(ii) Single Narrow Exception to Perpetuity. In affirming the Tax
Court’s holding that the Belks were not eligible for a deduction, the
Fourth Circuit explained that the “Treasury Regulations offer a
single—and exceedingly narrow—exception to the requirement that
a conservation easement impose a perpetual use restriction”:
[if a] subsequent unexpected change in the conditions
surrounding the property…make[s] impossible or impractical
the continued use of the property for conservation purposes, the
conservation purpose can nonetheless be treated as protected in
perpetuity if the restrictions are extinguished by judicial
proceeding and all of the donee’s proceeds…from a subsequent
sale or exchange of the property are used by the donee
81

The Smoky Mountain National Land Trust has since changed its name to Southwest Regional Land Conservancy.
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organization in a manner consistent with the conservation
purposes of the original contribution. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A14(g)(6)(i) (emphasis added by the court).
“[A]bsent these ‘unexpected’ and extraordinary circumstances,”
explained the Fourth Circuit, “real property placed under easement
must remain there in perpetuity in order for the donor of the
easement to claim a charitable deduction.”
(iii) Critical Requirements. The Fourth Circuit explained that
permitting a deduction for the donation of the Belk easement would
enable taxpayers to bypass several requirements critical to the
statutory and regulatory schemes governing deductions for
charitable contributions.
•

For example, permitting the Belks to change the boundaries
of the easement would render “meaningless” the
requirement that an easement donor obtain a qualified
appraisal because the appraisal would no longer be an
accurate reflection of the value of the easement, parts of
which could be clawed back. “It matters not,” said the court,
“that the Easement requires that the removed property be
replaced with property of ‘equal or greater value,’ because
the purpose of the appraisal requirement is to enable the
Commissioner, not the donee or donor, to verify the value of
a donation. The Easement’s substitution provision places the
Belks beyond the reach of the Commissioner in this regard.”

•

Similarly, the baseline documentation requirement “would
also be skirted if the borders of an easement could shift.”
“Not only does this regulation confirm that a conservation
easement must govern a defined and static parcel,” explained
the court, “it also makes clear that holding otherwise would
deprive donees of the ability to ensure protection of
conservation interests by, for instance, examination of maps
and photographs of ‘the protected property.’”

(iv) Kaufman and Simmons Distinguishable. The Belks argued that
Kaufman III and Simmons II support the notion that § 170(h) does
not require that easement restrictions attach to a single, defined
parcel. The Fourth Circuit rejected that argument, explaining that
those “out-of-circuit” cases:
plausibly stand only for the proposition that a donation will not
be rendered ineligible simply because the donee reserves its
right not to enforce the easement. They do not support the Belks’
view that the grant of a conservation easement qualifies for a
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charitable deduction even if the easement may be relocated.
Indeed, as we have explained, such a holding would violate the
plain meaning of § 170(h)(2)(C).82
(v) Federal Law Controls. The Belks argued that, because North
Carolina law permits parties to amend or swap easements, like a
right-of-way easement between neighbors, not permitting swaps
would render all conservation easements in North Carolina
ineligible for a deduction under § 170(h). The Fourth Circuit found
this argument “unpersuasive,” explaining:
whether state property and contract law permits a substitution in
an easement is irrelevant to the question of whether federal tax
law permits a charitable deduction for the donation of such an
easement…§ 170(h)(2)(C) requires that the gift of a
conservation easement on a specific parcel of land be granted in
perpetuity to qualify for a federal charitable deduction,
notwithstanding the fact that state law may permit an easement
to govern for some shorter period of time. Thus, an easement
that, like the one at hand, grants a restriction for less than a
perpetual term, may be a valid conveyance under state law, but
is still ineligible for a charitable deduction under federal law.
With the exception of North Dakota, which limits the duration of
any easement created in the State to 99 years, it appears that the
parties to a conservation easement can include provisions in the deed
to comply with the federal tax law perpetuity requirements and,
provided the easement is drafted appropriately, those provisions will
be legally binding on both the landowner and the holder even though
they impose conditions on the transfer or extinguishment of the
easement that may be different or more restrictive than those
imposed by state law (see Parts II.A. 9, 10, and 11 below, discussing
the interaction between state and federal law).
(vi) Savings Clause Did Not Save Deduction. The substitution
provision in the Belk conservation easement provided that
substitutions become final when they are reflected in a formal
recorded “amendment.” The amendment provision in the easement
provided that the land trust could not agree to any amendment that
would result in the easement failing to qualify as a qualified
82
In Simmons II, the D.C. Circuit implicitly rejected the argument of the amici curiae (the National Trust for Historic
Preservation et al.) that land trusts should be permitted to agree with developers to extinguish perpetual easements on
some properties to allow development of those properties in exchange for the receipt of easements on other properties.
The D.C. Circuit held, in part, that an “eligible donee” must have a “commitment to protect the conservation purposes of
the donation” and “the resources to enforce the restrictions” and that a tax-exempt organization would fail to enforce a
conservation easement “at its peril.” The D.C. Circuit also concluded that the donated easements at issue in Simmons II
“will prevent in perpetuity any changes to the properties inconsistent with conservation purposes.”
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conservation contribution under § 170(h) or the applicable
regulations. The Belks referred to this latter provision as a “savings
clause.” They argued that, if the Fourth Circuit found that the
substitution provision violated the requirements of § 170(h), the
savings clause would render the substitution provision inoperable,
thus making the easement eligible for the deduction. In other words,
the Belks argued that the savings clause would operate to negate a
right clearly articulated in the easement (the right to substitute
property), but only if triggered by an adverse determination by the
court.
The Fourth Circuit dismissed this argument, noting that the Belks
were asking the court to employ the savings clause to rewrite the
easement in response to the court’s holding, which the court was
unwilling to do. The court refused to condone such “trifling with the
judicial process.” The court also explained that holding for the Belks
“would dramatically hamper the Commissioner’s enforcement
power. If every taxpayer could rely on a savings clause to void, after
the fact, a disqualifying deduction…enforcement of the Internal
Revenue Code would grind to a halt.”
The Fourth Circuit also rejected the Belks’ “last-ditch” argument—
that the savings clause was designed “to accommodate
evolving…interpretation of Section 170(h)”—explaining
the statutory language of § 170(h)(2)(C) has not “evolved” since
the provision was enacted in 1980…. The simple truth is this:
the Easement was never consistent with § 170(h), a fact that
brings with it adverse tax consequences. The Belks cannot now
simply reform the Easement because they do not wish to suffer
those consequences.
e. Balsam Mountain. In Balsam Mountain, the Tax Court held that a
conservation easement that authorized the parties, for a period of up to five
years, to remove up to 5% of the land from the easement in exchange for
protecting a similar amount of contiguous land was not eligible for a
deduction under § 170(h).
(i) The Easement. The easement at issue in Balsam Mountain, which
was granted to the North American Land Trust (NALT) on 22 acres
in North Carolina, allowed the landowner to, for five years
following the donation, make alterations to the boundaries of the
area protected by the easement, subject to the following conditions:
• the total amount of land protected by the easement could not
be reduced,
• land added to the easement had to be contiguous to the
originally protected land,
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•
•
•

land added to the easement had to, in NALT’s reasonable
judgment, make an equal or greater contribution to the
easement’s conservation purpose,
the “location and reconfiguration of a boundary” could not,
in NALT’s judgment, result in any material adverse effect
on the easement’s conservation purposes, and
no more than 5% of the originally protected land could be
removed from the easement as a result of such alterations.

(ii) Belk Not Distinguishable. Based on Belk, the Tax Court held
that the Balsam Mountain easement was not “a restriction (granted
in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the real property”
as required by § 170(h)(2)(C) and, thus, was not eligible for a
deduction. The donor argued that Belk was distinguishable because
the Belk easement allowed for the substitution of all of the land
originally protected by the easement, while the Balsam Mountain
easement allowed for the substitution of only 5% of the originally
protected land. The Tax Court was not persuaded. While the court
agreed that the Belk and Balsam Mountain easements were different,
it said “the difference does not matter.” For five years following the
donation, the donor, with the approval of NALT, could change the
boundaries of the area protected by the easement (i.e., extinguish the
original easement in part without satisfying the judicial
extinguishment, impossibility or impracticality, or proceeds
requirements). Accordingly, the easement was not an interest in an
identifiable, specific piece of real property and, thus, was not
deductible.
(iii) The holdings in Belk and Balsam Mountain prohibiting swaps
are consistent with Carpenter I and II, in which the Tax Court held
that extinguishment of a tax-deductible easement requires a judicial
proceeding. Removing land from a conservation easement, whether
in connection with a swap or otherwise, constitutes an
extinguishment of the easement with regard to the removed land. It
allows the removed land to be used for previously prohibited
purposes, such as development, thus permitting the conservation
values of the removed land, which had previously been protected in
perpetuity, to be destroyed. The holdings in Belk and Balsam
Mountain are also consistent with Congress’s admonition in the
legislative history “that provisions allowing deductions for
conservation easements should be directed at the preservation of
unique or otherwise significant land areas or structures,” as well as
the detailed threshold conservation purpose and other qualification
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and valuation requirements that must be met to be eligible for a
deduction under § 170(h).83
f. Bosque Canyon Ranch. In Bosque Canyon Ranch, the Fifth Circuit
majority vacated the Tax Court’s holding that two conservation easements
that permitted 47 unencumbered 5-acre homesites to be moved around the
properties subject to the easements with the approval of the holder (North
American Land Trust, or NALT) violated § 170(h)(2)(C)’s “granted in
perpetuity” requirement. The Tax Court determined that, as in Belk, the
easements permitted property that was originally protected by the
easements to lose that protection. The Fifth Circuit majority held that Belk
was distinguishable for the following reasons.
•

The easements allowed only the homesite parcels’ boundaries to be
changed and then only (1) within the tracts that are subject to the
easements and (2) without increasing the acreage of the homesite
parcel in question. The easements did not allow any change in the
exterior boundaries of the easements or in their acreages. Thus,
neither the exterior boundaries nor the total acreage of the easements
would ever change: only the lot lines of one or more the five-acre
homesite parcels were potentially subject to change and then only
(1) within the easements and (2) with NALT’s consent.

•

The IRS’s expert reportedly confirmed that the unencumbered
homesite parcels had roughly the same per-acre value as the rest of
the ranch that was encumbered by the easements. Thus, changing
the boundaries of some of the homesite parcels would not return any
value to the easement donors.

•

The development plan for the ranch at the time of the trial indicated
that (1) the vast majority of the homesites would be tightly clustered,
largely contiguous, and located in the northernmost tip of the ranch;
(2) together, the homesites closely resembled a typical suburban
subdivision; (3) almost every homesite shared one or two common
side line boundaries with one or more other homesites; and (4) most
homesites were located on or in close proximity to the only road
inside the easements, which road provided the sole access to the
nearest public roads. Given this subdivision-like layout and the
homesites’ contiguity or close proximity to each other and to the
only interior road providing ingress and egress to and from the
public roads, “the plan visually eschewed any realistic likelihood of
significant future changes in homesite location—at most, only
theoretical or hypothetical changes.”

83
S. Rep. No. 96-1007, 1980-2 C.B. 599, at 603. See also supra note 25 and accompanying text, discussing IRS General
Information Letter regarding swaps
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The majority also determined that any homesite parcel adjustments would
be “de minimis” and “common-sense reasoning” indicated “that an
easement may be modified to promote the underlying conservation
interests.” Finally, the majority held that “the usual strict construction of
intentionally adopted tax loopholes is not applicable to grants of
conservation easements made pursuant to § 170(h)” and, instead, “the
ordinary standard of statutory construction” should apply.
Fifth Circuit Judge Dennis issued a strong dissent in Bosque. He pointed out
that the statutory requirement of a qualified appraisal would be rendered
meaningless if a donor were permitted to change the boundaries of a
conservation easement after the deduction was claimed. He disagreed that
homesite parcel adjustments would constitute de minimis changes,
explaining that there is no time limit within which the homesite
modifications must occur and there is no limit upon the distance or the
number of times a homesite can be relocated within the outer boundaries of
the tract.
Judge Dennis argued that the Bosque easement is not distinguishable from
the Belk easement because the forty-seven homesites were not a part of the
land protected by the conservation easement. By permitting changes to the
location of the homesite parcels, the easement authorized the removal of
previously-protected conservation habitat from the easement and
conversion of that habitat into residential development. In other words, the
substitutions would change “the real property” that is subject to the
easement.
Judge Dennis also rejected reliance on the existing development plan for the
ranch, focusing instead on what could be done over the perpetual life of the
conservation easement. He noted:
there is nothing in the modification provision that would stop the
limited partners from later deciding that they would rather not be
organized as a stereotypical subdivision and spread the sites across
the tract...there is nothing to prevent a limited partner from seeking
modification of his or her homesite even after a ranch home has been
constructed...
Judge Dennis further pointed out that there was nothing in the record to
suggest that the movable-homesite provision was designed to promote
conservation interests. Rather, it appeared that the provision would more
likely be used to benefit the partnerships and homeowners rather than
conservation goals. He explained that, because most of the homesites are
grouped together as a typical residential subdivision in the plan, they are not
as valuable for wildlife conservation purposes as land within the heart of
the 3,744-acre tract, and, thus, the swap of a homesite for a five-acre tract
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of initially-protected land would in most instances be detrimental to
conservation.
As for the fact that NALT had to approve movement of the homesites, Judge
Dennis explained:
Congress did not intend for possibly enormous tax deductions to be
based on the likelihood of continued agreement between the donortaxpayer and the non-profit donee as to the land designated as
subject to the conservation easement; rather, it specifically and
unequivocally required that a qualified conservation easement be
perpetual.
And, citing the Supreme Court’s opinion in INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, Judge Dennis noted the well-established rule that tax
deductions are a matter of legislative grace and are therefore “strictly
construed and allowed only as there is a clear provision therefor.” 84 He
explained that, contrary to the majority’s assertion, this rule applies and has
been applied in other circuits to a deduction for the donation of a
conservation easement.85
The impact of the Fifth Circuit majority’s holding in Bosque is likely to be
limited given that (i) it is contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Belk,
(ii) it was based on very specific and unusual facts, (iii) the rule of
construction applied by the majority differed from that applied in other
circuits to § 170(h) and to charitable deductions generally, (iv) there was a
strong dissent, and (v) in Pine Mountain II, discussed immediately below,
the Tax Court expressly declined to follow Bosque in cases not appealable
to the Fifth Circuit.
g. Pine Mountain II. In Pine Mountain II, the Tax Court held that two
conservation easements that allowed residential “building areas” to be
moved or identified following the easements’ donation, subject to the
holder’s approval, did not qualify for a deduction because neither easement
was a “restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of
the real property” as required by § 170(h)(2)(C). The Tax Court held that
the two easements were analogous to the easements in Belk, Balsam
Mountain, and Bosque, and the court expressly declined to follow the Fifth
Circuit’s majority opinion in Bosque, instead relying on its own analysis in
84

INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992).
See Minnick v. Commissioner, 796 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir.2015); Belk v. Commissioner, 774 F.3d 221, 225 (4th
Cir.2014); Scheidelman v. Commissioner, 755 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir.2014); Esgar Corp. v. Commissioner, 744 F.3d 648,
653 (10th Cir.2014). The strict-construction rule of INDOPCO has also been applied to charitable deductions generally.
See, e.g., Zavaldi v. Commissioner, 793 F.3d 866 (8th Cir.2015) (charitable income-tax deduction); Galloway v. United
States, 492 F.3d 219 (3d Cir.2007) (charitable estate tax deduction); Hewitt v. Commissioner, 166 F.3d 332 (4th Cir.1998)
(charitable income-tax deduction; “‘the taxpayer seeking the benefit of a deduction must show that every condition which
Congress has seen fit to impose has been fully satisfied’”).
85
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Bosque and Fifth Circuit Judge Dennis’s dissent in Bosque. The Tax Court
explained that appeal of its decision in Pine Mountain would be to the
Eleventh Circuit, and the Tax Court is not bound to follow a Fifth Circuit
holding in cases appealable in other circuits.86
The Tax Court further held that neither the reserved rights nor the
amendment clause included in a third easement meant that the conservation
purpose of that easement was not protected in perpetuity, and allowed a
deduction for the donation of that easement.
Tax Court Judge Morrison published a strong dissent taking issue with
various of the Tax Court majority’s arguments. Given the dissent and the
loss of sizable deductions by the taxpayer,87 it is likely that this case will be
appealed and, thus, the Tax Court’s holdings should not be viewed as the
final word on these issues.
(i) Background. Pine Mountain involved a developer’s donation of three
conservation easements to the North American Land Trust (NALT). The
easements, donated in 2005, 2006, and 2007, encumbered relatively small
portions (collectively approximately 20%) of a large tract of land slated for
development near Birmingham, Alabama (6,224 acres).
•

The 2005 easement encumbered approximately 47% of one parcel and
consisted of approximately 560 mostly contiguous acres. Among other
significant rights, the 2005 easement reserved to the developer (and the
developer’s successors) the right to construct a single family residence
and associated structures within each of ten building areas, each as large
as one acre.88 While Exhibit C of the easement situated the building
areas around a man-made lake, the 2005 easement permitted the
building areas to be relocated anywhere on the encumbered land,
provided the relocation “shall not, in NALT’s ‘reasonable judgment,’
adversely affect conservation purposes.”

•

The 2006 easement encumbered approximately 500 acres consisting of
seven noncontiguous plots within three parcels, and the encumbered
area constituted 17.6% of the total acreage of the parcels. Among other

86
This is based on the “Golsen rule,” established by Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 756-757 (1970), aff’d, 445
F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971).
87
At trial, the taxpayer claimed that it was entitled to a collective deduction of $88.26 million for the donation of the
2005 and 2006 easements. This was considerably in excess of the $29.276 million the taxpayer had claimed on its tax
return with respect to those easements.
88
Other rights reserved to the developer include the right to construct ten 5,000-square foot barns each of which could
include a dwelling, another barn, a riding stable, and indoor riding ring, two scenic overlooks that could involve treeclearing, fourteen piers and boat launches, five ponds, access roads and driveways, raised walkways, hunting stands and
blinds, and wells.
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significant rights,89 the 2006 easement reserved to the developer (and
the developer’s successors) the right to construct a single family
residence and associated structures within each of six building areas,
each as large as one acre. The 2006 easement did not specify the location
of the building areas and placed no limitation on where they could be
located, except to state that NALT had to approve the locations and
could withhold its approval if it believed a proposed location would
result “in any material adverse effect on the Conservation Values or
Conservation Purposes.”
•

The 2007 easement encumbered approximately 240 acres consisting of
seven noncontiguous plots within three parcels, and the encumbered
area represented 7.5% of the total acreage of the parcels. The developer
did not reserve any residential development rights in the 2007 easement,
but did reserve certain other rights (e.g., the right to construct a water
tower and underground pipelines that could service other properties; the
right to construct fences, raised walkways, service vehicle trials, and
utility installations; and the right to hunt, trap, and otherwise harvest
fish and wildlife on the property).

(ii) Movable Building Areas. In holding that the 2005 and 2006 easements
were analogous to the easements in Belk, Balsam Mountain, and Bosque,
and thus not eligible for a deduction, the Tax Court noted that its thinking
was well captured by the “Swiss cheese” metaphor used by Fifth Circuit
Judge Dennis in his dissent in Bosque. The Tax Court explained that one
must imagine the area encumbered by an easement as a large slice of
Emmenthaler cheese. The cheese represents the real property initially
restricted by the easement; the holes represent the zones reserved for
commercial or residential development; and § 170(h)(2)(C), which requires
that an easement attach to a “defined parcel of real property” or a “single,
immutable parcel,” bars the putting of any new holes in the cheese.
The court explained that a developer could consider two techniques for
reserving the right to put new holes in the cheese.
•
•

First, the developer could put new holes in the cheese and make up
for it by adding an equal amount of previously unprotected land to
the conservation area. That was the pattern in Belk.
Alternatively, the developer could put new holes in the cheese and
make up for it by plugging the same number of holes elsewhere in
the conservation area. That was the pattern in Bosque and in Pine
Mountain.

89

These rights were to some extent similar to those reserved in the 2005 easement (see supra note 88) and further included
the right to construct a water tower and underground pipelines that could service residential and commercial development
on portions of the larger property not protected by a conservation easement.
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The court explained that, in each instance, the acreage subject to the
easement remains exactly the same. But in each instance, the developer has
achieved the impermissible objective of putting new holes in the cheese,
i.e., subjecting to commercial or residential development land that was
supposed to be protected in perpetuity from such development.90 The court
explained that reserved development rights in Belk, Bosque, and Pine
Mountain were all paths to the same bottom line—the developer retaining
the right to develop a portion of the originally-protected conservation area
by substituting other property. Compare Butler, discussed in Part II.A.4.
above, in which the location of the building sites was fixed by the
conservation easement deed because a map stipulating the placement of
building sites in locations that were consistent with preservation of the
conservation purposes was found to be incorporated into the deed and
binding under Georgia law.
The Tax Court determined that the 2007 easement, which did not reserve to
the developer any residential development rights, did not suffer from the
same fatal flaw as the 2005 and 2006 easements because it did not permit
the developer to place any new holes in the cheese.
Tax Court Judge Morrison, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the 2005
and 2006 easements were distinguishable from the easements in Bosque
because the homesite parcels in Bosque were completely free of the
easements while the building areas in Pine Mountain allowed residential
development but were otherwise subject to the easements’ restrictions (that
is, he argued that the easements attached to “defined parcels”). Judge
Morrison argued that the relative weakness of the easement deeds’
restrictions in the building areas was relevant only to whether the easements
protected conservation purposes in perpetuity as required by §
170(h)(5)(A).
The Tax Court majority said that the fact that the building areas in Pine
Mountain were technically encumbered by the easements, while the
homesites in Bosque were not, was a distinction without a difference. The
majority explained that, by permitting the building areas to be relocated to
other sections of the conservation area, the easements allowed the developer
to subject to residential development land that was supposed to be protected
in perpetuity from any form of development. The court also explained that,
although the building areas were not literally exempt from the easements,
90
The court also explained that, because the 2005 easement permits Pine Mountain to construct a variety of other
buildings (at least eleven of which may include additional living quarters) anywhere within the conservation area, Pine
Mountain had reserved the right, not only to put new holes in the cheese for the ten residences, but to put twenty acres of
extra holes in the cheese for structures appurtenant to those residences. With regard to the 2006 easement, where the
location of the six building areas was not identified in the easement at the time of the donation, the court explained that
it was impossible to identify, when the easement was granted, the “real property” that would actually be restricted from
development because the residential lots could literally be placed anywhere on the property. As a result, the perpetual
use restriction did not attach at the outset “to a defined parcel of real property” or to “a single, immutable parcel.”
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they were not subject to the easements in any meaningful sense because
they permitted uses that were antithetical to the habitat and open space
protection conservation purposes of the easements. The court concluded
that it made no difference to anyone--the land trust, the developer, or the
homeowners--whether the building areas were encumbered (or not) by the
easements; either way the developer had the right to construct residential
development in those areas and that development was exempt, for all
practical purposes, from the restrictions imposed by the easements.
(iii) Extensive Reserved Rights. The IRS argued that the conservation
purposes of the Pine Mountain easements were not “protected in perpetuity”
because the extensive rights reserved to the developer (and the developer’s
successors) permitted the properties to be used in ways inconsistent with
those conservation purposes. Because the Tax Court majority determined
that the 2005 and 2006 easements did not qualify for a deduction due to the
movable building areas, this argument was relevant only to the 2007
easement and the majority held for the taxpayer on this issue. A NALT
biologist presented testimony that none of the reserved rights in the 2007
easement would impair the conservation purposes and, as in Glass and
Butler (discussed in Part II.A.4), the IRS failed to provide any evidence to
the contrary. The Tax Court held that since there was no conflicting
testimony as to whether the conservation purposes of the 2007 easement
were protected in perpetuity, it found that those purposes were so protected.
This holding and the holdings in Glass and Butler signal that, regardless of
the conservation purposes at issue, to succeed with this argument, the IRS
must hire its own experts to testify as to why, upon full exercise of all
reserved rights, the conservation purposes of an easement will not be
protected in perpetuity.
Because Judge Morrison in his dissent determined that the 2005 and 2006
easements were not rendered nondeductible as a result of the movable
building areas, and the 2007 easement was not rendered nondeductible by
the amendment clause (as discussed below), he viewed the “too many
reserved rights” argument as relevant to all of the Pine Mountain easements.
He held that the 2005 and 2007 easements did not permit uses inconsistent
with conservation purposes, but the 2006 easement did. With regard to the
2005 easement, Judge Morrison relied on the testimony of NALT’s
biologist that the man-made lake, the ten building areas around it, and the
other extensive reserved rights would not affect the conservation value of
the easement. He also noted that the “dense clustering” of the ten houses
around the lake would not appreciably affect the scenic value of the
protected land.
With regard to the 2006 easement, where the location of the building areas
was not specified in an exhibit to the easement, Judge Morrison felt
differently. He found that the right to build six houses was inconsistent with
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the habitat and scenic enjoyment conservation purposes because he did not
know where the building areas for the six houses would be. He noted that,
for the 2005 easement, the IRS had the opportunity to present evidence that
the initial locations of the building areas were inconsistent with
conservation purposes. He said there was no such opportunity regarding the
2006 easement. Rather “[t]here is only a vague hope that NALT will
exercise its veto over boundary areas that would undermine the
conservation purposes.” This hope, he said, was not enough to convince him
that the right to build in the yet-to-be-specified building areas is consistent
with the conservation purposes. He did not explain, however, why
developer’s ability to relocate the ten building areas in the 2005 easement,
which was also subject to only the “vague hope” that NALT would exercise
its veto power to prevent the undermining of conservation purposes, did not
similarly disqualify that easement.
(iv) Amendment Clause. The IRS argued that the amendment clause
included in the 2007 easement, which authorized the parties to agree to
amendments that are “not inconsistent with the Conservation Purposes,”
enabled the parties to amend the easement in ways that would clearly violate
the statutory perpetuity requirements, such as by reducing the size or
otherwise modifying the boundary of the protected area or by permitting
residential construction within the protected area. The Tax Court majority
rejected this argument on three grounds.
•

•

•

First, the Tax Court noted that it was hard to imagine how NALT
could conscientiously find such amendments to be “consistent with
the Conservation Purposes” set forth in the easement, and that an
easement’s restrictions should not be deemed “nonperpetual”
because of the risk that the qualified organization might be
unfaithful to the charitable purposes on which its exemption rests.
Citing to Simmons, the court noted that “[a]ny donee might fail to
enforce a conservation easement, with or without a clause stating
that it may consent or abandon its rights, and a tax-exempt
organization would do so at its peril.”
Second, the Tax Court’s noted that a conservation easement
involves a conveyance, which is a form of contract and, generally
speaking, the parties to a contract are free to amend it, whether or
not they explicitly reserve the right to do so. According to the court,
the amendment clause could thus reasonably be regarded as a
limiting provision, confining the permissible subset of amendments
to those that would not be “inconsistent with the Conservation
Purposes” of the easement.
Third, the Tax Court noted that the IRS’s argument would
apparently prevent the donor of any easement from qualifying for a
deduction under § 170(h) if the easement permitted amendments,
and the court said it found no support for that argument in the statute,
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the regulations, the decided cases, or the legislative policy
underlying the statute.
Dissenting Tax Court Judge Morrison disagreed with the Tax Court
majority on this issue as well. He noted that the amendment clause included
in the 2007 easement states that the developer and NALT “recognize that
circumstances could arise which would justify the modification of certain
of the restrictions contained in this Conservation Easement,” and “[t]o this
end,” NALT and the owner of the land in the conservation area have the
right to agree to amendments that are not inconsistent with the conservation
purposes. Judge Morrison argued that because the amendment clause
authorizes only modification of “the restrictions,” it limits the parties to
modifying the specific restrictions in the deed and, thus, would not permit
the parties to modify the exterior boundary of the easement.
Judge Morrison also noted that the Tax Court majority made unfounded
assumptions about NALT’s behavior. He explained that, while it is true that
the amendment clause provides that no amendment can be agreed to by
NALT unless the amendment is not inconsistent with the conservation
purposes, this does not require NALT to review proposed amendments to
see whether the amendments comply with § 170(h)(2)(C), which does not
refer to conservation purposes and requires only that an easement to be “a
restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the real
property.” Judge Morrison argued that the Tax Court majority mixed up the
“granted in perpetuity” and “protected in perpetuity” tests and made the
unsupported assumption that NALT would refuse to consent to amendments
that would bar a deduction for the donation of the easement under section
170(h)(2)(C) (i.e., amendments that would change the boundary of the
easement), and this “unrealistically supposes that NALT will essentially act
as a tax compliance officer.”
Judge Morrison further argued that the Tax Court majority made “radical
claims” about the consequences of the IRS’s interpretation of the
amendment clause. The majority asserted that the clause in the 2007
easement was similar to the amendment provisions in many other
conservation easement deeds and supported this assertion by citing an
amicus brief filed by the Land Trust Alliance in different case. Judge
Morrison pointed out that the amendment clause in the easement involved
in that other case was different from the amendment clause in the Pine
Mountain easements and, thus, that amicus brief was irrelevant to the Pine
Mountain Case. Judge Morrison also explained that the Land Trust Alliance
amicus briefs (he had refused to accept the one filed in Pine Mountain) made
unsubstantiated claims about particular amendment clauses being “widely
used” and, thus, were unreliable and should not affect the court’s analysis
of the amendment clause.
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Finally, Judge Morrison argued that, in wrapping up its discussion of the
amendment clause, the Tax Court majority misleadingly summarized the
IRS’s argument by stating that the IRS’s argument “would apparently
prevent the donor of any easement from qualifying for a charitable
contribution deduction under section 170(h) if the easement permitted
amendments.” Judge Morrison noted that, actually, the IRS had argued only
that the particular amendment clause in the Pine Mountain easement deeds
prevented the donor of those easements from qualifying for a deduction.
The IRS did not attack all amendment clauses in all easement deeds. Judge
Morrison noted that amendment clauses can and do differ, and that the
courts must interpret each clause to see whether it satisfies § 170(h)’s
requirements.
Although not mentioned by Judge Morrison in his dissent, the argument that
the 2007 easement involved a conveyance, which is a form of contract, and
generally speaking the parties to a contract are free to amend it, whether or
not they explicitly reserve the right to do so, makes no sense in the taxdeductible conservation easement context. First, that argument ignores the
fact that tax-deductible conservation easements are by definition charitable
gifts (they have to be in order to be eligible for a deduction), and under state
law charitable organizations are generally not free to alter the terms of a
charitable gift made for a specific purpose except to the extent that the
organization is granted the power to do so in the terms of the gift. 91
Accordingly, an amendment clause is not a limiting provision; it does not
constrain an otherwise unlimited power to amend. Rather, it is in
empowering provision—granting the donee certain rights to alter the terms
of the gift that the donee otherwise would not have. Moreover, if an
easement were simply a contract that could be amended by the current
landowner and donee at any time, the amendment provision itself could be
amended, and thus would not be a limiting provision. It also would be
impossible to comply with the various requirements in 170(h) – e.g., the
restriction on transfer, judicial extinguishment, and payment of a minimum
proportionate share of proceeds to the holder upon extinguishment
requirements – because the clauses included in a deed to satisfy those
requirements could be amended at any time.
7. Reserved Development Rights: Regulations and Examples.
a. Treasury Regulations. The following Treasury Regulations, among
others, limit reserved development rights.
(i) Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(v) contains a
limitation on the reservation of rights in an open space
easement—a deduction will not be allowed “if the terms of the
91

See Part II.A.10 below, discussing the interaction between federal and state law.
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easement permit a degree of intrusion or future development that
would interfere with the essential scenic quality of the land or
the governmental conservation policy being furthered by the
donation.”
(ii) Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(e)(2) provides that “a
deduction will not be allowed if the contribution would
accomplish one of the enumerated conservation purposes but
would permit destruction of other significant conservation
interests” (the “no inconsistent use” requirement).92
(iii) Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(1) provides that “any
interest in the property retained by the donor...must be subject to
legally enforceable restrictions...that will prevent uses of the
retained interest inconsistent with the conservation purposes of
the donation” (the “general enforceable in perpetuity”
requirement).
b. Examples 3 and 4. The Treasury Regulations provide two examples
addressing “future development” in an open space easement.93
(i) Example 3 involves Greenacre, a 900-acre parcel of
woodland, rolling pasture, and orchards on the crest of a
mountain, all of which is clearly visible from a nearby national
park. The highest and best use of Greenacre is as a subdivision
of 40-acre tracts (potentially twenty-two residential lots). The
landowner wishes to donate a scenic easement on Greenacre and
“would like to reserve the right to subdivide Greenacre into 90acre parcels with no more than one single-family home
allowable on each parcel.” Example 3 concludes that “[r]andom
building on the property, even as little as one home for each 90
acres [a total of only ten homes], would destroy the scenic
character of the view. Accordingly, no deduction would be
allowable.”
(ii) Example 4 assumes the same facts as Example 3, except:
•
•

“not all of Greenacre is visible from the park”
“the deed of easement allows for limited cluster
development of no more than five nine-acre clusters
(with four houses on each cluster) located in areas

92
The regulations provide, as an example, that the preservation of farmland will not qualify for a deduction if, under the
terms of the easement, a significant naturally occurring ecosystem could be injured or destroyed by the use of pesticides
in the operation of the farm. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(2). A use that is destructive of conservation interests is permitted
only if the use is necessary for the protection of the conservation interests that are the subject of the contribution, such as
allowing site excavation that may impair scenic values on property preserved as an archaeological site. Treas. Reg. §
1.170A-14(e)(3).
93
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(f), Examples 3 and 4.
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•
•

generally not visible from the national park and subject
to site and building plan approval by the donee
organization in order to preserve the scenic view from
the park,”
“[t]he donor and the donee have already identified sites
where limited cluster development would not be visible
from the park or would not impair the view,” and
“[o]wners of homes in the clusters will not have any
rights with respect to the surrounding Greenacre
property that are not also available to the general public.”

Example 4 concludes that the donation qualifies for a deduction.
Example 3 involves rights to build that could be exercised by the landowner
anywhere on the property. The donation is not eligible for a deduction,
despite the easement reducing the number of potential residential lots from
twenty-two to ten, because such rights could (i) interfere with the essential
scenic quality of the land or the governmental conservation policy being
furthered by the donation, 94 (ii) permit destruction of other significant
conservation interests, 95 and (iii) permit uses of the retained interest
inconsistent with the conservation purposes of the donation.96
Example 4 indicates that, even if the number of permitted homes is
increased (from ten to twenty), if the conditions specified in the Example
are met, the donation will be eligible for a deduction. Given that Example 4
provides that the “donor and the donee have already [i.e., at the time of the
donation] identified sites where limited cluster development would not be
visible from the park or would not impair the view,” the Example does not
appear to give the donee the discretion to determine the location of such
sites at some later date. Rather, to give each of the specified conditions in
Example 4 meaning, the Example could be interpreted to (i) give the donee
the discretion to later approve the site and building plans of the four
homesites within each cluster (rather than the sites of the clusters
themselves) or (ii) give the donor and donee the right to identify, at the time
of the donation, more than five possible sites “where limited cluster
development would not be visible from the park or would not impair the
view,” thus giving the donor and the donee some flexibility to later choose
the five cluster sites from the more than five possible sites identified on the
date of the donation.97
Identification of the possible sites of cluster development at the time of the
donation is also consistent with the Treasury Regulation requirements noted
94

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(v).
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(2).
96
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(1).
97
This is not an uncommon technique that is used to give donors some flexibility, while ensuring that the extent of the
reserved rights can be assessed by the IRS and the courts at the time of the donation.
95
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above because it would allow the IRS (and, if litigated, a court) to assess
whether—at the time of the donation—the reserved development rights
would (i) interfere with the essential scenic quality of the land or the
governmental conservation policy being furthered by the donation, (ii)
permit destruction of other significant conservation interests, or (iii) permit
uses of the retained interest inconsistent with the conservation purposes of
the donation. Alternatively, interpreting Example 4 to permit the donee to
determine the sites of the five cluster developments at some point after the
donation is made would render those threshold requirements meaningless
because the IRS and the courts would have no way to assess, at the time of
the donation, whether the easement satisfied those requirements. Similar to
the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Belk (discussed in Part II.A.6 above), the
purpose of these threshold requirements is to enable the Commissioner, not
the donee or donor, to verify that the reserved rights in a conservation
easement will not (i) interfere with the essential scenic quality of the land
or the governmental conservation policy being furthered by the donation,
(ii) permit destruction of other significant conservation interests, or (iii)
permit uses of the retained interest inconsistent with the conservation
purposes of the donation. Allowing the holder to identify or relocate
building areas at some point following the donation places taxpayers
beyond the reach of the Commissioner in this regard. 98 Had Congress
intended to grant holders the discretion to approve the location of building
areas and other intensive use of protected lands after the donation of an
easement, § 170(h) and the Treasury Regulations would be much shorter
and simpler.99
8. Addressing Reserved Development Rights. Reserved development rights
could be addressed in a number of ways:
a. The parties could identify the building areas in the conservation easement
deed.
b. The parties could identify more building areas in the conservation
easement deed than are permitted to be used. For example, the easement
might reserve to the grantor the right to build two additional single-family
residences on the subject property, each in a one-acre building area, but four
possible sites for the building areas may be identified in the deed. The deed
would also provide that the unused sites will be retired once the reserved
rights have been exercised.100
98

Allowing the holder to identify or relocate building areas at some point following the donation would also further
complicate an already challenging appraisal process, as the appraiser, who is not an attorney or an employee of the donee,
would be required to try and determine where on the subject property the holder might (and might not) permit the building
areas to be located.
99
See supra note 1 and accompanying text (explaining that the Treasury Regulations are based, in large part, on the
detailed Senate Report describing § 170(h)).
100
The deed might provide that the unused sites will remain extant even after the reserved rights have been exercised, to
be used if a future property owner decides to relocate a residence. However, given the difficulties associated with
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c. The parties could designate all conservation sensitive areas as “no-build”
areas,” and the remaining portions of the subject property as “build areas.”
However, the no-build areas would have to be more than just token
setbacks; they would have to be extensive enough to protect the property’s
conservation values.
d. The parties could exclude the building areas from the legal description of
the property encumbered by the conservation easement. A significant
drawback to this approach is that the holder would not be able to limit
intensive uses of the excluded areas, and those uses could negatively impact
the protection of conservation values on the encumbered land. Excluding
the building areas from the easement also might reduce the donor’s donation
as a result of the “entire contiguous parcel” valuation rule, which is designed
to reduce an easement donor’s deduction to the extent that the donation
increases the value of contiguous property owned by the donor or a member
of the donor’s family.101
In addition, the conservation easement and the baseline documentation should
explain why the location of each identified building site or build area will not
adversely impact the property’s conservation values or the conservation purposes
of the easement.
9. State Law Can Render Conservation Easements Nondeductible. In Wachter,
the Tax Court held that North Dakota law, which limits the duration of easements
created after July 1, 1977, to a maximum of 99 years, precludes conservation
easement donors in the state from qualifying for a deduction under § 170(h) because
easements in North Dakota cannot be granted “in perpetuity.”
a. Federal Law Controls. The Tax Court in Wachter reiterated the
fundamental principle that, while state law determines the nature of
property rights, it is federal law that determines the federal tax treatment of
those rights. Wachter confirmed that state law can render all conservation
easement donations in a state ineligible for the federal deduction if state law
prevents conservation easements from complying with federal
requirements.
Some states have considered making changes to their state codes that could
render conservation easements in the state ineligible for federal tax

restoration of developed sites to their natural condition, the possible negative impacts on conservation values might be
too extensive to warrant a deduction for the donation.
101
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i). The donor might also consider donating two easements, one nondeductible
easement encumbering the designated building areas, and a second deductible easement encumbering the remaining
property that satisfies all federal tax law requirements. While this could address the concern about intensive uses of the
unencumbered areas, the conveyance of two easements would increase the expense and complexity of the transaction.
For more on this and the option of excluding building areas from easement protections altogether, see the discussion of
PBBM-Rose Hill in Part II.A.12 below.
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incentives.102 Potential easement donors and their advisors should be aware
of this issue.
b. Wachter: Termination in 99 Years Not So Remote as to be Negligible.
The taxpayers in Wachter argued that North Dakota’s 99-year limitation
should be considered the equivalent of a remote future event that does not
prevent an easement from being considered perpetual. They cited Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A–14(g)(3), which provides, in part, that:
[a] deduction shall not be disallowed ... merely because the interest
which passes to, or is vested in, the donee organization may be
defeated by the performance of some act or the happening of some
event, if on the date of the gift it appears that the possibility that such
act or event will occur is so remote as to be negligible.
The Tax Court in Wachter noted that the courts have construed the soremote- as-to-be-negligible standard to mean:
‘a chance which persons generally would disregard as so highly
improbable that it might be ignored with reasonable safety in
undertaking a serious business transaction’ or ‘a chance which every
dictate of reason would justify an intelligent person in disregarding
as so highly improbable and remote as to be lacking in reason and
substance.’
The Tax Court explained that the term “remote” refers to the likelihood of
the event that could defeat the donee’s interest in the gift. It then explained
that the likelihood of the event in Wachter that could defeat the donee’s
interest in the charitable gifts of the conservation easements—expiration of
the easements after 99 years—was not “remote.” On the date of the donation
of the easements, the court explained, it was not only possible, it was
inevitable that the donee would be divested of its interests in the easements
by operation of North Dakota law. Accordingly, the easements were not
restrictions granted “in perpetuity” and, thus, were not deductible under
§ 170(h).
10. Interaction Between Federal and State Law. Numerous courts have
addressed the interaction between federal and state law in the conservation
easement context. As noted in the discussions of Carpenter I103 and Wachter104
above, while state law determines the nature of the property rights in an easement,
it is federal law that determines the tax treatment of those rights. Thus, in
determining whether an easement complies with federal tax law requirements, one
102
See, e.g., Keeping the Perpetual in Perpetual Conservation Easements,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/nonprofit/2015/12/keeping-the-perpetual-in-perpetual-conservation-easements.html.
103
See Part II.A.6 above.
104
See Part II.A.9 above.
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must look to the terms of the deed and applicable state law to determine how a
particular easement may, for example, be transferred, extinguished, or amended,
and then ask whether the easement, so configured, satisfies federal tax law
requirements.
a. In Belk III, the Fourth Circuit held that § 170(h) “requires that the gift of
a conservation easement on a specific parcel of land be granted in perpetuity
to qualify for a federal charitable deduction, notwithstanding the fact that
state law may permit an easement to govern for some shorter period of
time.” Thus, while an easement that grants restrictions for less than a
perpetual term, like the easement at issue in Belk, may be a valid
conveyance under state law, it will be ineligible for a deduction under
federal law.
b. With the exception of North Dakota, which limits the duration of any
easement created in the State to 99 years, it appears that the parties to a
conservation easement can include provisions in the deed to comply with
the federal tax law perpetuity requirements and, provided the easement is
drafted appropriately, those provisions will be enforceable under state law
even though they impose conditions on the transfer or extinguishment of the
easement that are different from or more restrictive than those imposed by
state law. As the Tax Court noted in Wachter, “[b]oth parties allege that the
State law at issue here is unique because [North Dakota] is the only State
that has a law that provides for a maximum duration that may not be
overcome by agreement.”
c. The drafters of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act, which has been
adopted in just over half the states and the District of Columbia, 105
specifically intended that the Act would allow parties to draft a conservation
easement that would comply with federal tax law requirements. The drafters
explained:
The Act enables the structuring of transactions so as to achieve tax
benefits which may be available under the Internal Revenue Code,
but parties intending to attain them must be mindful of the specific
provisions of the income, estate and gift tax laws which are
applicable.106
The Act enables parties to create a conservation easement of
unlimited duration subject to the power of a court to modify or
terminate the easement in accordance with the principles of law and
equity.… Allowing the parties to create such easements also enables
105

See Nancy A. McLaughlin, UNIFORM CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT STUDY COMMITTEE BACKGROUND REPORT
(prepared
for
the
Uniform
Law
Commission,
June
11,
2017),
available
at
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=dde6ced5-c42ef02a-ff3b-95ce0f53d3d6&forceDialog=0.
106
Unif. Conservation Easement Act, Prefatory Note, at 3 (2008).
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them to fit within federal tax law requirements that the interest be
“in perpetuity” if certain tax benefits are to be derived. 107
The Uniform Conservation Easement Act drafters also contemplated that
the terms of a conservation easement could be enforced by the relevant state
attorney general on behalf of the public if the holder failed to enforce the
easement or agreed to an improper amendment or extinguishment:
the Act also recognizes that the state's other applicable law may
create standing [to bring an action] in other persons. For example,
independently of the Act, the Attorney General could have standing
in his capacity as supervisor of charitable trusts, either by statute or
at common law.108
d. In 1980, at the congressional hearings on proposed § 170(h), in response
to the Treasury’s concern that charitable conservation organizations might
not properly enforce conservation easements, nineteen land trusts submitted
an Appendix to their testimony in which they acknowledged the status of
tax-deductible conservation easements as “charitable grants,” and noted the
power and duty of courts of competent jurisdiction and state attorneys
general to enforce such grants.109
e. In Carpenter I, the Tax Court held that the conservation easements at
issue were restricted charitable gifts, or “contributions conditioned on the
use of the gift in accordance with the donor’s precise directions and
limitations.” Restricted gift status means that both the donor and the donee
(and their successors) are bound by the terms of the easement deed under
state law, including the provisions included in the deed to satisfy federal tax
law requirements. Thus, if an easement deed is drafted appropriately, the
provisions included in the deed governing transfer, amendment, and
extinguishment should be binding on both parties (owner and holder) and
enforceable by the state attorney general, even though the state enabling
statute may contain different or less restrictive provisions addressing those
actions. For example, if a conservation easement enabling statute provides
that a conservation easement can be extinguished with the approval of a
public official, that state law requirement must be satisfied in addition to the
judicial extinguishment and division of proceeds requirements set forth in
the easement deed to satisfy § 1.170A-14(g)(6).

107

Unif. Conservation Easement Act, § 2, Comment (2008).
Unif. Conservation Easement Act, § 3, Comment (2008). See also Part II.A.13 below, discussing the Tax Court Order
in Hoffman Properties, which provides, in part, “it is undisputed that Ohio law empowers the AG to initiate a suit to
enforce the terms of an easement if the holder neglects to do so....”
109
See Minor Tax Bills: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 96th Cong. 238, 242 (1980) (Appendix to Testimony of French and Pickering Creeks Conservation Trust, the
Brandywine Conservancy, and other Conservation Organizations in re H.R. 7318 on June 26, 1980).
108
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11. Sample Restriction on Transfer and Extinguishment Provisions. A conservation
easement deed should include transfer and extinguishment provisions that comply with
Treasury Regulation requirements. The following are sample provisions.110
Article X. Transfer and Extinguishment
a. Restriction on Transfer.111
(1) Grantee is prohibited from assigning or otherwise transferring this
Easement, whether or not for consideration, unless:
(i) the transferee is, at the time of the transfer, a “qualified
organization” and an “eligible donee,” as those terms are
defined in § 170(h) of the Code and the regulations
promulgated thereunder, and
(ii) Grantee, as a condition of the transfer, requires that the
transferee agree in writing that the conservation purpose(s)
that the contribution of this Easement was originally intended
to advance will continue to be carried out.
Any subsequent transfer of this Easement shall also be subject to this
paragraph.
(2) If Grantee shall cease to exist, or cease to be a “qualified
organization” or an “eligible donee,” as those terms are defined in §
170(h) of the Code and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and
a prior transfer is not made in accordance with the requirements of
this paragraph, then Grantee’s rights and obligations under this
Easement shall vest in such entity as a court of competent jurisdiction
shall direct pursuant to the applicable laws of [State in which Property
is located] governing charitable gifts, provided that the requirements
of subparagraphs (1)(i) and (ii) of this paragraph shall be satisfied.
b. Extinguishment; Proceeds.112
(1) Grantor and Grantee agree that the donation of this Easement
creates a property right that immediately vests in Grantee. Grantor
and Grantee further agree that this property right has a fair market
value that is at least equal to the proportionate value that this
Easement, at the time of the gift, bore to the value of the Property as
a whole (unencumbered by this Easement) at that time, and such
110
These sample provisions are drafted to comply with § 170(h) and Treasury Regulation requirements. However, neither
the IRS nor the courts have blessed these sample provisions. Readers are responsible for obtaining legal advice from their
own legal counsel.
111
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(2). In the last sentence of this regulation, the cross-reference to (b)(3) should be to
(b)(2), and the cross-reference to (g)(5)(ii) should be to (g)(6); the Treasury failed to update the cross-references when it
finalized the proposed regulations in 1986.
112
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6).
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minimum proportionate value of Grantee’s property right, expressed
as a percentage (the “Minimum Percentage”), shall remain constant.
(2) This Easement can be extinguished in whole or in part (whether
through release, termination, eminent domain, abandonment, swap,
exchange, reconfiguration, or otherwise) only:
(i) in a judicial proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction,
(ii) upon a finding by the court that a subsequent unexpected
change in the conditions surrounding the Property has made
impossible or impractical the continued use of the Property
(or the portion thereof to be removed from this Easement) for
conservation purposes, and
(iii) with a payment of proceeds to Grantee, calculated as
provided in subparagraph (3) below, and all such proceeds
shall be used by Grantee in a manner consistent with the
conservation purposes of this gift.
(3) In the event of an extinguishment, Grantee shall be entitled to a
share of the proceeds from a subsequent sale, exchange, lease, or
involuntary conversion of the property removed from this Easement
equal to the greater of:
(i) the Minimum Percentage of such proceeds or
(ii) the appraised value of this Easement (or portion of this
Easement encumbering the property to be removed)
immediately before and ignoring the extinguishment,
calculated using before and after valuation methodology
similar to that provided in Treasury Regulation § 1.170A14(h)(3)).
If Grantee, in Grantee’s sole discretion, determines that the cost to
Grantee of obtaining an appraisal of this Easement (or relevant
portion thereof) at the time of extinguishment is likely to exceed any
benefit to Grantee from obtaining such appraisal, or that the benefit
of having such an appraisal prepared is so small as to be insignificant,
Grantee may elect to receive the amount determined pursuant to (i)
of this subparagraph (the “Minimum Percentage of such
proceeds”).113
113
The “greater of” proceeds formula complies with federal tax law requirements because the Grantee will always receive
at least the minimum proportionate (or floor) share of proceeds required by Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii).
The “greater of” formula also helps to (i) ensure that the Grantee will receive the appreciation (if any) in the value of
easement to be used “in a manner consistent with the conservation purposes of the original contribution” (i.e., to replace
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(4) If all or any part of the Property is taken under the power of
eminent domain, Grantor and Grantee shall participate in appropriate
proceedings at the time of such taking to recover the full value of their
respective interests subject to the taking and all incidental or direct
damages resulting from the taking. Grantee shall be entitled to
compensation from the recovered proceeds pursuant to
subparagraph (3) above. The respective rights of Grantor and Grantee
set forth in this subparagraph shall be in addition to, and not in
limitation of, any rights they may have at common law.
(5) For purposes of this Easement, any removal of any land from this
Easement, however characterized, constitutes an extinguishment.
(6) All provisions of this Article shall survive any extinguishment of this
Easement in whole or in part. Any attempted extinguishment of all or
a portion of the Easement contrary to this paragraph shall be invalid.
c. Interaction With State Law. Grantor and Grantee are prohibited from
exercising any power or discretion granted under state law regarding the
transfer or extinguishment of this Easement that would be inconsistent with
the provisions of this Easement, including the provisions in this Article, or the
continued protection in perpetuity of the conservation values of the Property
and the conservation purposes of this Easement.

12. Noncompliant Proceeds Clause. The courts have denied deductions for failure
to meet the proceeds requirement of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) in
two cases: Carroll and PBBM-Rose Hill.
a. Carroll. In Carroll, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of
approximately $650,000 of carryover deductions claimed with regard to a
conservation easement donation because the easement contained a
noncompliant proceeds clause. The court explained that the minimum
proportionate share of proceeds that must be payable to the holder of an
easement following extinguishment is equal to the percentage determined
by (i) the fair market value of the easement on the date of the gift, which is
the numerator, over (ii) the fair market value of the property as a whole on
the date of the gift, which is the denominator. For example, if the fair market
value of an easement on the date of the gift was $300,000, and the fair
market value of the property as a whole on the date of the gift was
$1,000,000, the easement represented 30% of the value of the property on
the date of the gift, and the holder must be entitled to at least 30% of the
proceeds following the easement’s extinguishment.

lost conservation or historic values) and (ii) eliminate the property owner’s perverse incentive to seek extinguishment to
benefit from any appreciation in the value of the easement following its donation, which may be significant.
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In Carroll, the conservation easement deed limited the numerator of the
formula noted above to “the deduction for federal income tax purposes
allowable” by reason of the donation. The court explained that, if the IRS
were to disallow the deduction for reasons other than valuation and the
easement were later extinguished in a judicial proceeding, the numerator
would be zero and the holder of the easement would not receive the
minimum proportionate share of proceeds as is required. The court also
noted that deductions are denied for many reasons unrelated to valuation,
and, in fact, the IRS made numerous arguments for disallowance of the
taxpayers’ claimed deductions in Carroll that were not based on valuation.
Although not mentioned by the court, mandating that the holder receive at
least a minimum proportionate share of proceeds following extinguishment
even if the donor’s deduction is disallowed for other than valuation reasons
is appropriate from a policy perspective. Donors of other types of charitable
gifts are not entitled to a return of those gifts or the value attributable thereto
if their deductions are denied for such things as failure to obtain a
contemporaneous written acknowledgment or qualified appraisal.
Moreover, regardless of whether a donor’s deduction is denied, holders
have an ongoing obligation to monitor and enforce the easements on behalf
of the public and they must invest time and resources fulfilling that
obligation. The value attributable to a conservation easement is a charitable
asset held for the benefit of the public and it should not be permitted to
revert to the donors (or the donors’ successors in interest) upon
extinguishment. Rather, such value should remain in the charitable sector
and be used to replace lost conservation values, as Treasury Regulation §
1.170A-14(g)(6) requires.
The Tax Court distinguished its holding in Carroll from the First Circuit’s
holding in Kaufman III. In Kaufman III, the First Circuit held that the donors
of a facade easement had satisfied the proceeds requirement because the
easement deed correctly stated the proceeds formula and the donee
organization had an absolute right as against the donors for its share of
proceeds upon extinguishment. 114 In Carroll, in contrast, the donee
organizations would not be entitled to any proceeds in certain circumstances
based on the formula included in the easement deed. Consistent with the
First Circuit’s reasoning in Kaufman III, failing to guarantee that the donees
would be entitled to at least the required minimum proportionate share of
proceeds upon extinguishment, and providing a potential windfall to the
donor or the donor’s successors as a result, was fatal to the deduction.
The Tax Court also dismissed the taxpayers’ argument that noncompliance
with the proceeds requirement should be forgiven because the probability
of extinguishment of the easement was “so remote as to be negligible.”
Citing Kaufman III, the Tax Court explained that easement donors cannot
114

The Tax Court has declined to follow this holding in Palmolive I, as discussed in Part II.F.1 below.
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satisfy the requirements of the extinguishment regulation by merely
establishing that the possibility of a change in conditions triggering judicial
extinguishment is unexpected. To accept such an argument, explained the
Tax Court, would nullify the requirements because the extinguishment
regulation, by its terms, applies only to “unexpected” conditions.115
Finally, the Tax Court explained that the taxpayers in Carroll “could have
avoided this adverse outcome by strictly following the proportionality
formula set forth in the regulation.” In addition, in finding that the taxpayers
were liable for accuracy-related penalties, the court noted:
[The taxpayers] offered no evidence which would explain why the
terms of the conservation easement varied from the requirements of
[Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)], nor do they clarify why
[they] failed to seek competent advice from a tax attorney or other
adviser to ensure the conservation easement’s compliance with
pertinent regulations. In the light of [the taxpayers’] high level of
sophistication and experience with conservation easements, we
conclude that [the taxpayers] have not demonstrated that they acted
with reasonable cause and in good faith in not seeking competent
tax advice regarding the conservation easement.
There are a number of takeaways from Carroll. First, conservation
easement donations generally involve high-dollar deductions and the
requirements of § 170(h) and the regulations are numerous. Accordingly,
prospective easement donors should hire experienced tax counsel to assist
them with their donations. If they do not, they run the risk of not only having
their deductions denied, but also being subject to penalties. Too often
easement donors are either unrepresented by legal counsel, or represented
by legal counsel with little or no relevant tax expertise.
Second, donors of conservation easements should not rely on a donee
organization, or donee’s template, or any other template or model easement
(many of which are out-of-date) to satisfy the requirements for the
deduction. The risks of noncompliance (audit, litigation, denial of
115
The Tax Court further found that the donors’ deductions were not saved by the last sentence in Treasury Regulation
§ 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii), which provides an exception to the requirement that the holder must receive at least a minimum
proportionate share of proceeds upon extinguishment if “state law provides that the donor is entitled to the full proceeds
from the conversion without regard to the terms of the [easement].” Maryland has an unusual provision in its state code.
Pursuant to this provision, if land subject to an easement held by Maryland Environmental Trust (MET) is condemned,
damages must be awarded “to the fee owner...and shall be the fair market value of the land or interest in it, computed as
though the easement...did not exist.” This presumably means the holder would receive nothing unless the parties agreed
that the fee owner would give a portion of the proceeds to the holder. The Carroll easement had been granted to MET
and a local land trust as co-holders. The Tax Court held that the state code provision above did not save the deduction
because (i) the provision applies only to easements held by MET and, thus, the proceeds formula in the deed still violated
the proceeds requirement with regard to the local land trust, and (ii) the provision applies only to condemnations and,
thus, the proceeds formula in the deed still violated the proceeds requirement with regard to judicial extinguishments not
based on condemnation.

52
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384360

deductions, and interest and penalties) fall on the shoulders of the donor,
and it is the responsibility of the donor and the donor’s tax counsel to ensure
that all requirements are satisfied. Most donees are careful to instruct donors
that they cannot and do not provide legal advice, and donors need to take
that warning to heart.
b. PBBM-Rose Hill. In PBBM-Rose Hill II, the Fifth Circuit similarly
sustained the IRS’s disallowance of a $15,160,000 deduction claimed with
regard to a conservation easement donation because the easement contained
a noncompliant proceeds clause. The proceeds clause included in the
PBBM-Rose Hill easement provided that, following extinguishment, the
holder was entitled to a share of the proceeds from a subsequent sale,
exchange, or involuntary conversion of the property equal to the greater of
(i) the fair market value of the easement around the date of the gift or (ii) a
“defined share” of the amount of such proceeds remaining after both the
expenses of the sale and the amount attributable to any improvements
constructed upon the property pursuant to reserved rights was deducted.
The defined share was the percentage determined by (i) the fair market
value of the easement around the date of the gift over (ii) the fair market
value of the property as a whole around the date of the gift (e.g., the 30% in
the example provided in the discussion of Carroll above).
The Fifth Circuit held that this formula did not satisfy the proceeds
requirement because the plain language of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A14(g)(6)(ii) does not permit the value of improvements to be subtracted
from the proceeds prior to the holder taking its share. The court also held
that an IRS Private Letter Ruling sanctioning a proceeds clause that
provided for such subtraction was not relevant because (i) the Regulation is
not ambiguous and (ii) even if the Regulation were ambiguous, the court
would not defer to an IRS interpretation in a Private Letter Ruling because
such a ruling is binding only with respect to the parties at issue and cannot
be cited as precedent.116
It seems likely that, in crafting the proceeds requirement of Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii), the Treasury specifically chose to create
a simple, bright-line rule that relies on the qualified appraisal of a
conservation easement obtained at the time of its donation. The Treasury
was aware of the issue of reserved rights, which are addressed elsewhere in
the Treasury Regulations, and it presumably also was aware that a
conservation easement might appreciate in value relative to the property it
encumbers over time (development pressures were increasing in the 1980s
when the Regulations were drafted). Yet the Treasury did not address those
116

A Private Letter Ruling (PLR) is a written statement issued to a taxpayer that interprets and applies tax laws to the
taxpayer’s specific set of facts. A PLR may not be relied on as precedent by other taxpayers or IRS personnel. PLRs are
generally made public after all information has been removed that could identify the taxpayer to whom it was issued. See
IRS, Understanding IRS Guidance – A Brief Primer, available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Understanding-IRS-GuidanceA-Brief-Primer.
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issues in § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii). The Treasury may have considered that any
variation from the simple, bright-line rule to take into account the value of
post-donation improvements or possible appreciation in the value of an
easement would require that an additional appraisal be obtained at a later
date, and a host of difficult issues would be raised by such a future appraisal.
In addition to the property owner and holder having opposing interests with
regard to such a future appraisal, a number of questions would arise: Would
it have to be a “qualified appraisal”? Who would choose the appraiser? Who
would define the scope of the assignment? What valuation methods should
be employed (e.g., should improvements be valued using the before and
after or replacement cost method)? Who would pay for the appraisal? What
would be done if the owner and holder did not agree on the appraised value?
The Treasury may have determined that the Regulation’s simple, bright-line
rule is, on balance, the better approach because it is based on the qualified
appraisal already required to be obtained at the time of donation and avoids
difficult future valuation issues.
In response to PBBM-Rose Hill, an easement donor that plans to construct
valuable improvements on the encumbered property might be prompted to
consider either (i) leaving designated building areas out of the conservation
easement and therefore unrestricted or (ii) conveying two easements, one
nondeductible easement encumbering the designated building areas, and a
second deductible easement encumbering the remaining property that
satisfies all federal tax law requirements. However, neither of these options
is ideal. The first—leaving building areas entirely unrestricted—could have
a detrimental effect on the protection of the conservation values of the
encumbered land and reduce the donor’s deduction as a result of the “entire
contiguous parcel” valuation rule. 117 The second—conveyance of two
easements—would increase the expense and complexity of the donation
transaction. The costs associated with these options also may be
disproportionate to the potential benefits obtained for a number of reasons.
• First, the Treasury Regulation’s formula, which requires the
payment of only a fixed minimum percentage of proceeds to the
holder following extinguishment, will benefit the property owner if
the value of the easement relative to the value of the land increases
following the date of the donation, which may often be the case.
• Second, extinguishments, which require a judicial proceeding and a
finding of impossibility or impracticality, should be extremely rare,
occurring only in “extraordinary circumstances” (see Belk III,
Carpenter).
• Third, the likelihood of an extinguishment during the donor’s
limited ownership period is even more remote.
• And fourth, while condemnation is a possibility, condemnations are
also relatively rare, and condemning authorities generally go out of
117

See Part II.A.8 above, discussing options for addressing reserved development rights.

54
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384360

their way to avoid condemning structures, particularly personal
residences.
Thus, while for some donors the costs associated with the two options noted
above may be worth the potential benefits, for many donors, given that
extinguishment of a perpetual easement is extremely unlikely, encumbering
the entire property (including the building areas) with a single easement and
including a compliant proceeds clause that does not subtract the value of
improvements will be the best option.
13. Noncompliant Deemed Approval Clause. In a July 12, 2017, pre-trail Order
issued in Hoffman Properties II, LP v. Comm’r (Docket No. 14130-15),118 the Tax
Court determined that the Hoffman partnership was not entitled to a $15 million
deduction for the donation of a façade easement on a building because the easement
contained an “automatic approval” clause. Specifically, the easement reserved to
Hoffman the right to modify, alter, or expand the building and its exterior in any
manner desired, provided that Hoffman obtained prior approval from the holder.
The easement further provided that if the holder failed to expressly reject a request
for approval within 45 days of receiving it, the request was automatically approved
and Hoffman could proceed with the proposed activity—even if the activity were
inconsistent with the historic character of the exterior and the conservation purposes
of the easement. The court explained that the automatic approval clause stripped
the holder of any right to object to or remedy alterations or modifications that might
be inconsistent with the historic character of the exterior or otherwise jeopardize
the easement’s conservation purpose. As a result, the conservation purpose of the
easement was not protected in perpetuity and the easement failed to qualify for a
deduction under § 170(h).
In a March 14, 2018, Order, the court denied Hoffman’s motion to reconsider its
holdings in its July 2017 Order and affirmed those holdings. The court also
addressed Hoffman’s argument that the shortcomings in the easement were
irrelevant because the general public or the Ohio Attorney General (AG) had the
right to prevent Hoffman from altering or modifying the building’s façade in a
manner inconsistent with the building’s historic character. In support of this
argument, Hoffman cited to Ohio statutory and case law empowering the AG to
enforce, oversee, and administer charitable interests and nonprofit corporations. In
rejecting this argument, the court explained that, while it is undisputed that Ohio
law empowers the AG to initiate a suit to enforce the terms of an easement if the
holder neglects to do so, the AG does not possess any greater rights than those
granted to the holder under the easement. Thus, neither the holder nor the AG could
object to an activity undertaken by Hoffman that had been automatically approved
under the automatic approval clause.
Finally, in a second March 14, 2018, Order, in which the court came to similar
conclusions regarding the portion of the easement relating the air space above the
building, Hoffman argued that the possibility that the holder would fail to deny a
118

Tax Court Orders are available on the Tax Court website: https://www.ustaxcourt.gov.
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request to do something inconsistent with the purpose of the easement within the
45-day period was “so remote as to be negligible.” In rejecting this argument, the
court explained that inclusion of the automatic approval clause in the easement
indicated that the parties did not consider that possibility to be improbable (i.e., so
remote as to be negligible).
Although not mentioned by the court, denying a deduction for a conservation
easement containing an automatic approval clause is also appropriate from a policy
perspective. A tax-deductible conservation easement should not be rendered
unenforceable as a result of the holder’s inaction. A holder may fail to respond to a
request from the landowner for a variety of reasons, such as other pressing
obligations, misplaced mail, email oversight, turnover in staff, or gross negligence,
none of which should result in the forfeiture of the public’s rights and investment
in an easement.119
Although Tax Court Orders are of limited precedential value, 120 the Hoffman
Orders signal the position of the Tax Court and the IRS with regard to automatic
approval clauses. Sometimes attorneys representing property owners treat
conservation easement donations as if they are commercial transactions rather than
charitable contributions, and these attorneys negotiate to include clauses in the
easement deed that they think will benefit the property owner, such as an automatic
approval clause. These attorneys fail to recognize that they are dealing with a
charitable contribution intended to provide perpetual benefits to the public and, to
be eligible for a deduction, the conservation purpose of the easement must be
protected in perpetuity. The Hoffman Orders should make clear that such clauses
are not appropriate in the tax-deductible conservation easement context.
Rather than automatic approval, a holder’s failure to respond should be deemed a
constructive denial. Below is a sample “constructive denial” clause. 121
For activities or uses that are expressly permitted by the terms of this
Easement only with Holder’s approval, Owner’s request for approval shall
be in writing and shall describe the nature, scope, design, location,
timetable, and any other material aspect of the proposed activity or use in
sufficient detail to permit Holder to make an informed determination
regarding approval or denial of the request. Such a request shall be delivered
to Holder at least sixty (60) days prior to the anticipated start date of such
activity or use. Holder agrees to use reasonable diligence to respond to the
request within sixty (60) days of delivery. Holder’s failure to respond to
119

For cases in which the court held that the public’s rights with respect to a conservation easement were not forfeited as
a result of the actions or inactions of the holder, see, e.g., Feduniak v. California Coastal Commission, 148 Cal. App. 4th
1346 (2007); Weston Forest and Trail Assoc. v. Fishman, 849 N.E. 2d 916 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).
120
U.S. Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 50(f) (“Orders shall not be treated as precedent, except as may
be relevant for purposes of establishing the law of the case, res judicata, collateral estoppel, or other similar doctrine.”).
121
This sample provision is drafted to comply with § 170(h) and Treasury Regulation requirements. However, neither
the IRS nor the courts have blessed this sample provision. Readers are responsible for obtaining legal advice from their
own legal counsel.
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such a request within the sixty (60) day period shall be deemed a
constructive denial. Because a constructive denial is not a decision by
Holder based on the merits of Owner’s request, it is not final or binding on
Holder, and Owner can resubmit the same or a similar request for approval.
This clause protects the public because the easement will not be rendered
unenforceable due to the holder’s failure to respond within the specified time
period. This clause also protects the property owner from an unreasonable or
negligent holder because the property owner can seek redress in the courts if the
holder fails to use “reasonable diligence” to respond within the designated time
period.
14. Releasing Land With Transfer to “Comparable” Easement. In Salt Point
Timber, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of a $2.1 million deduction
claimed by an LLC for the donation of a conservation easement on a 1,032-acre
parcel in South Carolina. The conservation easement contained a “boundary line
adjustment” provision that required the holder to release land from the original
easement (an extinguishment of the original easement with regard to the released
land) if (i) the released land was transferred to the owner of adjacent property
encumbered by a “comparable” conservation easement and (ii) the owner of the
adjacent property and the holder of the comparable easement agreed to modify the
comparable easement to add the released land.
The Tax Court denied the deduction because the boundary line adjustment
provision did not require the holder of the “replacement” (comparable) easement to
be a “qualified organization” within the meaning of § 170(h). The court explained
that, had the parties intended the replacement easement to be held by a qualified
organization, they could have easily written such a restriction into the boundary
line adjustment provision, which they did not do. In addition, the expectation that
the word “comparable,” which was not defined in the easement, incorporated such
a specific requirement was not objectively reasonable.
The Tax Court also determined that the possibility that acreage would be released
from the original easement and encumbered by a replacement easement was not “so
remote as to be negligible.” There was an expectation that the donation of the
original easement would “encourage neighboring landowners to commit their
properties to conservation in a domino-effect fashion,” state and local entities were
encouraging and subsidizing the donation of conservation easements in the area,
and, significantly, the parties had “bothered to put” the boundary line adjustment
provision in the easement.
Because the Tax Court denied the deduction on the grounds noted above, it did not
address the IRS’s argument that the boundary line adjustment provision permitted
the restrictions of the original easement to be extinguished with regard to the
released land without satisfaction of the Treasury Regulations’ judicial
extinguishment requirements.
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15. Reimbursement of Funders on Extinguishment. Irby analyzed Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) (the division of proceeds portion of the
extinguishment regulation) as applied to conservation easements conveyed in
bargain sale transactions. The conservation easements in Irby had been conveyed
to a land trust, but three government entities had supplied funding to pay
approximately 75% of the value of the easements to the landowners, and the
landowners made charitable gifts of the remaining 25%. To be eligible for a
deduction for the donation component of a bargain sale transaction, the donation
must meet all of the statutory and regulatory requirements for the deduction.122
The easement deeds in Irby provide that the grantee (the land trust) is entitled to
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii)’s mandated minimum proportionate
share of proceeds following extinguishment, but must pay 75% of those proceeds
to the government entities to reimburse them for their contributions to the purchase
price of the easements, which would leave the grantee with only 25% of the
proceeds.
a. The IRS argued that the reimbursement obligation meant that the grantee
was not actually entitled to the mandated minimum proportionate share of
proceeds following extinguishment—i.e., that its entitlement was merely
“superficial.” The Tax Court disagreed. The court explained that, unlike the
situation where a lender holding an outstanding mortgage on the property is
given priority to proceeds upon extinguishment (which furthers the
taxpayer’s interests because the proceeds will be used to pay down the
taxpayer’s debt), there was no risk that the taxpayers in Irby could reap a
similar windfall upon extinguishment because the proceeds payable by the
grantee to the governmental entities, each of which has a conservation
mission, would be used by such entities “in a manner consistent with the
original conservation purposes of the contribution” (as explained in the next
paragraph). Thus, the court found that the easement deeds met the
requirements of division of proceeds regulation.
b. The Tax Court noted that the IRS’s concerns in Irby more properly
seemed to address the question of whether all of the extinguishment
proceeds would be used by the grantee “in a manner consistent with the
conservation purposes of the original contribution” as required by Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i). The court determined that they would. It
explained that all three government entities “were established to assist the
conservation of open land” and are “legally obligated to fulfill their
conservation purpose.” In addition, the court stated that it appeared that the
reimbursements would enhance the ability of the government entities “to
conserve and protect more land, since the reimbursed funds would be used
to do just that.” Accordingly, the court found that the reimbursement

122

See IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide, supra note 23, at 39 and 40.
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provision in Irby did not violate the requirements of either the
extinguishment or division of proceeds regulations.123
c. The Tax Court issued stipulated decisions in Irby in December 2013
ordering the taxpayers to pay agreed upon deficiencies in income tax for
taxable years 2003 and 2004, but no penalties were imposed.
16. Safe Harbor Provisions and Amnesty Period. The amount of litigation in this
context could be significantly reduced if the IRS developed safe harbor or “sample”
conservation easement provisions to satisfy the key perpetuity requirements of §
170(h). While many provisions of an easement must be tailored to the specific
property and situation, many of the perpetuity requirements, including those
addressing restriction on transfer, judicial extinguishment, and division of proceeds
upon extinguishment, could be satisfied with provisions that generally should not
vary from easement to easement. Safe harbor provisions would facilitate both donor
compliance and IRS review, and would help to ensure that the public investment in
easements and their conservation purposes is actually “protected in perpetuity” as
Congress intended. Moreover, developing safe harbor provisions would not be a
novel approach to facilitating compliance and curbing abuse. The Treasury
developed safe harbor trust provisions with annotations in the charitable remainder
trust and charitable lead trust contexts and those provisions, which are widely used,
have greatly facilitated compliance and reduced abuses.
The IRS and Treasury also could consider providing a temporary amnesty period
upon issuance of safe harbor provisions. That is, give taxpayers a period of time
(e.g., 6 months) to amend already recorded easement deeds to bring noncompliant
clauses into compliance and, if they do, the fact that the deeds contained those
noncompliant clauses at the time of their donation would not result in a denial of
the deduction. But if taxpayers do not amend their deeds to come into compliance
during the amnesty period, the donations could be challenged on those grounds.
B. IRS Form 8283 (Appraisal Summary)
1. History.
a. In 1984, as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA), 124
Congress required taxpayers claiming deductions for noncash charitable
contributions in excess of $5,000 to obtain a qualified appraisal prepared by
a qualified appraiser and attach an appraisal summary to the return on which

123
Some have argued that the court reached the correct result in Irby, but for the wrong reason. Treasury Regulation §
1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) could be viewed as applying only to the portion of the proceeds attributable to the contribution
component of a bargain sale transaction, and not to the portion of the proceeds attributable to the sales component of the
transaction. Allowing the funders to be reimbursed for the funds they contributed to the purchase price should thus not
run afoul of the proceeds requirement, although the priority of the payments might be an issue.
124
Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 691 (1984).
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the deduction is first claimed for the property contributed.125 DEFRA also
directed the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe regulations implementing
the statutory requirements. Pursuant to this legislative mandate, the IRS and
the Treasury Department promulgated Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-13(c),
which provides that no deduction shall be allowed for a noncash
contribution in excess of $5,000 unless the taxpayer:
(i) obtains a qualified appraisal prepared by a qualified appraiser,
and
(ii) attaches a fully completed appraisal summary (IRS Form 8283)
to the tax return on which the taxpayer first claims a deduction for
the contribution.
b. In 2004, Congress added § 170(f)(11) to the Internal Revenue Code
effective for contributions made after June 3, 2004.126 Section 170(f)(11)
provides, among other things, that:
(i) in the case of contributions of property for which a deduction of
more than $5,000 is claimed, the taxpayer must obtain a qualified
appraisal and attach to the return for the taxable year in which such
contribution is made such information regarding such property and
such appraisal as the Secretary may require,127 and
(ii) in the case of contributions of property for which a deduction of
more than $500,000 is claimed, the taxpayer must attach the full
qualified appraisal to the return (i.e., the entire qualified appraisal
must be filed with the Form 8283).128
c. In 2006, Congress amended § 170(f)(11) to add statutory definitions of
the terms “qualified appraiser” and “qualified appraisal” (§ 170(f)(11), as
amended, is attached as Appendix D).129
d. Later in 2006, the IRS issued Notice 2006-96, which, among other things,
provided transitional guidance regarding § 170(f)(11)(E)’s definitions of
qualified appraisal and qualified appraiser.

125
DEFRA § 155(a). Congress defined the term “qualified appraisal” to mean an appraisal prepared by a qualified
appraiser that includes, among other information: (1) a description of the property appraised, (2) the fair market value of
the property on the contribution date and the specific basis for valuation, (3) a statement that the appraisal was prepared
for income tax purposes, (4) the qualifications of the appraiser, and (5) any additional information the Secretary may
prescribe by regulation. DEFRA § 155(a)(4).
126
See § 883 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418.
127
IRC § 170(f)(11)(C).
128
IRC § 170(f)(11)(D).
129
IRC § 170(f)(11)(E). See § 1219 of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–280, 120 Stat. 780. For an
explanation of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 changes, see JCT Explanation of Pension Protection Act of 2006,
supra note 17.

60
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384360

e. In 2008, the Treasury Department issued proposed regulations
implementing the substantiation and reporting requirements for charitable
contribution deductions. 130 Until these regulations were finalized and
effective, the transitional guidance in IRS Notice 2006-96 applied.
f. In July 2018, the Treasury Department issued final regulations
implementing substantiation and reporting requirements for charitable
contribution deductions (attached as Appendix E).131
(i) Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-16 sets forth the substantiation
and reporting requirements for noncash charitable contributions
made after July 30, 2018, although taxpayers may rely on the rules
of this regulation for contributions made after June 3, 2004, or
appraisals prepared for returns or submissions filed after August 17,
2006.132 Pursuant to this regulation:
(1) No deduction is allowed for a noncash charitable
contribution of more than $5,000 unless the donor:
• substantiates
the
contribution
with
a
contemporaneous written acknowledgment from the
donee,
• obtains a qualified appraisal prepared by a qualified
appraiser, and
• completes Form 8283 (Section B) and files it with the
return on which the deduction is claimed.133
(2) For a noncash charitable contributions of more than
$500,000, the donor must also attach a copy of the qualified
appraisal to the return on which the deduction is claimed.134
(3) These requirements also apply to a return filed for any
carryover year. 135
(ii) Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-17 sets forth the requirements for
“qualified appraisals” and “qualified appraisers” for contributions
made on or after January 1, 2019, although taxpayers may rely on
the rules of this regulation for appraisals prepared for returns or
submissions filed after August 17, 2006.136
130

See Substantiation and Reporting Requirements for Cash and Noncash Charitable Contribution Deductions, 73 Federal
Register 45908 (proposed August 7, 2008).
131
TD 9836, Final Regulations, Substantiation and Reporting Requirements for Cash and Noncash Charitable
Contribution Deductions (July 30. 2018) [hereinafter Final Substantiation and Reporting Regulations] (attached at
Appendix E).
132
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-16(g).
133
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-16(d)(1).
134
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-16(e)(1).
135
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-16(f)(3).
136
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-17(c).
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(iii) Treasury Regulation § 1.6050L-1(d)(2) provides that a donee
must retain the Form 8283 “for so long as it may be relevant in the
administration of any internal revenue law.”
g. As the foregoing indicates, the qualified appraisal, qualified appraiser,
and appraisal summary requirements are both statutory and regulatory
requirements.
2. IRS Form 8283, Section B. Donors should correctly and completely fill out
Section B of IRS Form 8283 and attach a Supplemental Statement as described
below. Donors should not rely on substantial compliance.
a. DEFRA specifically requires taxpayers to include on the return on which
a deduction is first claimed such information as may be prescribed by
Treasury Regulations, including the cost basis and acquisition date of the
donated property.137 The Treasury Regulations implement this requirement
by providing that the appraisal summary (Form 8283) must include, among
other things: (i) the fair market value of the property on the “valuation
effective date”; (ii) the manner and approximate date of acquisition of the
property by the donor; (ii) the cost or other basis of the property; and (iv) a
statement explaining whether the contribution was made by means of a
bargain sale and, if so, the amount of any consideration received.138
b. The donee and the individual appraiser or appraisers (if more than one)
must all sign the Form 8283.139
c. The Instructions for Form 8283 state, with regard to Section B, Part I,
Line 5, Columns (d)—(f) (addressing date acquired, how acquired, and
basis): “If you have reasonable cause for not providing the information in
columns (d), (e), or (f), attach an explanation so your deduction will not
automatically be disallowed” (emphasis added). The Instructions also
provide: “For a qualified conservation contribution, indicate whether you
are providing information about the underlying property or about the
easement.”
d. The case law in this context is unpredictable. For example, in Kaufman
III, the First Circuit held that the taxpayers’ failure to include the date,
manner of acquisition, and cost or other basis relating to a façade easement
on the Form 8283 was not fatal to the deduction.140 However, in Belair, the
Tax Court held that the taxpayer, who on the advice of a consultant had
declined to include the cost basis relating to a conservation easement on the
Form 8283, neither strictly nor substantially complied with the Treasury
137

DEFRA § 155(a)(1)(C).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-16(d)(3).
139
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-16(d)(3), (4), (5), (7).
140
See also Scheidelman III.
138
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Regulation requirements. The taxpayer in Belair claimed a deduction for
the donation that presupposed that the encumbered land had increased in
value by 1,380% in the 2½ years since its purchase, amid the worst real
estate crisis since the Great Depression. The court explained:
When a taxpayer claims a charitable contribution deduction for
recently purchased property, a wide gap between cost basis and
claimed value raises a red flag suggesting that the return merits
examination. Unless the taxpayer complies with the regulatory
requirement that he disclose his cost basis and the date and manner
of acquiring the property, the Commissioner will be deprived of an
essential tool that Congress intended him to have.
In response to the taxpayer’s claim that it effectively disclosed its cost basis
elsewhere on its tax return, the court noted:
The IRS reviews millions of returns each year for audit potential,
and the disclosure of cost basis on the Form 8283 itself is necessary
to make this process manageable. Revenue agents cannot be
required to sift through dozens or hundreds of pages of complex
returns looking for clues about what the taxpayer’s cost basis might
be…. If cost basis is not explicitly disclosed where it is required to
be disclosed, the Commissioner will be handicapped in identifying
suspicious charitable deductions and deterring taxpayers from
“continu[ing] to play the ‘audit lottery.’
Moreover, Belair was not a case were the taxpayer had omitted the
information through inadvertence. Rather, the taxpayer made a conscious
election not to supply the required information. However, the Tax Court
determined that it did not have sufficient facts to resolve the issue of
whether the taxpayer could qualify for the reasonable cause defense.141
e. The IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide provides the
following list of common errors in Section B of Form 8283:
• Inadequate description of the property
• Missing information
• Missing signatures
• Inconsistent dates142
3. Supplemental Statement. The Instructions for Form 8283 require the donor to
attach a supplemental statement to the form.
a. The supplemental statement must:

141
142

See § 170(f)(11)(A)(ii)(II).
See IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide, supra note 23, at 27.
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(i) identify the conservation purposes furthered by the donation,
(ii) show, if before and after valuation is used, the fair market value
of the underlying property before and after the gift,
(iii) state whether the donation was made in order to get a permit or
other approval from a local or other governing authority and whether
the donation was required by a contract (i.e., was there a quid pro
quo), and
(iv) if the donor or a related person has any interest in other property
nearby, describe that interest.
b. The Supplemental Statement should be comprehensive and detailed
(numerous pages long). An example of a supplemental statement is attached
as Appendix F.
4. Special Rules for Façade Easement Donations. For the donation of a façade
easement on a building in a registered historic district, in addition to the Form 8283
and Supplemental Statement, the taxpayer must include with the taxpayer’s return
for the year of the contribution: (a) a qualified appraisal, (b) photos of the entire
exterior of the building, (c) a description of all restrictions on the development of
the building, and (d) if the deduction claimed is more than $10,000, a $500 filing
fee.143
In Gemperle, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of deductions claimed
with regard to the donation of a façade easement because the taxpayers, a married
couple who represented themselves in Tax Court, failed to include a qualified
appraisal of the easement with the return they filed for the year of the contribution.
The court also found the Gemperles liable for 20% penalties for “disregard of rules
or regulations” under IRC § 6662(a) and (b)(1). The court explained that the
requirement that the full qualified appraisal be included with the tax return filed for
the year of the contribution is stated not only in the Internal Revenue Code but also
in the instructions for the Form 8283, and the taxpayers “were at least careless, if
not reckless, in ignoring the warning that an appraisal was required.” The court
further found that the Gemperles were alternatively liable for 40% strict liability
penalties under IRC § 6662(h) for making gross valuation misstatements on their
2007 and 2008 returns with regard to the easement.
C. Qualified Appraisal Requirements
1. General Requirements. The current “qualified appraisal” requirements are
found in IRC § 170(f)(11) (attached as Appendix D) and Treasury Regulation §
1.170A-17 (attached as Appendix E). Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-17 applies to
contributions made on or after January 1, 2019, although taxpayers may rely on the
143

See IRC §§ 170(h)(4)(B)(iii) and 170(f)(13). See also IRS Form 8283-V.
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rules of this regulation for appraisals prepared for returns or submissions filed after
August 17, 2006.144
For the “qualified appraisal” regulations in effect before Treasury Regulation §
1.170A-17, see Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-13. For transitional guidance
regarding § 170(f)(11)(E)’s definitions of “qualified appraisal” and “qualified
appraiser,” see IRS Notice 2006-96. Taxpayers may rely on Notice 2006-96 prior
to the effective date of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-17, noted above.145 For a
history of these requirements, see Part II.B.1 above.
Because Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-17 incorporates or only slightly modifies
many of the qualified appraisal and qualified appraiser requirements in place before
its effective date, the cases below, which were decided based on the former
requirements, remain relevant.
a. Donors Should Strictly Comply. Donors should strictly comply with all
statutory and regulatory qualified appraisal requirements. While in some
cases the courts have been willing to forgive failures to strictly comply with
some of the requirements, 146 in the following cases failures to strictly
comply led to a complete disallowance of the claimed deductions.
(i) Lord. In Lord, the Tax Court sustained the disallowance of a
deduction for the donation of a conservation easement because the
taxpayer’s appraisal (which did not include the easement
contribution date, the date the appraisal was performed, or the
appraised fair market value of the easement on the contribution date)
was not a qualified appraisal. The doctrine of substantial compliance
was not applicable because significant information was omitted.
(ii) Costello. In Costello, landowners conveyed a conservation
easement permanently prohibiting development of their 73-acre
farm to Howard County, Maryland, in exchange for the right to sell
16 development rights to a developer for $2.5 million. The
developer was able to use those rights to increase density on parcels
located in a “receiving area” of the county (i.e., the exchange was
pursuant to the county’s transfer of development rights program).
Seven months later, the landowners hired an appraiser to appraise
144

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-17(c).
See Final Substantiation and Reporting Regulations, supra note 131, at 36418.
146
In Zarlengo, the Tax Court held that the taxpayer complied or substantially complied with the various qualified
appraisal requirements even though, among other things, the appraisal was “premature” (i.e., prepared more than sixty
days prior to the date of the contribution). In Irby, the Tax Court held that an appraisal report’s discussion of the purpose
of the appraisal (i.e., to value an easement for purposes of § 170(h)) was sufficient to satisfy Treasury Regulation §
1.170A–13(c)(3)(ii)(G)’s requirement that the appraisal contain “[a] statement that the appraisal was prepared for income
tax purposes.” In Simmons II, Scheidelman II, and Friedberg II, the courts held that the appraisals obtained to substantiate
façade easement donations sufficiently detailed the method used and basis of valuation for purposes of Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(J) and (K). Provision of the basis of valuation is also required by DEFRA
§155(a)(4)(B).
145
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their property before and after a “hypothetical” sale of development
rights. The appraiser was unaware of the existing conservation
easement and assumed the property could be developed into a 25lot subdivision. He estimated the value of the hypothetical
development rights to be $5.5 million and the taxpayers filed a tax
return claiming a charitable income tax deduction of that amount.
Howard county refused to sign an IRS Form 8283 as the “donee”
because it questioned whether the conveyance of the easement
constituted a charitable donation.
The IRS disallowed the claimed deduction on a number of grounds,
including that the taxpayers failed to obtain a “qualified appraisal.”
The Tax Court sustained the disallowance, finding, among other
things, that the taxpayer’s appraisal failed to include the following
three elements required for a qualified appraisal: (a) the appraisal
did not contain an accurate description of the contributed property
(the appraiser didn’t describe or purport to value the conservation
easement because the appraiser was unaware of its existence), (b)
the appraisal did not contain the date of the contribution
(unsurprising given that the appraiser was unaware of the easement
conveyance), and (c) the appraisal did not contain the salient terms
of any of the agreements relating to the contributed property (again,
unsurprising given that the appraiser was unaware that the
landowners had agreed to grant the easement to the county in
exchange for the right to sell development rights for $2.5 million).
After filing their initial income tax return and claiming a $5.5
million deduction, the landowners apparently had second thoughts.
They had their appraiser prepare an addendum to his appraisal that
took into account their sale of development rights to the developer
for $2.5 million, and they filed an amended income tax return
claiming a deduction of only $3 million. However, the appraiser’s
addendum was not prepared within the required time period for the
qualified appraisal (i.e., no more than 60 days before the date of the
gift and no later than the due date (including extensions) of the
return on which the deduction was first claimed).147 The Tax Court
held that the untimely addendum did not convert the original
appraisal into a qualified appraisal. The court also held that the
appraisal did not “substantially comply” with the reporting
requirements because it omitted numerous categories of important
information and appraised the wrong asset.
The Tax Court further explained that, pursuant to IRC
§ 170(f)(11)(A)(ii)(II) (see Appendix D), “[e]ven absent strict or
substantial compliance with the ‘qualified appraisal’ and reporting
147

See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(i)(A).
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requirements, a deduction will not be denied if the failure to meet
those requirements is due to ‘reasonable cause and not to willful
neglect.’” The burden of proving reasonable cause is on the
taxpayer, however, and the court held that, given the magnitude of
the omissions from the appraisal and the Form 8283, particularly the
failure to disclose the prior sale of development rights for $2.5
million, the taxpayers could not show that their failures were due to
reasonable cause.
(iii) Mecox. In Mecox, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York sustained the IRS’s complete disallowance of
a deduction claimed with regard to the donation of a façade
easement because (i) the easement was found not to have been
contributed until the year it was recorded, which was the year
following the year in which the taxpayer claimed the deduction and
(ii) the appraisal was untimely (i.e., the appraisal was made more
than 60 days prior to the date of the contribution148). For a more
detailed discussion of Mecox, see Part III.C.2 below.
b. Collective Defects. After the Second Circuit’s holding in Scheidelman II
(discussed below), the Tax Court in Rothman II reconsidered its earlier
opinion and concluded that the Rothman appraisal met the method used and
basis of valuation requirements of the Treasury Regulations. However, the
court noted that Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-13 imposed fifteen distinct
requirements and the appraisal in Rothman failed to satisfy eight of the
fifteen requirements. Because of the “collective defects,” the court
reconfirmed its holding that the appraisal was not qualified. The court
further noted that, because the qualified appraisal regulation was
promulgated under an express delegation of congressional authority and has
been found to be valid, the U.S. Supreme Court instructs that courts respect
the lines the Secretary of the Treasury has drawn therein as a valid exercise
of rulemaking authority. Whether the donor in Rothman qualified for the
“reasonable cause” exception for not having a qualified appraisal under §
170(f)(11)(A)(ii)(II) was an issue that remained to be tried, but the case
settled.
c. Qualified Appraisals That Are Not Credible. In a number of façade
easement cases the courts held that the appraisals met the minimal
requirements of a qualified appraisal but did not provide credible evidence
of value.
(i) Scheidelman. In Scheidelman II, the Second Circuit explained:
[f]or the purpose of gauging compliance with the reporting
requirement, it is irrelevant that the IRS believes the method
148

See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(i)(A).
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employed [a mechanical application of a percentage
diminution] was sloppy or inaccurate, or haphazardly
applied—it remains a method, and [the appraiser] described
it. The regulation requires only that the appraiser identify the
valuation method “used”; it does not require that the method
adopted be reliable.
However, the Second Circuit went on to explain that its conclusion
that the appraisal met the minimal requirements of a qualified
appraisal mandated neither that the Tax Court find the appraisal
persuasive nor that Scheidelman be entitled to any deduction for the
donated façade easement, and it remanded to the Tax Court.
In Scheidelman III, the Tax Court held that, although the taxpayers’
appraisal was a qualified appraisal: (a) the taxpayers did not provide
sufficient credible evidence to meet their burden of establishing
entitlement to the claimed deduction and (b) the preponderance of
the evidence supported the IRS's position that the façade easement
had no value.
In Scheidelman IV the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s
holding that the easement had no value. 149 In support of its holding,
the Second Circuit quoted the IRS’s valuation expert, who explained
that “in highly desirable, sophisticated home markets like historic
brownstone Brooklyn, the imposition of an easement, such as the
one granted...does not materially affect the value of the subject
property.” The Second Circuit also found persuasive the fact that the
donee had assured one of Scheidelman's mortgagors that:
[a]s a practical matter, the easement does not add any new
restrictions on the use of the property because the historic
preservation laws of the City of New York already require a
specific historic review of any proposed changes to the
exterior of this property.

149
In Evans, Dunlap, Foster, Scheidelman, Kaufman, Chandler, and Reisner, façade easements on residential properties
were found to have no value (in Reisner the parties so stipulated). However, in some cases courts have determined that
façade easements reduced the value of the properties they encumbered, albeit by less than the taxpayers’ claimed. In
Simmons I, Zarlengo, and Gorra, the Tax Court held that façade easements reduced the value of the subject residential
properties by 5%, 3.5%, and 2%, respectively. In Seventeen Seventy Sherman Street, the IRS argued that a façade
easement had no effect on the value of a historic shrine because of already existing local historic preservation restrictions.
The Tax Court disagreed, holding that the easement was more protective of the shrine than local law. In Whitehouse
Hotel, after two appeals, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s holding that a façade easement encumbering the
historic Maison Blanche building (which is located in the French Quarter in New Orleans and is now used as a Ritz
Carlton hotel) reduced the value of the building by 14.9%. For a comprehensive discussion of the valuation case law
through 2015, see Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements and the Valuation Conundrum, 19 FLA. TAX REV.
225 (2016), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2704576.
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(ii) Kaufman. In Kaufman III, the First Circuit vacated the Tax
Court’s opinions in Kaufman I and Kaufman II in part and remanded
to the Tax Court on the issue of valuation.150 The First Circuit noted
that the Kaufmans had expressed concern to the donee, the National
Architectural Trust (NAT), about the high appraised value of the
façade easement they were donating because it implied a substantial
reduction in the resale value of their home, which was located in
Boston’s South End Historic District. “In an effort to reassure them,
a [NAT] representative told the Kaufmans that experience showed
that such easements did not reduce resale value.” “This,” said the
First Circuit, “could easily be the IRS's opening argument in a
valuation trial.”151 And so it apparently was.
In Kaufman IV, on remand from the First Circuit, the Tax Court
sustained the IRS’s complete disallowance of the deductions
claimed with regard to the façade easement donation on the ground
that the easement had no value. Although the Tax Court assumed
the Kaufman’s appraisal was a “qualified appraisal,” the court gave
no weight to the appraisal’s estimate of value because it found the
appraiser’s method (application of a standard diminution percentage
to the value of the property before the easement's donation) to be
unreliable and his analysis unpersuasive. The Tax Court found the
IRS’s valuation expert, who determined that the value of the
easement was zero, to be more persuasive. The IRS’s expert opined,
among other things, that the typical buyer would find the restrictions
in the façade easement no more burdensome than local historic
preservation restrictions and, even if the façade easement were more
restrictive, it would not necessarily reduce the value of the property
because homeowners in historic districts place a premium value on
the assurance that the neighborhood surrounding their homes will
remain unchanged over time. In Kaufman IV the Tax Court also
sustained the IRS imposition of accuracy-related penalties.
The indefatigable Kaufmans appealed the holding imposing
penalties to the First Circuit. In Kaufman V (discussed in Part III.B.2
below), the First Circuit affirmed, noting that the Tax Court did not
clearly err when it found that the Kaufmans were liable for penalties
for claiming a deduction for the donation of “a worthless historic
preservation easement on their home.”
(iii) Chandler. In Chandler, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s
complete disallowance of deductions claimed with regard to two
façade easement donations. As in Kaufman, the properties were
150

For discussion of other issues in Kaufman, see Part II.B.2 above and Part II.F.1 and Part III.B below.
The First Circuit also noted “Section 170(h) does not allow taxpayers to obtain six-figure deductions for gifts of lesser
or no value.”
151
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located in Boston’s South End Historic District and the easements
were donated to NAT. Relying on its analysis in Kaufman IV, the
court explained that, although there were minor differences (in
scope, monitoring, and enforcement) between the easement
restrictions and the restrictions already imposed by local law, those
differences do not affect property values because a typical buyer
would perceive no difference between the two sets of restrictions.
The court did not find the taxpayer’s appraisal, which asserted a
16% diminution in the value of the properties, to be credible. The
appraiser who prepared the appraisal has been barred from preparing
any kind of appraisal report or otherwise participating in the
appraisal process for any property relating to federal taxes.152
d. Importance of Compliant Appraisals. Donors should not rely on
appraisals that do not strictly comply with the qualified appraisal
requirements or use questionable valuation methods or bases. 153 While
failures to strictly comply with the rules have been forgiven in some cases,
in other cases they have resulted in complete disallowance of the claimed
deductions. Moreover, even though an appraisal might be found to be a
qualified appraisal, if it is poorly written, employs questionable methods or
bases, or is otherwise unconvincing, it may nonetheless trigger an audit and,
if litigated, the donor may be found to have failed to provide sufficient
credible evidence of value. In situations where a donation has already been
made and satisfaction of the qualified appraisal requirements is an issue on
audit or in litigation, however, the decisions in Simmons II, Scheidelman II,
Friedberg II, Irby, and Zarlengo may be helpful.
2. Conservation Easement-Specific Valuation Rules. Donors should strictly
comply with the conservation easement-specific valuation rules in Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A-14(h)(3), including the “entire contiguous parcel” and
“enhancement” rules.
a. Pursuant to the entire contiguous parcel rule, 154 the amount of the
deduction in the case of a conservation easement covering a portion of
contiguous property owned by the donor and the donor's “family” is the
difference between the fair market value of the entire contiguous parcel
before and after the granting of the easement.
b. Pursuant to the enhancement rule,155 if the granting of a conservation
easement has the effect of increasing the value of any other property owned
by the donor or a “related person,” the amount of the deduction must be

152

See Part I.O above.
For the IRS’s view of appraisals, see Nonprofit Law Professors Blog, IRS on Conservation Easement Appraisals, at
http://bit.ly/1UqHbTl.
154
The entire contiguous parcel rule is found in the fourth sentence of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i).
155
The enhancement rule is found in the fifth sentence of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i).
153
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reduced by the amount of the increase in the value of the other property,
whether or not such property is contiguous.
c. IRS Office of Chief Counsel Advice 201334039 (CCA) provides helpful
guidance on the application of the entire contiguous parcel and
enhancement rules.156
(i) The CCA discusses the meaning of the term “family” for
purposes of the entire contiguous parcel rule, the meaning of the
term “related person” for purposes of the enhancement rule, and
rules relating to constructive ownership and entity classification and
their impact on both the entire contiguous parcel and enhancement
rules. The CCA provides twelve examples of the application of these
rules to various situations involving property owned by individuals
and entities (LLCs, partnerships, and corporations).
(ii) The CCA also explains in a footnote that, for purposes of the
entire contiguous parcel rule, whether the entire contiguous parcel
is valued as one large property or as separate properties depends on
the highest and best use of the entire contiguous parcel.157
3. File Qualified Appraisal with Income Tax Return. The IRS has informally
suggested that a copy of the qualified appraisal be included in the package filed
with the income tax return on which a deduction for the easement donation is first
claimed even if the appraised value of the easement is $500,000 or less. If possible,
the qualified appraisal should include a copy of the recorded (date stamped)
conservation easement deed. In all cases, the appraiser should have valued the
restrictions as they appear in the final recorded easement deed rather than in an
earlier draft.
D. Contemporaneous Written Acknowledgment
1. IRC § 170(f)(8) Requirements. No deduction is allowed for a charitable
contribution of $250 or more unless the taxpayer substantiates the contribution with
a contemporaneous written acknowledgment (CWA) obtained from the donee.158
a. A CWA must include the following information:
(i) the amount of cash and a description (but not value) of any
property other than cash contributed,

156

IRS Chief Counsel Advice 201334039 (released Aug. 23, 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irswd/1334039.pdf.
157
See IRS on Conservation Easement Appraisals, supra note 153 (discussing this issue).
158
IRC § 170(f)(8)(A). While not a conservation easement donation case, Van Dusen v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 515, contains
a detailed discussion of the CWA requirement.
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(ii) whether the donee provided any goods or services in
consideration, in whole or in part, for the contributed property, and
(iii) if goods and services were provided, a description and good
faith estimate of the value of such goods or services.159
b. A CWA will be contemporaneous only if the taxpayer obtains it on or
before the earlier of
(i) the date on which the taxpayer files a return for the taxable year
in which the contribution was made, or
(ii) the due date (including extensions) for the filing of such
return.160
2. Form 990 Filing Insufficient. Failure of a donor to obtain a CWA cannot be
cured by having the donee file a Form 990 containing the required information. In
15 West 17th St. LLC, the Tax Court held that § 170(f)(8)(D)’s exception to the
CWA requirement, which provided that the requirement shall not apply if the donee
files a return including the CWA information “on such form and in accordance with
such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe,” was not available because the
Treasury had not issued such form or regulations.161 The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
signed into law by President Trump on December 22, 2017, repealed the §
170(f)(8)(D) exception to the CWA requirement for contributions made in tax years
beginning after December 31, 2016.162
3. Substantial Compliance Doctrine Inapplicable. As noted in 310 Retail LLC,
“‘[t]he doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply to excuse failure to obtain
a CWA meeting the statutory requirements.’” To justify the seeming harshness of
the rule disallowing a deduction for failure to obtain a CWA, the Ninth Circuit
explained: “The deterrence value of section 170(f)(8)’s total denial of a deduction
comports with the effective administration of a self-assessment and self-reporting
system.”163
4. No Particular Form Required but Form 8283 is not a CWA.
a. As noted in 310 Retail LLC, a CWA need not take any particular form
and may be furnished to the donor by (for example) letter, postcard, or
computer-generated media. Whatever form the acknowledgment takes,
159

IRC § 170(f)(8)(B).
IRC § 170(f)(8)(C).
161
See also 310 Retail LLC; Big River Development, LP; IRS Chief Counsel Advice 201120022 (May 20, 2011). 15 West
17th St. LLC involved a New York facade easement for which the taxpayer claimed a $64,490,000 deduction. The
property had been acquired 2½ years before the donation for $10 million, and the taxpayer was positing that the property
had appreciated in value by almost 600% during that time. By deciding the case on lack of CWA grounds, the court
avoided the fact-intensive valuation issue.
162
Pub. L. 115-97, § 13705.
163
See Addis v. Commissioner, 374 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2004).
160
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however, it must include all of the information required by § 170(f)(8)(B),
including an affirmative indication that the donee has provided no goods or
services to the donor, if that is the case.
b. An IRS Form 8283 (appraisal summary), even if fully completed, does
not constitute a CWA because only Section B, Part IV of that form
constitutes a donee acknowledgement, and that acknowledgement does not
contain all of the information required by § 170(f)(8)(B).164
5. Case Law Unpredictable. In Schrimsher and French, the Tax Court held that
the conservation easement deed could not serve as a CWA. See also Bruzewicz
(letter identifying cash contributions relating to façade easement donation was not
a CWA; doctrine of substantial compliance inapplicable) and Didonato (settlement
agreement was not a CWA). In Simmons I,165 Averyt, RP Golf I, 310 Retail LLC,
and Big River Development, LP, however, the Tax Court held that the conservation
easement deed could serve as a CWA. And in Irby, the Tax Court held that
documents associated with the bargain sale of two easements collectively
constituted a CWA. Given the fact-specific holdings in the cases, donors should not
rely on a conservation easement deed or other documentation to serve as the CWA.
Rather, donors should always obtain a separate CWA from the donee.
6. Safety Valve. Some government entities accepting conservation easement
donations have refused to provide donors with a CWA. Donors and their counsel
should discuss this issue early on with a prospective government holder. To address
this issue and, in general, to serve as both a good “safety valve” and a reminder to
the parties, some practitioners include a statement in the easement deed that (i) no
goods or services were provided by the donee in consideration for the easement (if
that is the case) and (ii) the donee agrees to provide the donor with a separate letter
containing the information required by § 170(f)(8).
E. Compelling and Timely Baseline Documentation
1. The Treasury Regulations require that an easement donor make available to the
donee, prior to the time the donation is made, documentation sufficient to establish
the condition of the subject property at the time of the gift (“baseline
documentation”).166

164

See Final Substantiation and Reporting Regulations, supra note 131, at 36419.
In Simmons I, Tax Court Judge Goeke stated that the easement deed could serve as a CWA. However, the donee in
Simmons had provided the donor with a separate letter that complied with the statutory CWA requirements, so it is not
clear why the Judge addressed the issue. The judge did not fully discuss whether or how the easement deed satisfied the
CWA requirements.
166
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i). Although this requirement is applicable only if the “donor reserves rights the
exercise of which may impair the conservation interests associated with the property,” that will almost always be the
case. Moreover, it is common practice and recommended that this requirement be satisfied with regard to every
conservation easement donation because it helps to ensure the holder will have the information needed to properly enforce
the easement.
165
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a. The baseline documentation must describe in detail the subject property
and its open space, habitat, scenic, historic, and other conservation values.
In addition, if the easement deed contains restrictions with regard to a
particular natural resource to be protected, such as water quality or air
quality, then the condition of that resource at or near the time of the gift
must also be established in the baseline documentation.167
b. The baseline documentation must be accompanied by a statement signed
by the donor and a representative of the donee clearly referencing the
documentation and in substance stating: “This natural resources inventory
is an accurate representation of [the protected property] at the time of the
transfer” (referred to hereinafter as a “certification”).168
•

In some cases, the parties have drafted the certification to provide
that the parties agree the inventory (or baseline documentation) may
be supplemented in the future (e.g., where the baseline
documentation is prepared when the property is covered with snow).
This has caused problems on audit. The baseline documentation
must be fully completed prior to the time the donation is made.
While annual or more frequent monitoring reports should be added
to the file maintained for the easement following its donation, the
baseline documentation is a snapshot of the condition of the property
at the time of the easement’s donation and should not be modified.

•

Assuming the baseline documentation is timely completed,
easement drafters may want to include language in the easement
deed confirming that the baseline documentation is complete and
that the parties agree that it is an accurate representation of the
protected property at the time of the donation.

c. The baseline documentation should be detailed and compelling; it is the
donor’s best opportunity (as part of the tax filing) to persuade the IRS that
the property has important conservation or historic values worthy of
preservation. In some instances, easement donees hire qualified consultants
to put together comprehensive and extensive baseline documentation. The
Treasury Regulations, however, technically put the burden on the donor to
make the baseline documentation available to the donee prior to the time
the donation is made. 169 Accordingly, it is the donor’s responsibility to
ensure that the baseline documentation requirements are satisfied.
d. The baseline documentation is also critical for enforcement purposes; it
provides evidence of the condition of the property, including the property’s
conservation values and any improvements or incursions, on the date of the
167

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i)(D).
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i)(D).
169
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i).
168
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donation. The Treasury Regulations explain that the purpose of the baseline
is to “protect the conservation interests associated with the property, which
although protected in perpetuity by the easement, could be adversely
affected by the exercise of the reserved rights.” 170 The baseline is thus
essential to ensuring that the conservation purpose of the easement is
“protected in perpetuity,” and failure to timely prepare a fully completed
baseline could be fatal to the deduction.
e. The IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide provides that a
comprehensive baseline study would generally include the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

A description of the encumbrance
A description and map of the conservation characteristics and
areas (i.e., listing of identified plants or wildlife)
A map or series of maps depicting roads, fences, existing
structures, trails, water bodies, wetlands, and any other property
features
Identification of any reserved building sites
Surveys or plat maps
Description of any management plans, such as a timber plan
On-site photographs including aerial photographs
The study author’s name and professional credentials171

The Guide explains that the IRS examiner will need to assess the credibility
of the baseline study. A baseline study prepared by an independent qualified
expert such as a conservationist, biologist, forester or botanist would
generally be given greater evidentiary weight than one prepared by a less
qualified person or the taxpayer’s self-assessment. Also, a baseline with a
lot of documentary support is more credible than one with little support.172
The Guide further explains that some baseline studies are not propertyspecific and, instead, include a narrative about the general area or State
without any specific reference to the donated property, and those baseline
studies do not meet Treasury Regulation requirements.173
2. In Bosque Canyon Ranch, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of
$15.9 million of deductions claimed for the donation of conservation easements to
the North American Land Trust (NALT). Among other things, the court found that
the baseline documentation reports, which NALT had prepared, were “slipshod”
and “unreliable, incomplete, and insufficient to establish the condition of the
relevant property on the date the respective easements were granted.” Although the

170

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i).
See IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide, supra note 23, at 69.
172
See id., at 70.
173
See id., at 70.
171
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Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court, its opinion should not be viewed as a green
light for shoddy and untimely baselines.
•

Bosque Canyon Ranch is controlling only in the Fifth Circuit.

•

Preparation of comprehensive baseline documentation at the time of the
donation is in the interest of both the donor and the donee. Aside from the
risk of having the deduction denied, if there is no or an incomplete record
of the improvements and incursions on the subject property at the time the
donation was made, it may be impossible for the holder to prove, at some
later date, that a violation has occurred. Similarly, if there is no or an
incomplete record of the condition of the conservation values the easement
is intended to protect at the time the donation was made, it may be
impossible for the holder to prove, at some later date, that such conservation
values have been degraded or destroyed, or the extent of the damage or
destruction.

3. The IRS routinely asks for the baseline documentation on audit.
F. Correct and Timely Lender Agreement (if applicable)
1. Full Subordination. Donors should obtain a lender agreement that subordinates
the lender’s rights to all of the rights of the holder under the conservation easement,
including the holder’s right to at least a minimum proportionate share of the
proceeds received following extinguishment of the easement as specified in
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii). 174 Although the First Circuit took a
somewhat liberal approach to this issue in Kaufman III, in Palmolive I the Tax
Court indicated that it will not follow the First Circuit’s holding regarding this issue
in other circuits, and it appears that the IRS will continue to challenge deductions
on this ground in other circuits.
a. Kaufman III. In Kaufman III, the First Circuit vacated the Tax Court’s
holdings in Kaufman I and II that priority language in a lender agreement
impermissibly limited the operation of the “proceeds” clause included in a
facade easement to satisfy Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii). The
lender agreement in Kaufman provided that, if the easement were
extinguished as a result of a casualty event (such as a fire or flood) or
condemnation, the bank holding an outstanding mortgage on the property
174

For an example of such a “full subordination” clause, see the subordination agreement template of the Compact of
Cape Cod Conservation Trusts, which provides:
[Name and address of financial institution] ("Mortgagee"), present holder of a mortgage from, [donors]
("Mortgagor"), recorded on [date] in the [County] Registry of Deeds in Deed Book [ ] Page [ ], for consideration
paid, hereby recognizes and assents to the terms and provisions of a Conservation Restriction running to the
___________ Conservation Trust, to be recorded herewith, and agrees to subordinate and hold its mortgage
subject to the terms and provisions of said Conservation Restriction to the same extent as if said mortgage had
been recorded subsequent to the recording of the Conservation Restriction, and the undersigned shall, in the
exercise of its rights pursuant to said instrument, recognize the terms and provisions of the aforesaid
Conservation Restriction.
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had first priority to any insurance or condemnation proceeds. The Tax Court
held that the easement, as qualified by the lender agreement, failed to satisfy
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) because the intent of the drafters
of that regulation was that the donee have a right to a share of the proceeds
following extinguishment, and not merely a contractual claim against the
owner of the property for an amount equal to such share. The First Circuit
reversed, holding that it was sufficient that the donee had such a contractual
claim against the owner.
In footnote 5 of Kaufman III, however, the First Circuit noted that Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(2) (the “mortgage subordination” regulation)
could be read broadly to require that a lender subordinate its rights to the
donee’s right to post-extinguishment proceeds, which, pursuant to Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A–14(g)(6)(i), must be used by the donee to advance
conservation purposes. The First Circuit noted that it did not pursue this
issue because the IRS had “disclaimed” that broad reading of the mortgage
subordination regulation in Kaufman III.
b. Palmolive I. In Palmolive I, which is appealable to the Seventh Circuit,
the Tax Court declined to follow the First Circuit’s holding in Kaufman III
and, instead, reaffirmed its decisions Kaufman I and II.175 In Palmolive I,
the easement deed and the lender agreements provided that two banks
holding outstanding mortgages on the subject property had first priority to
any insurance or condemnation proceeds. The Tax Court held that these
priority rights violated both Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(2) (the
“mortgage subordination” regulation) and Treasury Regulation § 1.170A14(g)(6)(ii) (the “proceeds” regulation).
Among other things, the Tax Court rejected the argument that the mortgage
subordination regulation is satisfied as long as the lender is prevented from
extinguishing the easement in foreclosure. The court explained that, if the
mortgage subordination regulation was intended to require that a lender
subordinate only its right to foreclose on the property to the rights of the
donee, then the regulation would have been drafted to say that. Instead, the
regulation requires that a lender subordinate its rights in the property

175

In Irby, decided after Kaufman III, the Tax Court noted:
In cases involving a conservation easement where we determined that the regulation's requirements were not
met and thus denied the claimed charitable contribution deduction, the grantee organization had been prevented
by the deeds themselves from receiving the full proportionate value of the extinguishment proceeds…. The
funds diverted by the deeds were used to further the donor taxpayer's interests. For example, in Wall, the deed
of conservation easement provided that if the property was condemned, the grantee conservation organization
would be entitled to the easement's proportionate value, but only after any claim of a mortgagee was satisfied.
Hence, the first use of the extinguishment proceeds was to further the donor taxpayer's interest in repaying the
mortgage on the property, with the grantee conservation organization's receiving only a residual amount of
money…. Our conclusions in those cases (i.e., denying the deduction) reflect the purpose of the regulation.
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(including its rights to any insurance and condemnation proceeds) to the
rights of the donee.176
The Tax Court also held that the “so remote as to be negligible” rule of
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(3) is not an alternative provision on
which taxpayers may rely if they otherwise fail to satisfy the express
requirements of the regulations, like the mortgage subordination and
extinguishment requirements.
Finally, the Tax Court rejected Palmolive’s argument that a “savings
clause” in the easement, which purportedly operated to amend the easement
after the donation to the extent necessary to comply with the Treasury
Regulations, saved the deduction. The court explained that the requirements
of § 170 and the Treasury Regulations must be satisfied at the time of the
gift, and a savings clause cannot retroactively modify an easement to
comply with such requirements.
2. Mortgages Must be Subordinated at Time of Donation.
a. Mitchell III. In Mitchell III, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s
holdings in Mitchell I and II that, to be eligible for a deduction for the
donation of a conservation easement under § 170(h), any outstanding
mortgages on the underlying property must be subordinated to the rights of
the holder of the easement at the time of the gift. This means the lender
agreement should be recorded at the same time as the conservation
easement.
(i) The Facts. The donor in Mitchell did not obtain a subordination
agreement from the lender holding an outstanding mortgage on the
subject property until almost two years following the date of the
donation. The IRS argued that the mortgage subordination
requirement in the Treasury Regulations is a bright-line requirement
that requires any existing mortgage to be subordinated to the rights
of the holder of the easement at the time of the gift, irrespective of
176
See also Nancy A. McLaughlin, Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h): National Perpetuity Standards for Federally
Subsidized Conservation Easements, Part 1, The Standards, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 473, 493 (2010), which
explains:
The Treasury Regulations do not provide that a lender must subordinate its rights to the right of the holder to
enforce the easement. Rather, the regulations provide that the lender must subordinate its rights to the rights of
the holder to enforce the conservation purposes of the gift in perpetuity. That language embraces all of the
elements of a donated easement’s perpetual nature, not just the holder’s right to enforce the particular
restrictions in the easement. Thus, the holder’s rights to which a lender must subordinate its rights should
necessarily include, among other things, the holder’s right to receive proceeds upon extinguishment of the
easement to be used to replace lost conservation values as provided in Treasury Regulation section 1.170A14(g)(6). This makes sense from a policy perspective because the value attributable to the gift that was made
for the benefit public and for which a federal subsidy was provided should remain in the charitable sector and
be devoted to similar conservation purposes (as opposed to being paid to the landowner’s lender). If the holder
is not entitled to receive proceeds upon extinguishment because of a limited subordination agreement, the
donation should not be deemed to comply with the statutory mandate that the conservation purpose of the
contribution be protected in perpetuity. (emphasis added)
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the likelihood of foreclosure or any alternate safeguards. The IRS
also asserted that subordination must occur at the time of the gift
because, without subordination, the easement would be vulnerable
to extinguishment upon foreclosure and, thus, the conservation
purpose would not be protected in perpetuity as required under §
170(h). The Tenth Circuit agreed.
(ii) Deference to Commissioner. Citing to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
holding in Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United
States, 131 S.Ct. 704, 711 (2011), the Tenth Circuit explained that,
because the Commissioner promulgated the regulations under
§ 170(h) pursuant to the authority granted to him by Congress, the
regulations are binding unless they are “arbitrary and capricious in
substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Where Congress
has delegated to the Commissioner the power to promulgate
regulations, said the court, “we must defer to his regulatory
interpretations of the Code so long as they are reasonable.’”
Requiring existing mortgages to be subordinated to conservation
easements prevents extinguishment of the easements in the event the
landowners default on the mortgages. In this way, said the Tenth
Circuit, the mortgage subordination requirement is “reasonably
related” to Congress’s mandate in § 170(h)(5)(A) that the
conservation purpose of an easement be “protected in perpetuity.”
• The Tenth Circuit also rejected the donor’s claim that the
mortgage subordination regulation is arbitrary and
capricious, and therefore unenforceable. Although declining
to consider that argument because it was raised for the first
time on appeal, the Tenth Circuit noted that the argument
would fail because the regulation is “a reasonable exercise
of the Commissioner’s authority to implement the statute.”
(iii) Subordination Must Be Timely. The donor in Mitchell argued
that, since the mortgage subordination regulation contains no
explicit time frame for compliance, it should be interpreted to allow
for subordination to occur at any time. The Tenth Circuit rejected
this argument, noting that the regulation “expressly provides that
subordination is a prerequisite to allowing a deduction.” The Tenth
Circuit further noted that, even if it were to view the regulation as
ambiguous with respect to timing, the result would be no different
because the court must defer to the Commissioner’s reasonable
interpretation on this point.
(iv) Functional Subordination Not Sufficient. The donor in Mitchell
argued that strict compliance with the mortgage subordination
requirement was unnecessary because the easement deed allegedly
contained sufficient safeguards to protect the conservation purpose

79
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384360

in perpetuity. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument as
inconsistent with the plain language of the mortgage subordination
provision. The court pointed out that the regulation contains one
narrow exception to the “unambiguous” subordination
requirement—for donations occurring prior to 1986.177 In the case
of a pre-1986 donation, a taxpayer may be entitled to a deduction
without subordination if the taxpayer can demonstrate that the
conservation purpose is nonetheless protected in perpetuity. The
negative implication of this express, time-limited exception, said the
court, is that no alternative to subordination will suffice for post–
1986 donations.178
(v) Likelihood of Foreclosure Irrelevant. The donor in Mitchell
argued that strict compliance with the mortgage subordination
requirement was unnecessary in her case because the risk of
foreclosure was “so remote as to be negligible” (the partnership that
donated the easement apparently paid its debts on time and had
sufficient assets to satisfy in full the amounts due).179 The donor
pointed to Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(3), which provides
that a deduction will not be disallowed merely because the interest
that passes to the donee organization may be defeated by the
happening of some future event, “if on the date of the gift it appears
that the possibility that such … event will occur is so remote as to
be negligible.” She argued that this provision acts as an exception to
the mortgage subordination provision—i.e., that because the risk of
foreclosure in her case was arguably so remote as to be negligible,
failure to satisfy the mortgage subordination requirement should be
forgiven.
•

The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the
“so-remote-as-to-be-negligible” provision cannot be
reasonably read as modifying the strict mortgage
subordination requirement. In promulgating the rules,
explained the court, the Commissioner specifically
considered the risk of mortgage foreclosure to be neither
remote nor negligible, and therefore chose to target the
accompanying risk of extinguishment of the conservation
easement by strictly requiring mortgage subordination.

177

The mortgage subordination requirement first appeared when the Treasury Regulations were finalized in 1986, hence
the 1986 effective date.
178
In Palmolive I, the Tax Court similarly explained:
The different regime for contributions before February 1986 should be noted: Literal subordination was not
required, as long as “protect[ion] in perpetuity” by other means could be demonstrated. For subsequent
contributions, “no deduction will be permitted” without subordination.
179
A partnership of which Ms. Mitchell was a partner donated the easement. For convenience purposes, Ms. Mitchell is
referred to as the donor in this summary.
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•

The Tenth Circuit also noted that, even if the regulations
were unclear with respect to the interplay between the
mortgage subordination and remote future event provisions,
the donor would not prevail because the court is required to
defer to the Commissioner’s interpretation to resolve any
ambiguity unless it is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulations” or there is any other “reason to suspect the
interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and
considered judgment on the matter.” “[I]t is reasonable,”
said the court, “for the Commissioner to adopt an easilyapplied subordination requirement over a case-by-case, factspecific inquiry into the financial strength or credit history
of each taxpayer.” The court quoted a law review article in
support of its holding:
The specific requirements in the Code and Treasury
Regulations establish bright-line rules that promote
efficient and equitable administration of the federal
tax incentive program. If individual taxpayers could
fail to comply with such requirements and claim that
their donations are nonetheless deductible because
the possibility of defeat of the gift is so remote as to
be negligible, the Service and the courts would be
required to engage in an almost endless series of
factual inquiries with regard to each individual
conservation easement donation.180

b. Minnick III. In Minnick III, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s
holding in Minnick I that, to be eligible for a deduction for the donation of
a conservation easement, any outstanding mortgages on the underlying
property must be subordinated to the rights of the holder of the easement at
the time of the gift.
(i) Citing to Mitchell III, the Ninth Circuit explained that the plain
language of the mortgage subordination regulation supports the Tax
Court’s interpretation. The regulation specifies that “no deduction
will be permitted … unless the mortgagee subordinates its rights in
the property.” Strictly construed, said the Ninth Circuit, that
language makes clear that “subordination is a prerequisite to
allowing a deduction.” Since there was no dispute that Minnick’s
lender had not subordinated its rights in the subject property when
Minnick donated the easement at issue (despite warranties in the
easement deed to the contrary), under the plain meaning of the
regulation no deduction was permitted.
180
Nancy A. McLaughlin, Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h): National Perpetuity Standards for Federally
Subsidized Conservation Easements Part 1: The Standards, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 473, 505–06 (2010).
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(ii) The Ninth Circuit further explained that, even if the regulation
was deemed ambiguous, that would not change the outcome. Under
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), courts defer to the IRS’s
reasonable interpretation of its own regulations and, as explained in
Mitchell III, the IRS’s interpretation is reasonable and not plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. The Ninth Circuit
noted:
An easement can hardly be said to be protected ‘in
perpetuity’ if it is subject to extinguishment at essentially
any time by a mortgage holder who was not a party to, and
indeed (as here) may not even have been aware of, the
agreement between the Taxpayers and a [land] trust.
(iii) In Minnick II, an unpublished opinion issued the same day as
Minnick III, the Ninth Circuit addressed the remaining issues in
Minnick, holding for the IRS on each point.
•

Like the Tenth Circuit in Mitchell III, the Ninth Circuit in
Minnick II held that the taxpayer’s failure to comply with the
mortgage subordination requirement could not be excused
by invoking the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible regulation.

•

The Minnicks argued that their failure to obtain a timely
subordination agreement should be excused because there
was “verifiable evidence of original intent to enforce the
easement in perpetuity” in the easement deed, which
specifically stated that there were “no outstanding
mortgages...in the Property that have not been expressly
subordinated to the Easement.” The Ninth Circuit rejected
this argument, explaining that, even if the statement in the
deed evidenced an intent to subordinate, intent is irrelevant.
A mortgage must be subordinated at the time of the gift.

•

The Minnicks argued that Idaho’s cy pres doctrine, which
“restricted the Minnicks from abandoning or otherwise
encumbering the easement,” adequately ensured that the
easement would continue in perpetuity and, thus, the
subordination requirement was satisfied. The Ninth Circuit
rejected this argument, noting that the “cy pres doctrine is
inapplicable here because it has no effect on the ability of the
bank holding the unsubordinated mortgage to extinguish the
easement by foreclosure.” Cy pres would have no effect on
the ability of the bank to extinguish the easement in the event
of foreclosure because the easement had been granted to the
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land trust subject to the mortgage and, thus, the bank’s rights
had priority over those of the land trust and the public.
•

The Minnicks argued that the Tax Court improperly imposed
a 20% negligence penalty on them under IRC § 6662(a). The
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that the
Minnicks did not have reasonable cause for claiming a
deduction because Mr. Minnick had a law degree and
reading the Treasury Regulations would have given him
notice that subordination may have been required.

(iv) Mr. Minnick (a former member of the U.S. House of
Representatives from Idaho) sued his attorney for malpractice. The
Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the suit was not barred by the statute
of limitations.181
c. RP Golf III. In RP Golf III, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s
holding in RP Golf II that, to be eligible for a deduction for the donation of
a conservation easement, any outstanding mortgages on the underlying
property must be subordinated to the rights of the holder of the easement at
the time of the gift. In RP Golf II, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s
disallowance of a $16.4 million deduction for the donation of a conservation
easement on two private golf courses in Kansas City, Missouri. Although
the IRS challenged the claimed deduction on a number of grounds
(including failure to satisfy the conservation purposes test, overvaluation,
and the taxpayer’s lack of ownership of a portion of the subject property),
in RP Golf II, the Tax Court denied the deduction because the taxpayer
failed to obtain subordination agreements at the time of the gift of the
easement. The Tax Court considered and rejected the taxpayer’s argument
that the lenders had orally agreed to subordinate their interests before the
date of the gift, finding no evidence of a binding oral or written agreement
under state law. The Tax Court explained that, because the easement could
have been extinguished by foreclosure after the date of the gift, the easement
“was not protected in perpetuity and, therefore, was not a qualified
conservation contribution.” In affirming the Tax Court, the Eighth Circuit
relied in part on Mitchell and Minnick and determined that the Tax Court’s
finding that there were no oral agreements to subordinate was not clearly
erroneous.
G. So-Remote-As-To-Be-Negligible Does Not Cure Noncompliance. Based on the
holdings in numerous cases, the “so-remote-as-to-be-negligible” provision182 will not cure
181
Legal Malpractice Lawyer Blog, Minnick v. Ennis, No. 41663: Supreme Court of Idaho Remands Dismissal of Legal
Malpractice Case, http://www.legalmalpracticelawyer.com/2015/01/22/461/ (last visited April 25, 2015).
182
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A–14(g)(3) provides in part:
[a] deduction shall not be disallowed ... merely because the interest which passes to, or is vested in, the donee
organization may be defeated by the performance of some act or the happening of some event, if on the date of
the gift it appears that the possibility that such act or event will occur is so remote as to be negligible.
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noncompliance with a specific requirement in the § 170(h) or the Treasury Regulations.
Below is a sampling of the relevant cases.183
1. In Carpenter I, the Tax Court held that the “so-remote-as-to-be-negligible”
provision does not modify Treasury Regulation § 1.170A–14(g)(6)(i). Thus, failure
to comply with the extinguishment requirements of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A–
14(g)(6)(i) cannot be cured by a showing that the possibility of extinguishment is
so remote as to be negligible.
2. In Mitchell I, the Tax Court explained that the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible
standard cannot be used to avoid any of the following specific requirements:
(i) Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(2)’s mortgage subordination requirement,
(ii) Treasury Regulation § 1.170A- 14(g)(6)(i)’s judicial proceeding requirement,
or (iii) Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii)’s proceeds requirement.
3. In Mitchell III, the Tenth Circuit noted that the D.C. Circuit in Simmons did not
excuse the taxpayer from complying with the mortgage subordination requirement,
or excuse noncompliance with any express precondition to taking a deduction
contained in the regulations. Rather, it applied the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible
provision to allow a deduction despite the risk of noncompliance with § 1.170A–
14’s more general perpetuity requirement. Thus Simmons does not support an
interpretation that the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible provision will excuse
noncompliance with the mortgage subordination provision’s plain and specific
mandate that “no deduction will be permitted...unless” the mortgage is
subordinated. The Tenth Circuit also noted that Kaufman III similarly “provides
little guidance.” In Kaufman III the First Circuit held that the taxpayer was entitled
to a deduction because the donation satisfied the in perpetuity requirement, but
specifically declined to address whether the taxpayer had complied with the
mortgage subordination provision or to base its holding on the so-remote-as-to-benegligible provision.
4. In Palmolive I, the Tax Court explained that:
Paragraph (g)(3) of section 1.170A–14 is not an alternative provision on
which taxpayers may rely if they otherwise fail to satisfy the express
requirements of paragraph (g)(2) or (g)(6) … regularly occurring
circumstances that are expressly foreseen and are explicitly provided for in
the regulations (i.e., mortgages and extinguishment proceeds) are by their
nature not “remote”, and the specific requirements in the regulations as to
those contingencies are not affected by paragraph (g)(3).

183

See also Hoffman Order (discussed in Part II.A.13 above), and Wachter, Carroll, and Salt Point Timber.
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III. Other Important Issues
A. Valuation. For a comprehensive discussion of conservation and facade easement
valuation rules and the relevant valuation case law through 2015, see Nancy A.
McLaughlin, Conservation Easements and the Valuation Conundrum. 184 For cases
involving valuation after 2015, see, e.g., Gemperle, Palmer Ranch, Mountanos, McGrady,
Wendell Falls, PBBM Rose-Hill II, Pine Mountain I.185
B. Penalties.
1. Penalty Provisions. As part of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (the PPA),
Congress expanded the circumstances under which penalties can be imposed for
overvaluations. Before enactment of the PPA, a substantial valuation misstatement
(subject to a 20% penalty) existed if the value of property reported on a tax return
was two times (200%) or more of the amount determined to be the correct value. A
gross valuation misstatement (subject to a 40% penalty) existed if the value
reported on a tax return was four times (400%) or more of the amount determined
to be the correct value.186 Taxpayers could avoid these penalties if they made the
valuation misstatement in good faith and with reasonable cause.
The PPA lowered the threshold from 200% to 150% for a substantial valuation
misstatement and from 400% to 200% for a gross valuation misstatement. The PPA
also eliminated the reasonable cause exception for gross valuation misstatements
of charitable deduction property, making that penalty a strict liability penalty. The
PPA further enacted new penalties for preparers of an appraisal to be used to
support a tax position if the appraisal results in a substantial or gross valuation
misstatement. 187 The PPA changes apply to (i) returns claiming deductions for
façade easement donations that are filed after July 25, 2006, and (ii) returns
claiming deductions for donations of easements encumbering land that are filed
after August 17, 2006.188
2. Case Law. Below is a sampling of court holdings regarding penalties. For
additional more recent cases involving penalties, see, e.g., Partita Partners II,
Graev III, Roth, PBBM Rose-Hill II, and Palmolive II.
a. Kaufman V. In Kaufman V, the First Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s
holding in Kaufman IV that the Kaufmans were liable for gross valuation
misstatement penalties for claiming a deduction “for a worthless historic
preservation easement on their home.” Because the Kaufmans’ returns were
184

Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2704576.
For a recent case that did not involve a conservation easement donation but discusses the definition of “fair market
value” for charitable deduction purposes, see Grainger v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2018-117.
186
If the correct value of an easement is determined to be zero, the value claimed on the taxpayer’s return is deemed to
be 400% or more of the correct amount and, thus, a gross valuation misstatement. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662–5(g).
187
See IRC § 6695A.
188
For an explanation of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) changes, see JCT Explanation of Pension Protection
Act of 2006, supra note 17. See also Chandler (discussing the PPA effective dates).
185
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filed before the effective date of the PPA, the gross valuation misstatement
penalty was not a strict liability penalty. However, the Kaufmans were
unable to avoid penalties by showing that they made a good-faith
investigation of the value of the easement or acted with reasonable cause
and in good faith. This was due, in large part, to the following factors.
•

The Kaufmans represented in a letter to the lender holding an
outstanding mortgage on the subject property (for purposes of
obtaining a subordination agreement) that “[t]he easement
restrictions are essentially the same restrictions as those imposed by
current local ordinances that govern this property.”

•

The Kaufmans used an appraiser that the donee—the National
Architectural Trust (NAT)—both recommended and taught to do
façade easement appraisals. NAT also suggested language for the
appraiser to include in his appraisals, which he incorporated “almost
verbatim” into all of his reports, regardless of the property involved.
The First Circuit further noted that the appraiser “at least arguably
had an incentive to calculate a high value for the easement, given
that he performed appraisals for [NAT] and [NAT] received cash
donations corresponding to a set percentage of the assessed value of
the donated easements.”

•

After receiving the appraisal indicating that the easement would
reduce the value of their home by $220,800 (or by 12%), Dr.
Kaufman expressed concern to NAT that the reduction in the resale
value of the home would be so large as to “overwhelm the tax
savings” from the donation. In a “smoking gun email,” NAT
responded that façade easements do not actually reduce the value of
the properties they encumber. Among other things, the email noted:
One of our directors, Steve McClain, owns fifteen or so historic
properties and has taken advantage of this tax deduction himself.
He would never have granted any easement if he thought there
would be a risk or loss of value in his properties.

Despite the evidence indicating that the easement had no value, the
Kaufmans proceeded to claim a $220,800 deduction. The First Circuit
agreed with the Tax Court that “the Kaufmans should have recognized
obvious warning signs indicating that the appraisal’s validity was subject to
serious question, and should have undertaken further analysis in response.”
The First Circuit further noted that the Tax Court did not purport to equate
“good faith investigation” with “exhaustive investigation.” Rather, it
“merely required that the Kaufmans do some basic inquiry into the validity
of an appraisal whose result was squarely contradicted by other available
evidence glaringly in front of them.” The Kaufmans were highly intelligent
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and very well educated, said the First Circuit, 189 “and the Tax Court
reasonably found that developments casting doubt on the…appraisal should
have alerted them that they needed to take further steps to assess their
‘proper tax liability.’”
The First Circuit also noted that decisions in which the courts have declined
to impose penalties (Whitehouse, Chandler, Zarlengo, and Scheidelman)
were not inconsistent with its conclusion to impose penalties in Kaufman V.
In contrast to Kaufman, there were no “red flags” in those other cases
suggesting that the easements had no value.
b. Chandler. In Chandler, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s complete
disallowance of deductions claimed with regard to two façade easement
donations on the same grounds as in Kaufman (the easements had no value
because the typical buyer would find the easement restrictions no more
burdensome than local historic preservation restrictions). The taxpayers in
Chandler claimed deductions with regard to the easement donations on their
2004, 2005, and 2006 returns and, because the Tax Court determined the
easements had no value, the valuation misstatement for each year was a
gross valuation misstatement. Chandler raised the novel issue of whether
the taxpayers could assert the reasonable cause defense for the
underpayment on their 2006 return (despite the PPA having made the gross
valuation misstatement penalty a strict liability penalty with regard to
returns filed after August 17, 2006) because the underpayment was the
result of a carryover of deductions from their 2004 return. The taxpayers
argued that denying their right to raise a reasonable cause defense with
regard to their 2006 return would amount to retroactively applying the PPA.
The Tax Court disagreed, noting that (i) the penalty statute as revised by the
PPA by its plain language applies to returns filed after a certain date and
(ii) when the taxpayers filed their 2006 return they “reaffirmed” the
easement’s grossly misstated value. For similar holdings, see Reisner and
Mountanos III.
The court in Chandler did, however, find that the taxpayers were not liable
for penalties for their 2004 and 2005 underpayments because they
underpaid with reasonable cause and in good faith. The IRS argued that Mr.
Chandler should have known the easements were overvalued because he
was well educated (he had a JD and an MBA). The Tax Court disagreed,
noting that even experienced appraisers find valuing conservation
easements difficult, and the flaws in the appraisals would not have been
evident to the Chandlers. The court also distinguished Kaufman because the
Kaufmans had been assured by the donee that their easement would not
reduce the value of the property. In Chandler there was no evidence that the
taxpayers had similarly relied on appraisals in bad faith.
189
Dr. Kaufman was an emeritus professor of statistics at MIT and Mrs. Kaufman was a company president with a Ph.D.
in psychology.
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c. Gorra. In Gorra, the Tax Court rejected the taxpayers’ argument that the
gross valuation misstatement penalty was an “excessive fine” under the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, noting that such
penalties are remedial in nature, not “punishments,” and are an important
tool because they enhance voluntary compliance with tax laws.
d. Legg. In Legg, the Tax Court held that the IRS’s determination that the
Leggs were liable for strict liability 40% gross valuation misstatement
penalties was proper. The Leggs argued that the IRS examiner had not made
an “initial determination” of the 40% penalties as required by IRC §
6751(b)(1) because the examination report calculated the penalties using the
20% rate and the 40% penalties were posed only as an alternative position.
The Tax Court disagreed, explaining that Congress enacted § 6751(b) to
ensure that taxpayers understand the penalties imposed on them and the
examination report sent to the Leggs clearly explained why the Leggs were
liable for the 40% penalties. Accordingly, the IRS satisfied the procedural
requirements of § 6751(b) and imposition of the 40% penalties was proper.
e. Carroll. In Carroll, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of
deductions claimed with regard to the donation of a conservation easement
because the easement contained a noncompliant “proceeds” clause. The
court also found that the taxpayers were liable for 20% accuracy-related
penalties and did not qualify for the reasonable cause exception to those
penalties. The court explained that one of the taxpayers was a highly
educated medical school graduate who had previous experience with
conservation easements; although the taxpayers had hired an attorney to
draft a related gift deed for the subject property, that attorney was not a tax
attorney and “d[id] not answer tax-related questions or give tax advice;” the
taxpayers offered no evidence that would explain why the terms of the
easement varied from the proceeds requirement in the Treasury Regulation;
and the taxpayers did not explain why they failed to seek competent advice
from a tax attorney or other adviser to ensure that the easement complied
with the pertinent regulations. The court concluded that, in the light of the
high level of sophistication of one of the taxpayers and his experience with
conservation easements, the taxpayers did not demonstrate that they acted
with reasonable cause and in good faith in not seeking competent tax advice
regarding the donation. The court declined to impose substantial or gross
valuation misstatement penalties, however, because the IRS did not assert
those penalties on a timely basis.
C. Date of Donation and Recordation Date. Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(1)
provides:
any interest in the property retained by the donor (and the donor’s successors in
interest) must be subject to legally enforceable restrictions (for example, by
recordation in the land records of the jurisdiction in which the property is located)
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that will prevent uses of the retained interest inconsistent with the conservation
purposes of the donation.
The donor of a conservation easement should see to it that the easement is recorded in the
year in which the donor intends to claim the donation was made. Absent recordation of an
easement, a purchaser of the subject property who records the purchase deed will generally
take the property free of the easement. In addition, many state conservation easement
enabling statutes specifically require recordation for an easement to be legally
enforceable.190 Accordingly, absent recordation in the year of the purported donation, the
IRS can argue that the easement was not “granted in perpetuity” and its conservation
purpose was not “protected in perpetuity” in that year.
1. IRS Position on Year of Donation. The IRS Conservation Easement Audit
Techniques Guide provides that “An easement is not enforceable in perpetuity
before it is recorded.” 191 The Guide further instructs that, “for conservation
easements, the year of the deduction is the year of recordation” and provides the
following as an example:
A conservation easement was granted to a qualified organization on
December 20, 2007, as evidenced by the dated signatures on the
conservation easement deed. However, the easement was not recorded in
the public records until March 12, 2008. The year of donation is 2008.192
The Guide also instructs that, in addition to the easement deed, all exhibits or
attachments to the deed, such as diagrams and lender agreements, may need to be
recorded.193
2. Case Law.
a. Gorra. Gorra involved a donation to the National Architectural Trust
(NAT) of a façade easement on a building in the Carnegie Hill Historic
District of New York City. NAT delivered the easement to the recorder’s
office on December 28, 2006, paid the recording fees and taxes, and
obtained a receipt for the delivery. Due to a cover sheet error, however, the
easement was not recorded until January 18, 2007. The IRS argued that the
deed was not recorded until 2007. The Tax Court disagreed, holding that,
under New York law, delivery of the deed to the recorder’s office, with
receipt acknowledged, constituted recordation, even though there was a
delay in the actual recording until the following year because of the cover
sheet error. The court cited N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 317, which provides that
190
For example, the Uniform Conservation Easement Act provides that “[n]o right or duty in favor of or against a holder
and no right in favor of a person having a third-party right of enforcement arises under a conservation easement before
its acceptance by the holder and a recordation of the acceptance.” Uniform Conservation Easement Act § 2(b) (Last
Revised or Amended in 2007).
191
See IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide, supra note 23, at 12.
192
Id., at 9.
193
Id., at 12.
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every instrument entitled to be recorded is considered recorded from the
time of delivery to the recording officer.
b. Zarlengo. Zarlengo involved a donation to NAT of a façade easement on
a building in a Manhattan historic district. The easement donors and NAT
signed the easement in 2004, NAT sent the donors a letter thanking them
for the donation in 2004, and the donors claimed deductions for the donation
on their 2004 returns. For reasons not explained in the Tax Court’s opinion,
however, the easement was not recorded until January 26, 2005. The IRS
argued that the taxpayers were not entitled to deductions in 2004 because
the façade easement was neither (i) a “qualified real property interest” as
defined in § 170(h)(2)(C) (i.e., “a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the
use which may be made of the real property”) nor (ii) donated exclusively
for conservation purposes as required under § 170(h)(5) (i.e., the
conservation purpose of the easement was not “protected in perpetuity”) in
2004.
In analyzing these issues, the Tax Court first reiterated the well settled rule
that, “[i]n a Federal tax controversy, State law controls the determination of
a taxpayer’s interest in property while the tax consequences are determined
under Federal law.” Accordingly, New York law governed when the
taxpayers’ donation of the façade easement was regarded as complete, but
Federal tax law determined the tax consequences. Because New York law
provides that conservation easements in the state have no legal effect unless
they are recorded, the court found that the façade easement was not effective
until January 26, 2005.194 Unlike in Gorra, the façade easement in Zarlengo
presumably was not delivered to the recording office in 2004 and thus, was
not considered recorded in that year.
The Tax Court further explained that, even assuming the façade easement
had been legally enforceable by NAT against the donors in 2004 because
both parties signed the easement that year, the easement still would not have
satisfied the perpetuity requirements in 2004 “because neither the use
restriction nor the conservation purpose of the conservation easement was
protected in perpetuity until January 26, 2005.” The court explained that, if
a buyer had purchased the subject townhouse and recorded the purchase
deed before January 26, 2005, the buyer would have taken the townhouse
free and clear of the conservation easement. Moreover, the possibility that
this could have occurred was not so remote as to be negligible.
The Tax Court concluded that the donors in Zarlengo were not entitled to
deductions on their 2004 returns because the perpetuity requirements were
194

The Tax Court held similarly in Rothman I. See also Satullo (although decided on lack of mortgage subordination
grounds, the Tax Court stated “Georgia law clearly provides that until an easement is recorded its intended property
restrictions are legally unenforceable” and “although the Deed of Gift created an easement that was accepted by [the land
trust] during December 1985, its terms were not enforceable as required by [Treas. Reg. § 1.170A- 14(g)(1)] until January
19, 1988, when it was recorded”).
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not satisfied in 2004, and it followed that the donors also were not entitled
to carryover deductions on subsequent years’ returns. However, the IRS had
acknowledged that the easement could be considered “made in perpetuity”
in 2005 for purposes of § 170(h)(2)(C) and § 170(h)(5)(A) because the
easement was recorded in that year, and the Tax Court determined that “both
the use restriction and the conservation purpose of the conservation
easement were protected in perpetuity as of January 26, 2005.”
Accordingly, given that the other requirements of § 170(h) and the
substantiation requirements were satisfied, the donors’ tax liability for
2005, 2006, and 2007 could be redetermined assuming the donation had
been made in 2005.
c. Mecox. Mecox involved a donation to NAT of a façade easement on a
building in New York’s Greenwich Village Historic District. The donor (the
Mecox partnership) and NAT signed the easement in December 2004 and
Mecox claimed a $2.21 million deduction for the donation on its 2004
partnership tax return. However, the easement was not recorded until
November 17, 2005, almost one year later. The IRS disallowed the claimed
deduction in full, arguing that (i) the contribution was not made until 2005,
the year in which the easement was recorded, and (ii) the appraisal was not
timely because it was made more than 60 days before the date of the
contribution. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
held for the IRS on both counts.
As in Zarlengo and Rothman I, the District Court found that, as a matter of
law, Mecox had not made a charitable contribution of the façade easement
in 2004 because the easement was not effective under New York law until
it was recorded in November 2005. The District Court further explained
that, even if the court were to accept that the date the easement was
contributed was the date of the delivery of the deed to NAT, the easement
still did not satisfy § 170(h)’s definition of a “qualified conservation
contribution” until the easement was recorded in 2005 (i.e., the conservation
purpose of the contribution was not “protected in perpetuity” and the
underlying property was not “subject to legally enforceable restrictions”
until 2005). Absent recordation, a purchaser of the property who recorded
the purchase deed would take the property free of the easement.
Mecox argued that, because the easement did not specifically reference the
New York conservation easement enabling statute, that statute did not apply
and the easement was a common law restrictive covenant that does not
require recordation to be effective. The court dismissed that argument,
finding that there was “no question” that the easement fell under the New
York enabling statute’s definition of a conservation easement.
Failure to record the easement until November 2005 also rendered Mecox’s
appraisal untimely. The appraisal was dated June 13, 2005, and estimated
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the value of the easement as of November 1, 2004. The court found that the
appraisal was “conducted” on June 13, 2005, but the easement was not
“contributed” to NAT until it was recorded on November 17, 2005 (5
months later). Accordingly, the appraisal “took place” more than 60 days
before the contribution date and thus, did not satisfy the timing requirement
in Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(i).
d. Ten Twenty Six Investors. Ten Twenty Six Investors also involved a
donation to NAT of a façade easement on a building in New York City. The
donor (a partnership) and a representative of NAT signed the easement in
December 2004 and the partnership claimed a $11.3 million deduction for
the donation on its 2004 partnership tax return. However, the easement was
not recorded until December 2006. The IRS disallowed the claimed
deduction in full and the Tax Court sustained the disallowance.
The partnership in Ten Twenty Six Investors argued that Zarlengo, Rothman,
and Mecox were wrongly decided. The Tax Court disagreed, holding that
those closely analogous cases compelled the conclusion that the partnership
was not entitled to a deduction in 2004 for the conveyance. However, “for
the sake of completeness,” the court addressed the partnership’s key
arguments in greater detail in the Ten Twenty Six Investors opinion and
concluded that the perpetuity requirements of § 170(h)(2)(C) and § 170(h)
(5)(A) were not met for 2004 because neither the use restriction nor the
conservation purpose of the easement was protected in perpetuity as of the
date of donation.
3. Finer Points of Delivery and Recording. In many jurisdictions, where the
recording offices are backed up, a document may be delivered to the recording
office in December but not recorded by the office staff until January or even later.
As explained in the discussion of Gorra above, in some states, like New York,
delivery to the recording office constitutes recording, but that may not be the rule
in all states. In addition, many conservation easement deeds have an “effective
date” provision that says the easement is effective when it is signed and recorded.
Legal counsel to donors should consider whether it would be prudent to instead
include a provision in an easement deed stating that the easement is effective when
the deed is signed and “delivered for recording.” In addition, the person who
delivers the signed easement deed to the recording office should obtain a datestamped copy indicating the delivery date. At the very least, easement holders,
donors, and their advisors should be aware of this issue.
D. Quid Pro Quo.
1. Treasury Regulation Requirements. A charitable contribution is not deductible
if it is structured as a quid pro quo exchange.195 Treasury Regulation § 1.170A14(h)(3)(i) provides:
195
Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 681 (1989) (“The legislative history of the ‘contribution or gift’ limitation
reveals that Congress intended to differentiate between unrequited payments to qualified recipients, which are deductible,
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•

If, as a result of the donation of a [conservation easement], the donor or a
related person receives, or can reasonably expect to receive, financial or
economic benefits that are greater than those that will inure to the general
public from the transfer, no deduction is allowable under this section.

•

However, if the donor or a related person receives, or can reasonably expect
to receive, a financial or economic benefit that is substantial, but it is clearly
shown that the benefit is less than the amount of the transfer, then a
deduction under this section is allowable for the excess of the amount
transferred over the amount of the financial or economic benefit received or
reasonably expected to be received by the donor or the related person.196

2. Case Law. Quid pro quo has been an issue in a number of cases.
a. Pollard. In Pollard, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of a
deduction of more than $1 million claimed with respect to a conservation
easement conveyance because the conveyance was part of a quid pro quo
exchange. The taxpayer had purchased a 67-acre parcel in Boulder County,
Colorado, and had to obtain approval from the county to increase the
property’s building density. After public hearings, the board of county
commissioners agreed to grant the taxpayer’s subdivision exemption
request, which allowed the property to be split into two residential lots,
provided the taxpayer granted a conservation easement encumbering the
property to the county.
The taxpayer in Pollard maintained that no quid pro quo arrangement
existed, arguing, among other things, that approval of his subdivision
and payments made to such recipients with some expectation of a quid pro quo in terms of goods or services, which are
not deductible.”). See also Boone v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2013-101 (conveyance of fill to city not a deductible charitable
contribution because taxpayer failed to meet its burden of proving that the fair market value of the fill exceeded the fair
market value of the consideration received in exchange); Perlmutter v. Comm’r, 45 T.C. 311 (1965) (transfers of land to
school districts and a recreation district in accordance with zoning regulations were not charitable contributions); Ottawa
Silica Co. v. U.S., (Ct. Cl. Trial Div.), 49 A.F.T.R.2d 82-1162, 82-1 USTC P 9308 (“It is...quite apparent that plaintiff
conveyed the land to the school district fully expecting that as a consequence of the construction of public access roads
through its property it would receive substantial benefits in return”); Small, Real Estate Developers and Conservation
Easements—Not as Simple as it Sounds, 19-JUN PROB. & PROP. 24 (2005).
196
See Rev. Rul. 76-185, from which the Treasury Regulation language appears to be derived, and which provides that
“payments made by the taxpayer for the restoration and maintenance of the historic mansion and its grounds are not
deductible as charitable contributions...unless the taxpayer can establish that the payments exceed the monetary value of
all benefits received or expected to be received.” See also United States v. Amer. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986)
(“The sine qua non of a charitable contribution is a transfer of money or property without adequate consideration. The
taxpayer, therefore, must at a minimum demonstrate that he purposely contributed money or property in excess of the
value of any benefit he received in return.”); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h)(1) (“No part of a payment that a taxpayer makes
to or for the use of an organization described in section 170(c) that is in consideration for…goods or services...is a
contribution or gift within the meaning of section 170(c) unless the taxpayer—(i) Intends to make a payment in an amount
that exceeds the fair market value of the goods or services; and (ii) Makes a payment in an amount that exceeds the fair
market value of the goods or services.”); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h)(2)(i) (“The charitable contribution deduction under
section 170(a) for a payment a taxpayer makes partly in consideration for goods or services may not exceed the excess
of - (A) The amount of any cash paid and the fair market value of any property (other than cash) transferred by the
taxpayer to an organization described in section 170(c); over (B) The fair market value of the goods or services the
organization provides in return.”).
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exemption request had been “virtually guaranteed,” that the land use code
sections governing his exemption request did not require the grant of a
conservation easement, and that all documents relating to the grant of the
easement referred to it as a “gift.” One of the county commissioners even
wrote a letter to the taxpayer (apparently at the taxpayer’s request in
preparation for the Tax Court trial) stating that, to the best of his
recollection, he did not require the taxpayer to grant the easement in
exchange for the subdivision exemption.
The Tax Court was not persuaded. Based on its examination of the “external
features of the transaction,” the court found that the subdivision exemption
request was far from being virtually guaranteed and, in fact, had little
chance of being granted without the taxpayer’s promise to grant the
easement. 197 The taxpayer also did not establish that the value of the
easement he conveyed to the county exceeded the value of the subdivision
exemption granted to him, or that he intended to make a charitable
contribution.198
The Tax Court also sustained the IRS’s imposition of an accuracy-related
penalty in Pollard, finding that the taxpayer did not act with reasonable
cause and in good faith in claiming the deduction. The evidence produced
at trial, said the court, demonstrated that all of the parties involved
understood that the easement was contributed for the express purpose of
encouraging the county to grant the taxpayer a subdivision exemption, and
it would be unreasonable for the court to believe that anyone involved in
the transaction (i.e., the taxpayer, his advisers, or the county
commissioners) believed there was an unrequited contribution.
b. Seventeen Seventy Sherman Street. In Seventeen Seventy Sherman Street,
the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s complete disallowance of an LLC's
claimed $7.15 million deduction for the conveyance of interior and exterior
easements restricting the use of a shrine in Denver, Colorado, because the
conveyance was part of a quid pro quo exchange. The shrine is listed on the
National Register of Historic Places and as a historic landmark by the City
and County of Denver. The LLC owned two properties on Sherman Street—
the shrine and a parking lot. Prior to granting the easements, the LLC and
the City of Denver entered into a development agreement in which, among
other things, the LLC agreed to convey the easements to Historic Denver
and rehabilitate the shrine in exchange for certain zoning changes to the
shrine and the parking lot.

197
In ascertaining whether a given payment is a contribution or gift, or is made with the expectation of quid pro quo, the
IRS and the courts examine “the external features of the transaction,” thus avoiding the need to conduct an imprecise
inquiry into the motivations of individual taxpayers. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 701–702 (1989).
198
See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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The Tax Court’s opinion detailed the following elements of a quid pro quo
analysis in the charitable deduction context.
•
•
•

•
•

•
•

•

A taxpayer's contribution is deductible ‘only if and to the extent it
exceeds the market value of the benefit received.’
‘[t]he sine qua non of a charitable contribution is a transfer of money
or property without adequate consideration.’
‘a charitable gift or contribution must be a payment made for
detached and disinterested motives. This formulation is designed to
ensure that the payor’s primary purpose is to assist the charity and
not to secure some benefit personal to the payor.’
The consideration received by the taxpayer need not be financial.
Medical, educational, scientific, religious, or other benefits can be
consideration that vitiates charitable intent.
In ascertaining whether a given payment was made with the
expectation of anything in return, courts examine the external
features of the transaction. This avoids the need to conduct an
imprecise inquiry into the motivations of individual taxpayers.
The taxpayer claiming a deduction must, at a minimum, demonstrate
that “he purposely contributed money or property in excess of the
value of any benefit he received in return.”
Thus, a taxpayer who receives goods or services in exchange for a
contribution of property may still be entitled to a charitable
deduction if the taxpayer (1) makes a contribution that exceeds the
fair market value of the benefits received in exchange and (2) makes
the excess payment with the intention of making a gift.199
If the taxpayer satisfies these requirements, the taxpayer is entitled
to a deduction not to exceed the fair market value of the property the
taxpayer transferred less the fair market value of the goods or
services received.200

The Tax Court explained that a quid pro quo analysis in the conservation
easement donation context ordinarily consists of two parts—(1) valuation
of the contributed conservation easement and then (2) valuation of the
consideration received in exchange for the easement. The court explained,
however, that when a taxpayer grants a conservation easement as part of a
quid pro quo exchange and fails to identify or value all of the consideration
received, the taxpayer is not entitled to a deduction because he failed to
comply with § 170 and the regulations. In such a case, it is unnecessary to
determine either the value of the easement or whether the taxpayer made an
excess payment with the intention of making a gift. The taxpayer’s failure
to identify or value all of the consideration received and, thus, to prove that

199
200

See id.
See id.
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the value of the easement exceeded the value of the consideration is fatal to
the deduction.201
The Tax Court determined that the LLC had received two types of
consideration in exchange for its conveyance of the interior and exterior
easements:
•

a zoning change that eliminated authorization to develop residential
condominium units within the shrine but also permitted
development on the parking lot up to 650 feet, subject to a “view
plane” restriction of 155 feet (a view plane restriction limits the
height of buildings from a specified view point within Denver's city
park and is meant to preserve the view of the Rocky Mountain
Skyline from that view point), and

•

the Denver Community Planning and Development Agency’s
recommendation to the Denver Planning Board to approve a view
plane variance (which variance was ultimately approved).

On its 2003 tax return, however, the LLC claimed a $7.15 million charitable
deduction for its conveyance of the easements and made no adjustment for
the consideration it received in exchange. At trial, the LLC conceded that it
had received the zoning change in exchange for its conveyance of the
easements and argued that its deduction should be reduced by just over $2
million as a result. The LLC also asserted that the Planning and
Development Agency’s recommendation to the Planning Board to approve
a view plane variance was either not consideration received in exchange for
the grant of the easements, or was consideration but had no real value. The
Tax Court disagreed, finding that the Agency’s view-plane-variance
recommendation was consideration and had substantial value. The court
concluded that the LLC’s failure to identify or value all of the consideration
received, or to provide any credible evidence to permit the court to
accurately value all of the consideration received, was fatal to the deduction.
Also notable is that the consideration the LLC received in exchange for its
conveyance of the easements did not come from the donee, Historic Denver,
but instead came from the City of Denver. The IRS argued that the LLC
failed to substantiate its claimed deduction because it failed to (i) obtain a
contemporaneous written acknowledgment (CWA) meeting the
requirements of IRC § 170(f)(8) or (ii) disclose that the contribution was
part of a bargain sale on Form 8283. The LLC argued that § 170(f)(8)
201
See also Cohan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-8, in which the Tax Court upheld the IRS’s complete disallowance of
a charitable income tax deduction claimed with respect to a bargain sale transaction because the contemporaneous written
acknowledgment (CWA) that the donee provided to the donor did not include a description or good faith estimate of the
total consideration provided to the donor, and the donor’s reliance on the CWA was therefore unreasonable. The court
explained that “the deterrence value of § 170(f)(8)’s total denial of a deduction comports with the effective administration
of a self-assessment and self-reporting system.”
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requires a donor to obtain a CWA providing a good-faith estimate of the
value of the consideration received from the donee (i.e., Historic Denver),
and it received no consideration from Historic Denver. The LLC also argued
that the grant of the easements to Historic Denver was not a bargain sale
because it received no consideration from Historic Denver and, thus, it was
not required to report the conveyance as a bargain sale on the Form 8283.
The Tax Court found these contentions “dubious.” The court noted that the
grant of the easements was a complex negotiation among the LLC, the city,
and Historic Denver, and Historic Denver's role was largely as the city's
designee to hold the easements. The court thus generally found persuasive
the IRS’s argument that the consideration received should have been
disclosed on the CWA and the Form 8283. However, because the court
denied the deduction in full on quid pro quo grounds, it did not decide these
substantiation issues.
The Tax Court also agreed with the IRS that the LLC was liable for the
accuracy-related penalty because it acted negligently or in disregard of the
requirements of § 170 and the regulations. “Negligence,” said the court, is
strongly indicated where a taxpayer fails to make a reasonable attempt to
ascertain the correctness of a deduction that would seem to a reasonable and
prudent person to be “too good to be true.” And a taxpayer acts with
“disregard” when, among other things, he does not exercise reasonable
diligence to determine the correctness of a return position. The LLC
conveyed the easements as part of a quid pro quo exchange but reported the
conveyance on its 2003 return as a charitable contribution without making
any adjustment for the consideration it received in exchange. The court
found that the LLC acted negligently or with disregard because it did not
make a reasonable attempt to ascertain the correctness of the deduction.
The LLC argued that it was eligible for the reasonable cause and good faith
exception to the penalty because it relied on professional advice. The Tax
Court disagreed. Although the LLC had consulted with a tax attorney
regarding the conveyance, that attorney testified at trial that he had advised
the LLC that it had to reduce the value of its deduction by the consideration
received in the quid pro quo exchange. The Tax Court noted that it would
be unreasonable for the court to believe that at the time of the contribution
or at the time of filing the LLC’s return either the LLC or its advisers
believed that the contribution of the easements was an unrequited
contribution or that the consideration received had no value. Consequently,
the LLC's disregard of the attorney’s advice was not reasonable and in good
faith, and the LLC could not rely on the professional advice of the attorney
to negate the penalty.
c. Wendell Falls. In Wendell Falls I, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s
disallowance of a $1.798 million deduction claimed by the Wendell Falls
Development, LLC, with regard to a conservation easement donation. The
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LLC owned 1,280 acres in Wake County, North Carolina, and planned to
subdivide the land into a master-planned community with residential areas,
commercial spaces, an elementary school, and a park. The LLC identified
125 of the 1,280 acres as the land upon which the park would be placed.
In mid-2005, the LLC and the county began discussions regarding the
county’s purchase of the 125 acres for use as a county park. Sometime after
those discussions began, the LLC proposed placing a conservation easement
on the 125 acres before the sale to restrict the 125 acres to park use. The
LLC presumably wanted to be able to assure purchasers of the residential
and commercial lots on the remaining land that the 125 acres would be
permanently protected as a park. Throughout 2006, the LLC and the county
discussed the restrictions the easement would include and which charitable
organization would hold the easement.
In October 2006, the Town of Wendell approved the Planned Unit
Development (PUD), which contemplated up to 4,000 residential lots and
stated that 125 acres would be dedicated to the creation of a park. However,
the 125 acres was “unaffected by the town’s approval of the PUD” because,
even though the 125 acres was described in the PUD, it was outside the
boundaries of the town and therefore not subject to the town’s zoning
ordinances. The Tax Court noted that “[t]he PUD stated that Wendell Falls
received no preferential zoning in exchange for setting aside the 125 acres
for use as a park. This statement is consistent with the rest of the record.”
In December 2006, the county and the LLC entered into a purchase
agreement regarding the 125 acres. The purchase agreement stated that
placing a mutually agreeable conservation easement on the land was a
precondition to the sale. The purchase agreement was later revised to correct
for some errors, and in June of 2007, the county reauthorized the purchase
of the 125 acres for just over $3 million, which was the appraised value of
the 125 acres unrestricted by the easement (i.e., the “before” easement value
of the 125 acres). In exchange for $3 million, the LLC (i) conveyed a
conservation easement on the 125 acres to a local land trust and (ii)
conveyed the restricted fee to the county. Thus, it appears that the county
paid the LLC for both the easement and the restricted fee, although the
easement was conveyed to a third-party land trust.
The LLC then claimed a $1.8 million deduction for its “donation” of the
easement to the land trust based on an appraisal that asserted that the
easement had a value of more than $4.8 million (that is, the LLC claimed a
deduction for the difference between an alleged $4.8 million value for the
easement and the $3 million the LLC had received from the county). The
LLC then later filed an amended return on which it claimed it was entitled
to a deduction for full $4.8 million and, at trial, its valuation expert asserted
that the easement had a value of over $5.9 million.
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The IRS argued, among other things, that the deduction should be
disallowed because LLC expected a substantial benefit from the
easement—namely that the prospect of a public park on the 125 acres would
increase the value of the rest of the adjoining 1,280 acres owned by the LLC.
The Tax Court agreed, explaining that (i) no deduction for a charitable
contribution is allowed if the taxpayer expects a substantial benefit from the
contribution, (ii) in assessing whether a taxpayer expected a substantial
benefit, the court looks to the external features of the transaction, and (iii)
the LLC did expect a substantial benefit from the easement because having
the park as an amenity would increase the value of the lots on the LLC’s
adjoining land.
The Tax Court also held, in the alternative, that the easement had no value.
The court explained that, as evidenced by the LLC’s development plan for
the 1,280 acres (which included the 125 acres), the best use of the 125 acres
was as parkland in the midst of a master-planned community. The
conservation easement therefore did not diminish the value of the 125 acres
because it did not prevent it from being put to its best use. The court further
explained that its answer would not change if the land valued before and
after the easement were the entire contiguous parcel (the entire 1,280 acres).
Using the 125 acres as a park would make the master-planned community
more desirable and therefore increase the value of the residential and
commercial lots the LLC intended to sell. Taking that enhancement into
account, the court said, the total value of the 1,280 acres would be
undiminished by the easement.
The LLC was not, however, found liable for a 20% penalty because it
satisfied the reasonable cause and good faith exception. The court noted that
the most important factor in determining reasonable cause and good faith is
the extent of the taxpayer’s effort to ascertain the proper tax treatment of
the transaction in question. As to the value of the easement, the LLC had
retained two different state-certified real estate appraisers to appraise the
easement. Although neither appraiser correctly accounted for the
enhancement conferred by the easement on the unencumbered property,
neither did the IRS’s trial expert. Thus, the court held that “[u]nder the
narrow circumstances of this case,” there was reasonable cause for reporting
the deduction and the deduction was reported in good faith.
In Wendell Falls II, the Tax Court denied the LLC’s motion for
reconsideration and supplemented its first opinion.
d. Costello. In Costello, taxpayers conveyed a conservation easement to
Howard County, Maryland, in exchange for the right to sell 16 development
rights to a developer pursuant to the county’s transfer of development rights
program. The right to sell the development rights was conditioned on the
conveyance of the easement, which prohibited any future development of

99
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384360

the subject property. In filing their tax return and claiming a deduction for
the conveyance of the easement, the taxpayers failed to indicate that they
had received the right to sell the development rights (and $2.5 million on
their sale) as a result of the conveyance. The Tax Court held that, even if
the taxpayers had complied with the qualified appraisal and appraisal
summary requirements (which they did not), the court would nonetheless
disallow the deduction because the easement was conveyed as part of a quid
pro quo exchange.
The taxpayers argued that easement’s value exceeded the $2.5 million of
consideration they received in exchange for its conveyance (in the form of
proceeds from their sale of the 16 development rights). The Tax Court
dismissed that argument because (i) the taxpayers failed to provide evidence
that the property could have been developed into more than 16 lots and (ii)
the taxpayers could not sell the 16 development rights until they had placed
the easement on the property and, once they did, all future development was
prohibited, so there was no “excess” development potential that they could
have contributed to the county in the form of a bargain sale.
The Tax Court sustained the IRS’s imposition of accuracy-related penalties
in Costello, explaining, in part, that the taxpayers “knew or reasonably
should have known” that the sale of the development rights for $2.5 million
was relevant in determining any deduction to which they might be entitled.
e. McGrady. In McGrady, the taxpayers donated a conservation easement
on their 25-acre homestead property to a Bucks County, Pennsylvania,
Township, and fee-title to an adjacent 20-acres to a local nonprofit. The
taxpayers claimed a $2.35 million deduction for each donation. The
conveyances were components of a complex conservation transaction
involving the taxpayers’ property and neighboring property, and the parties
involved included the Township, the local nonprofit, the owners of the
neighboring property, and a local developer.
The IRS disallowed the deductions, claiming that the donations were made
as part of a quid pro quo transaction. The IRS argued that the donations
were components of a conservation transaction that benefited the taxpayers
by reducing development on the neighboring property and ensuring that
much of that property was conserved, thus protecting the taxpayers’ privacy
and views. The Tax Court rejected that argument, finding that neither the
grant of the easement nor the conveyance of the 20-acre parcel was
conditioned on the Township or nonprofit supplying any return benefit to
the taxpayers. The court held that the taxpayers were mere “incidental
beneficiaries” of the overall conservation transaction, and neither the
nonprofit, the Township, nor the developer intended to benefit the
taxpayers.
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The court, however, reduced the allowable deductions for the donations of
the 20-acre parcel and the conservation easement to $2.19 million and $1.49
million respectively, and further reduced those deductions by $29,000 for
an access easement the taxpayers received as part of the overall
conservation transaction. Although the taxpayers had an informal access
agreement with the owners of the neighboring property, they received a
recorded access easement as part of the overall transaction, and the court
found that the access easement constituted a return benefit that had to be
valued and reduce the amount of the taxpayer’s charitable contributions.
The value of the conservation easement reported on the taxpayer’s return
($2.35 million) exceeded 150% of the value that the court determined to be
correct ($1.49 million) and, thus, constituted a substantial valuation
misstatement. The taxpayers were not liable for valuation or other penalties,
however, because they met the reasonable cause and good faith exceptions.
f. Pesky. In Pesky, the IRS asserted not only that the taxpayer’s conveyance
of a conservation easement was made in exchange for a quid pro quo, but
also that the taxpayer was liable for a civil fraud penalty under IRC § 6663.
Section 6663 imposes a 75% penalty on tax underpayments due to fraud.
Fraud is defined as an “intentional wrongdoing on the part of the taxpayer
with the specific intent to avoid a tax known to be owing.” The government
must prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence, but intent can be
inferred from strong circumstantial evidence.
After a review of the facts and circumstances surrounding the easement
conveyance, the District Court was unable to conclude that a reasonable jury
could find it “highly likely” that the taxpayer’s deduction was due to fraud.
Because the government did not produce sufficient evidence to meet its
burden of showing fraud by clear and convincing evidence, the court
granted the taxpayer’s motion for summary judgment on the issue. The
court determined, however, that other issues could not be resolved on
summary judgment, including whether the conveyance of the easement was
made in exchange for quid pro quo and whether the taxpayer obtained a
contemporaneous written acknowledgment accurately reflecting any goods
and services provided by the donee in exchange for the contribution. The
parties in Pesky appear to have settled the case after the District Court
rejected the fraud claim.
E. Side Agreements. In Graev I, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of
deductions claimed with regard to the donation to the National Architectural Trust (NAT)
of both a façade easement valued at $990,000 and an accompanying $99,000 cash
contribution. NAT had written a side letter to Mr. Graev, the donor, promising that, if the
deduction for the easement were disallowed, NAT would “promptly refund [Mr. Graev’s]
entire cash endowment contribution and join with [him] to immediately remove the facade
conservation easement from the property’s title.” The Tax Court disallowed the deductions
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for both the easement and cash contributions because the gifts were conditional and, at the
time they were made, the possibility they would be defeated was not so remote as to be
negligible.
Section 170 and the corresponding Treasury Regulations provide instructions and
limitations that, at least in part, ensure that a donor will be able to deduct no more than
what the donee actually receives. Three such limitations effectively provide that no
deduction for a charitable contribution will be allowed unless, on the date of the
contribution, the possibility that the donee’s interest in the contribution will be defeated is
“so remote as to be negligible.” Those limitations are found in Treasury Regulations §
1.170A-1(e) (pertaining to conditional gifts), § 1.170A-7 (pertaining to partial interest
gifts), and § 1.170A-14(g)(3) (pertaining to gifts of conservation easements).
Based on the facts in Graev I, the court found that, on the date of the contributions, the
possibility that the IRS would disallow the easement deduction and NAT would return the
cash to Mr. Graev and remove the easement (i.e., that the gifts would be defeated) was not
so remote as to be negligible. The facts the court found persuasive included the IRS’s
announced intention to scrutinize deductions for facade easement donations; Mr. Graev’s
insistence that NAT issue the side letter; NAT’s practice of issuing side letters, the very
essence of which “implies a non-negligible risk;” the enforceability of the side letter under
state law; and NAT’s incentive to honor its promises in the side letter so as not to impair
its ability to obtain future contributions.
The possibility that a gift will be defeated will be considered so remote as to be negligible
only if it is “so highly improbable that one might ignore it with reasonable safety in
undertaking a serious business transaction” or “so highly improbable and remote as to be
lacking in reason and substance.”202 In Graev I, the court explained: “the mere fact that he
required the side letter is strong evidence that, at the time of Mr. Graev’s contribution, the
risk that his corresponding deductions might be disallowed could not be (and was not)
‘ignored with reasonable safety in undertaking a serious business transaction.’” Obtaining
the side letter also indicated that Mr. Graev did not think the chance of disallowance was
“so highly improbable and remote as to be lacking in reason and substance.” Accordingly,
the mere fact of obtaining a side letter such as that at issue in Graev I may be a tripwire
that destroys deductibility.
F. Donation by Term-Limited Lessee. In Harbor Lofts, the Tax Court held that the
Harbor Lofts partnership, which leased two buildings from a Massachusetts public
corporation for a term of years, was not entitled to a deduction for a façade easement on
the buildings that Harbor Lofts and the corporation jointly conveyed to a historic
preservation nonprofit. Harbor Lofts claimed a $4,457,515 deduction for the donation,
presumably because the owner of the building, the Massachusetts public corporation,
which is a nonprofit corporation established under state law, could not benefit from the
deduction.

202

See Briggs v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 646, 656-57 (1979).
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Harbor Lofts argued, among other things, that § 170(h)(2)(C) does not explicitly require
that an easement donor own the real property that is subject to the easement and that
multiple parties, such as tenants in common, may join together in granting an easement.
The IRS argued that Harbor Lofts, as a “time-limited” lessee, did not have a perpetual
interest to give and that a time-limited leasehold interest could not be equated to the fee
interest of a tenant in common.
In agreeing with the IRS, the Tax Court explained that:
(i) state law determines the nature of property rights, whereas federal law
determines the appropriate tax treatment of those rights, and under Massachusetts
law, a term-of-years leasehold interest constitutes personal property,
(ii) Harbor Lofts was not a tenant in common and the limited duration of a leasehold
interest is far different from fee ownership as a tenant in common,
(iii) Harbor Lofts did not hold perpetual property rights in the buildings, so it was
not possible for it to contribute a perpetual restriction on the use of the buildings as
required by § 170(h)(2)(C),
(iv) while § 170(h) does not specifically require that an easement donor hold a fee
interest, only the holder of a fee interest is able to grant a perpetual conservation
restriction,
(v) when Harbor Lofts joined in the grant of the easement, it gave up contractual
rights under the lease agreement, which are personal property rights, and a
charitable contribution of a personal property right is not a “qualified real property
interest” under § 170(h)(2)(C),
(vi) while Harbor Lofts gave up something of value when it joined in the grant of
the easement (the rights it held under the lease contract to make certain
improvements or alterations to the buildings), it ceded those rights to the
Massachusetts public corporation, not the holder of the easement,
(vii) even if Harbor Lofts were deemed to hold equitable ownership interests in the
buildings as a result of the long-term lease, those interests would be for only a finite
period and could not satisfy the perpetuity requirements of § 170(h), and
(viii) as a time-limited lessee, Harbor Lofts did not have the power to impose
perpetual restrictions on the buildings—it could not give what it did not have—and,
thus, it could not protect the conservation purpose in perpetuity.
The Harbor Lofts opinion raises a number of questions. For example, could the holder of
a life estate and the holder of the remainder interest in real property jointly donate a
conservation easement on the property and share the deduction based on the value of their
respective interests? Or is the owner of a life estate, which is effectively a term-limited
interest, prevented from granting a perpetual use restriction? What if a long-term lessee
and the owner of the fee contribute their interests to a partnership, the partnership donates
an easement, and the partnership allocates the entire resulting deduction to the lessee? If a
term-limited lessee like Harbor Lofts were deemed to have a sufficient interest in the real
property to claim a deduction, would other parties with limited interests similarly be
entitled to claim a deduction, such as a lender holding an outstanding mortgage on the
property? Or is the answer that any party holding an interest that is not an undivided portion
of the entire fee must agree to subordinate its interest to the easement for the easement to
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qualify for the deduction, but the deduction can be claimed only by the owner (or owners)
of undivided portions of the fee (like the sole owner of the fee or tenants in common)?
G. “Qualified Farmer or Rancher.” Pursuant to IRC § 170(b)(1), an individual can
generally claim the deduction generated by a conservation easement donation to the extent
of 50% of the individual’s adjusted gross income (AGI) in each of the year of the donation
and the following fifteen years. However, an individual who is a “qualified farmer or
rancher” can deduct the value of the donation to the extent of 100% of his or her AGI in
each of the year of the donation and the following fifteen years. A “qualified farmer or
rancher” is an individual whose gross income from the trade or business of farming (within
the meaning of IRC § 2032A(e)(5)) is greater than 50% of the individual’s gross income
for the taxable year.203
In Rutkoske, two brothers who ran a complex farming operation involving multiple entities
claimed that they were qualified farmers or ranchers and, thus, eligible to benefit from the
100% of AGI deduction provision with regard to the donation component of the bargainsale of a conservation easement by an LLC in which they each owned a 50% interest. The
Tax Court disagreed, finding that neither brother had gross income from the trade or
business of farming greater than 50% of his gross income for the taxable year on two
grounds.
1. Neither the sale of land nor the bargain sale of a conservation easement are
activities listed in § 2032A(e)(5). Accordingly, the proceeds from such sales, which
flowed through the LLC to the brothers for the taxable year, did not constitute
“income from the trade or business of farming.”
2. If a partnership is not in the trade or business of farming, income or gain flowing
through the partnership to the partners does not constitute “income from the trade
or business of farming.” In Rutkoske, the LLC was not in the business of farming;
it was in the business of leasing real estate. Thus, the income from the LLC that
flowed through to the Rutkoske brothers did not constitute income from the trade
or business of farming.
The court acknowledged that the statutory rules make it difficult for a farmer to receive the
maximum charitable contribution deduction if the farmer sells property in a year in which
he donates a conservation easement, especially in a state with high land values. However,
the court explained that it is not its task to rewrite statutes, and “being a farmer does not
make one a ‘qualified farmer’” for purposes of the 100% of AGI deduction rule.
H. Disguised Sales. In each of SWF Real Estate, LLC, and Route 231, LLC v. Comm’r,
810 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2016), the IRS successfully invoked a tax avoidance principle—the
“disguised sales” rules under IRC § 707—to attack the special allocation of state income
tax credits generated by a partnership’s donation of a conservation easement. The courts
held that each partnership’s transfer to a 1% partner of more than 90% of the state income
203
For guidance on deductions by individuals for qualified conservation contributions, including farmers and ranchers,
see IRS Notice 2007-50.
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tax credits generated by the donation was a taxable disguised sale. In Route 231, LLC, the
Fourth Circuit explained that § 707 “prevents use of the partnership provisions to render
nontaxable what would in substance have been a taxable exchange if it had not been ‘run
through’ the partnership.”
In Bosque Canyon Ranch I, the Tax Court held that two partnerships’ transfers of 5-acre
homesites on a shared-amenities ranch to limited partners in exchange for purported
“capital contributions” were, in fact, taxable disguised sales. The court found that the
distributions of the 5-acre homesites to the limited partners were made in exchange for the
limited partners’ payments and were not subject to the entrepreneurial risks of the
partnerships’ operations. Accordingly, the court held that the partnerships were required to
recognize and include in their gross income any gains relating to the disguised sales. In
Bosque Canyon Ranch II, however, the Fifth Circuit vacated the Tax Court’s determination
that the entirety of the limited partners’ contributions were disguised sales and remanded
for that court to determine the correct amount of any taxable income that resulted from the
disguised sales.
I. PLRs Recommending Revocation of Tax-Exempt Status.204 The IRS has issued a
number of Private Letter Rulings (PLRs) recommending revocation of the tax-exempt
status of organizations holding conservation easements based on fairly egregious facts.205
These PLRs illustrate some of the issues the IRS has focused on when examining
organizations that accept and hold conservation easements.
1. Although the PLRs are impossible to accurately summarize in an outline because
of their highly fact specific nature, some of the problems noted in the PLRs include:
•
•

•

the organization served as a vehicle for its founder, the founder’s family, or
other related parties to donate conservation easements and claim
deductions;
the easements donated to the organization did not satisfy the conservation
purpose test under § 170(h)(4) (e.g., the preservation was not pursuant to a
clearly delineated government conservation policy; the easement
encumbered ordinary farmland with no unique features like native plants,
trees, or animals; or the easement encumbered land in a gated condominium
tennis resort and contained a private miniature golf course used for the
pleasure of the residents only);
the organization did not take steps to ensure that the easements it accepts
serve a conservation purpose (e.g., the organization’s officers, trustees, and
employees did not have backgrounds or expertise in botany, biology,
ecological sciences, or other fields that would enable them to credibly
process or evaluate the property, or no baselines were obtained or consisted
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See supra note 116 for a description of Private Letter Rulings.
See, e.g., PLR 201044026; PLR 201048045; PLR 201109030; PLR 201110020; PLR 201405018. See also PLR
201234029 (organization created for the purpose of carrying on a for-profit hay farm on property that is not ecologically
significant or open to the public is not operated for an exempt purpose).
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•

•
•

•
•
•
•

of one page or one paragraph reports; or the organization was unaware of
the extensive retained rights in the easements it accepted);
the organization did not monitor the easements it accepted on a regular basis
(or at all), did not have the commitment to protect the conservation purposes
(if any) of the donations, and did not have the resources to enforce the
easements should enforcement become necessary;
there was no one associated with the organization that had any formal
education, training, or expertise in conservation matters;
the organization allowed one of its easement-encumbered properties to be
damaged by illegal dumping and vehicles, and another, located in an
exclusive small waterfront residential development, to be encroached upon
by the residents who constructed, among other things, large ponds and a
boat and recreational vehicle storage facility for the exclusive use of the
residents;
the organization amended a conservation easement to allow additional
development for a fee;
the easements the organization acquired violated the perpetuity requirement
under § 170(h) because the organization had the right to terminate the
easements;
the organization did not develop or sponsor any educational events, solicit
the general public for support, or appear to hold itself out to the public as a
charitable conservation organization; and
the organization was not operated in accordance with its bylaws (e.g., there
were no meetings of officers or board members, no elections, and no
internal controls, and there was only the bare minimum with regard to
records and recordkeeping).

2. PLR 201048045 explains:
To establish that it operates exclusively for charitable conservation
purposes under section 501(c)(3), an organization must do more than
merely accept and hold easements for which donors are claiming charitable
contribution deductions under section 170(h). The organization must
establish that any accepted easements actually serve a conservation purpose.
The organization must also operate as an effective steward to ensure that
the easement continues to further a conservation purpose. The easement is
a set of legal rights. It can serve conservation purposes only if enforced
where necessary. The need for enforcement can be determined only through
monitoring. The extent of an organization's due diligence and monitoring
activities, combined with its capacity for and commitment to enforcement
when necessary, becomes highly significant in determining whether
accepting and holding easements actually furthers a charitable conservation
purpose and thus whether an organization with the primary purpose of
accepting and holding easements qualifies for exemption under section
501(c)(3).
3. The IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide notes:
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A “self-serving” donee organization organized solely for the purpose of
accepting one easement may lack charitable purpose or be engaged in selfdealing. If there is a question or concern as to the operations of the
organization, examiners should submit a referral to Tax Exempt and
Governmental Entities (TEGE). 206
The Guide also provides that an IRS examiner should:
Ask for the [donee] organization’s monitoring reports to verify whether the
taxpayer is in compliance with, and the donee organization is enforcing, the
terms of the easement. In some cases, donee organizations have allowed
changes that were in violation of the terms of the easement.
Examiners should consult Counsel for assistance if the easement was
terminated or not being enforced. In addition, a referral to TEGE should be
considered.207
J. State Tax Credits. A number of states offer state income tax credits to donors of
conservation easements and several cases have addressed issues relating to such credits.
Esgar involved three taxpayers, each of whom donated a conservation easement on land
located in Colorado, received transferable income tax credits from Colorado as a result of
the donation, and sold a portion of the credits to third parties within two weeks. The
taxpayers reported the proceeds from the credit sales as long-term capital gain, short-term
capital gain, and ordinary income, respectively. After an audit of the taxpayers’ income tax
returns, the IRS determined that the proceeds from the sales of the credits should have been
reported as ordinary income.
In Tempel v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 341 (2011), the Tax Court held that the taxpayers’ state tax
credits were zero-basis capital assets and, given the short holding periods, income from the
sale of such credits was short-term capital gain. Several months later, the IRS released a
Chief Counsel Advice that addresses the tax consequences of the sale of state tax credits to
both the seller and the buyer.208
The taxpayers appealed both Esgar I (in which the Tax Court held that the taxpayers had
substantially overvalued the conservation easements) and Tempel to the Tenth Circuit. In
Esgar II, the taxpayers argued that their state tax credits, which they held for only about
two weeks, were nonetheless long-term capital assets because they held the underlying real
properties for longer than one year, they relinquished development rights in those
properties through the donation of the easements, and they received the tax credits because
of the donations. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, noting that the Tax Court correctly
concluded in Tempel that the taxpayers had no property rights in the tax credits until the
easement donations were complete and the credits were granted, and the credits never were,
206

See IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide, supra note 23, at 57.
See id., at 71.
208
Chief Counsel Advice 201147024, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/1147024.pdf.
207

107
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384360

nor did they become, part of the taxpayers’ real property rights. The Tenth Circuit also
agreed with the Tax Court that the taxpayers’ holding period in the credits began at the
time the credits were granted and ended when taxpayers sold them, and since the taxpayers
sold the credits in the same month in which they received them, the gains from the sale of
the credits were short-term capital gains.
The Tenth Circuit also summarily rejected the argument that the transactions amounted to
some sort of like-kind exchange of conservation easements for tax credits that might result
in the “tacking” of holding periods. The court further noted that if these were like-kind
exchanges it would negate the charitable nature of the taxpayers’ contributions of the
easements.
As noted in Part III.H above, in each of SWF Real Estate, LLC, and Route 231, LLC v.
Comm’r, 810 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2016), the IRS successfully invoked the “disguised sales”
rules under § 707 to attack the nonpro rata allocation of state income tax credits generated
by a partnership’s donation of a conservation easement.
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Appendix A
Internal Revenue Code § 170(h)
(h) Qualified conservation contribution.
(1) In general. For purposes of subsection (f)(3)(B)(iii), the term "qualified
conservation contribution" means a contribution-(A) of a qualified real property interest,
(B) to a qualified organization,
(C) exclusively for conservation purposes.
(2) Qualified real property interest. For purposes of this subsection, the term
"qualified real property interest" means any of the following interests in real
property:
(A) the entire interest of the donor other than a qualified mineral
interest,
(B) a remainder interest, and
(C) a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of
the real property.
(3) Qualified organization. For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "qualified
organization" means an organization which-(A) is described in clause (v) or (vi) of subsection (b)(1)(A), or
(B) is described in section 501(c)(3) [IRC Sec. 501(c)(3)] and-(i) meets the requirements of section 509(a)(2) [IRC Sec.
509(a)(2)], or
(ii) meets the requirements of section 509(a)(3) [IRC Sec.
509(a)(3)] and is controlled by an organization described in
subparagraph (A) or in clause (i) of this subparagraph.
(4) Conservation purpose defined.
(A) In general. For purposes of this subsection, the term "conservation
purpose" means-(i) the preservation of land areas for outdoor recreation by, or the
education of, the general public,
(ii) the protection of a relatively natural habitat of fish, wildlife, or
plants, or similar ecosystem,
(iii) the preservation of open space (including farmland and forest
land) where such preservation is-(I) for the scenic enjoyment of the general public, or
(II) pursuant to a clearly delineated Federal, State, or local
governmental conservation policy,
and will yield a significant public benefit, or
(iv) the preservation of an historically important land area or a
certified historic structure.
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(B) Special rules with respect to buildings in registered historic districts. In
the case of any contribution of a qualified real property interest which is
a restriction with respect to the exterior of a building described in
subparagraph (C)(ii), such contribution shall not be considered to be
exclusively for conservation purposes unless-(i) such interest-(I) includes a restriction which preserves the entire
exterior of the building (including the front, sides, rear,
and height of the building), and
(II) prohibits any change in the exterior of the building
which is inconsistent with the historical character of such
exterior,
(ii) the donor and donee enter into a written agreement
certifying, under penalty of perjury, that the donee-(I) is a qualified organization (as defined in paragraph (3))
with a purpose of environmental protection, land
conservation, open space preservation, or historic
preservation, and
(II) has the resources to manage and enforce the
restriction and a commitment to do so, and
(iii) in the case of any contribution made in a taxable year
beginning after the date of the enactment of this subparagraph
[Aug. 17, 2006], the taxpayer includes with the taxpayer's return
for the taxable year of the contribution-(I) a qualified appraisal (within the meaning of subsection
(f)(11)(E)) of the qualified property interest,
(II) photographs of the entire exterior of the building, and
(III) a description of all restrictions on the development of
the building.
(C) Certified historic structure. For purposes of subparagraph (A)(iv), the
term "certified historic structure" means-(i) any building, structure, or land area which is listed in the
National Register, or
(ii) any building which is located in a registered historic district (as
defined in section 47(c)(3)(B) and is certified by the Secretary of
the Interior to the Secretary as being of historic significance to the
district.
A building, structure, or land area satisfies the preceding sentence if it
satisfies such sentence either at the time of the transfer or on the due
date (including extensions) for filing the transferor's return under this
chapter for the taxable year in which the transfer is made.
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(5) Exclusively for conservation purposes. For purposes of this subsection-(A) Conservation purpose must be protected. A contribution shall not be
treated as exclusively for conservation purposes unless the conservation
purpose is protected in perpetuity.
(B) No surface mining permitted.
(i) In general. Except as provided in clause (ii), in the case of a
contribution of any interest where there is a retention of a
qualified mineral interest, subparagraph (A) shall not be treated
as met if at any time there may be extraction or removal of
minerals by any surface mining method.
(ii) Special rule. With respect to any contribution of property in
which the ownership of the surface estate and mineral interests
has been and remains separated, subparagraph (A) shall be
treated as met if the probability of surface mining occurring on
such property is so remote as to be negligible.
(6) Qualified mineral interest. For purposes of this subsection, the term
"qualified mineral interest" means-(A) subsurface oil, gas, or other minerals, and
(B) the right to access to such minerals
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§ 1.170A-14 Qualified conservation contributions.
(a) Qualified conservation contributions. A deduction under section 170 is generally not
allowed for a charitable contribution of any interest in property that consists of less than the
donor's entire interest in the property other than certain transfers in trust (see § 1.170A-6 relating
to charitable contributions in trust and § 1.170A-7 relating to contributions not in trust of partial
interests in property). However, a deduction may be allowed under section 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) for the
value of a qualified conservation contribution if the requirements of this section are met. A
qualified conservation contribution is the contribution of a qualified real property interest to a
qualified organization exclusively for conservation purposes. To be eligible for a deduction under
this section, the conservation purpose must be protected in perpetuity.
(b) Qualified real property interest -- (1) Entire interest of donor other than qualified mineral
interest. (i) The entire interest of the donor other than a qualified mineral interest is a qualified
real property interest. A qualified mineral interest is the donor's interest in subsurface oil, gas, or
other minerals and the right of access to such minerals.
(ii) A real property interest shall not be treated as an entire interest other than a qualified
mineral interest by reason of section 170(h)(2)(A) and this paragraph (b)(1) if the property in which
the donor's interest exists was divided prior to the contribution in order to enable the donor to
retain control of more than a qualified mineral interest or to reduce the real property interest
donated. See Treasury regulations § 1.170A-7(a)(2)(i). An entire interest in real property may
consist of an undivided interest in the property. But see section 170(h)(5)(A) and the regulations
thereunder (relating to the requirement that the conservation purpose which is the subject of the
donation must be protected in perpetuity). Minor interests, such as rights-of-way, that will not
interfere with the conservation purposes of the donation, may be transferred prior to the
conservation contribution without affecting the treatment of a property interest as a qualified real
property interest under this paragraph (b)(1).
(2) Perpetual conservation restriction. A "perpetual conservation restriction" is a qualified real
property interest. A "perpetual conservation restriction" is a restriction granted in perpetuity on
the use which may be made of real property -- including, an easement or other interest in real
property that under state law has attributes similar to an easement (e.g., a restrictive covenant or
equitable servitude). For purposes of this section, the terms easement, conservation restriction,
and perpetual conservation restriction have the same meaning. The definition of perpetual
conservation restriction under this paragraph (b)(2) is not intended to preclude the deductibility of
a donation of affirmative rights to use a land or water area under § 1.170A-13(d)(2). Any rights
reserved by the donor in the donation of a perpetual conservation restriction must conform to the
requirements of this section. See e.g., paragraph (d)(4)(ii), (d)(5)(i), (e)(3), and (g)(4) of this section.
(c) Qualified organization -- (1) Eligible donee. To be considered an eligible donee under this
section, an organization must be a qualified organization, have a commitment to protect the
conservation purposes of the donation, and have the resources to enforce the restrictions. A
conservation group organized or operated primarily or substantially for one of the conservation
purposes specified in section 170(h)(4)(A) will be considered to have the commitment required by
the preceding sentence. A qualified organization need not set aside funds to enforce the
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restrictions that are the subject of the contribution. For purposes of this section, the term
qualified organization means:
(i) A governmental unit described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(v);
(ii) An organization described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi);
(iii) A charitable organization described in section 501(c)(3) that meets the public support test
of section 509(a)(2);
(iv) A charitable organization described in section 501(c)(3) that meets the requirements of
section 509(a)(3) and is controlled by an organization described in paragraphs (c)(1) (i), (ii), or (iii)
of this section.
(2) Transfers by donee. A deduction shall be allowed for a contribution under this section only
if in the instrument of conveyance the donor prohibits the donee from subsequently transferring
the easement (or, in the case of a remainder interest or the reservation of a qualified mineral
interest, the property), whether or not for consideration, unless the donee organization, as a
condition of the subsequent transfer, requires that the conservation purposes which the
contribution was originally intended to advance continue to be carried out. Moreover, subsequent
transfers must be restricted to organizations qualifying, at the time of the subsequent transfer, as
an eligible donee under paragraph (c)(1) of this section. When a later unexpected change in the
conditions surrounding the property that is the subject of a donation under paragraph (b)(1), (2),
or (3) of this section makes impossible or impractical the continued use of the property for
conservation purposes, the requirement of this paragraph will be met if the property is sold or
exchanged and any proceeds are used by the donee organization in a manner consistent with the
conservation purposes of the original contribution. In the case of a donation under paragraph
(b)(3) of this section to which the preceding sentence applies, see also paragraph (g)(5)(ii) of this
section.
(d) Conservation purposes -- (1) In general. For purposes of section 170(h) and this section,
the term conservation purposes means -(i) The preservation of land areas for outdoor recreation by, or the education of, the general
public, within the meaning of paragraph (d)(2) of this section,
(ii) The protection of a relatively natural habitat of fish, wildlife, or plants, or similar
ecosystem, within the meaning of paragraph (d)(3) of this section,
(iii) The preservation of certain open space (including farmland and forest land) within the
meaning of paragraph (d)(4) of this section, or
(iv) The preservation of a historically important land area or a certified historic structure,
within the meaning of paragraph (d)(5) of this section.
(2) Recreation or education -- (i) In general. The donation of a qualified real property interest
to preserve land areas for the outdoor recreation of the general public or for the education of the
general public will meet the conservation purposes test of this section. Thus, conservation
purposes would include, for example, the preservation of a water area for the use of the public for
boating or fishing, or a nature or hiking trail for the use of the public.
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(ii) Access. The preservation of land areas for recreation or education will not meet the test of
this section unless the recreation or education is for the substantial and regular use of the general
public.
(3) Protection of environmental system -- (i) In general. The donation of a qualified real
property interest to protect a significant relatively natural habitat in which a fish, wildlife, or plant
community, or similar ecosystem normally lives will meet the conservation purposes test of this
section. The fact that the habitat or environment has been altered to some extent by human
activity will not result in a deduction being denied under this section if the fish, wildlife, or plants
continue to exist there in a relatively natural state. For example, the preservation of a lake formed
by a man-made dam or a salt pond formed by a man-made dike would meet the conservation
purposes test if the lake or pond were a nature feeding area for a wildlife community that included
rare, endangered, or threatened native species.
(ii) Significant habitat or ecosystem. Significant habitats and ecosystems include, but are not
limited to, habitats for rare, endangered, or threatened species of animal, fish, or plants; natural
areas that represent high quality examples of a terrestrial community or aquatic community, such
as islands that are undeveloped or not intensely developed where the coastal ecosystem is
relatively intact; and natural areas which are included in, or which contribute to, the ecological
viability of a local, state, or national park, nature preserve, wildlife refuge, wilderness area, or
other similar conservation area.
(iii) Access. Limitations on public access to property that is the subject of a donation under this
paragraph (d)(3) shall not render the donation nondeductible. For example, a restriction on all
public access to the habitat of a threatened native animal species protected by a donation under
this paragraph (d)(3) would not cause the donation to be nondeductible.
(4) Preservation of open space -- (i) In general. The donation of a qualified real property
interest to preserve open space (including farmland and forest land) will meet the conservation
purposes test of this section if such preservation is -(A) Pursuant to a clearly delineated Federal, state, or local governmental conservation policy
and will yield a significant public benefit, or
(B) For the scenic enjoyment of the general public and will yield a significant public benefit.
An open space easement donated on or after December 18, 1980, must meet the requirements of
section 170(h) in order to be deductible.
(ii) Scenic enjoyment -- (A) Factors. A contribution made for the preservation of open space
may be for the scenic enjoyment of the general public. Preservation of land may be for the scenic
enjoyment of the general public if development of the property would impair the scenic character
of the local rural or urban landscape or would interfere with a scenic panorama that can be
enjoyed from a park, nature preserve, road, waterbody, trail, or historic structure or land area, and
such area or transportation way is open to, or utilized by, the public. "Scenic enjoyment" will be
evaluated by considering all pertinent facts and circumstances germane to the contribution.
Regional variations in topography, geology, biology, and cultural and economic conditions require
flexibility in the application of this test, but do not lessen the burden on the taxpayer to
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demonstrate the scenic characteristics of a donation under this paragraph. The application of a
particular objective factor to help define a view as "scenic" in one setting may in fact be entirely
inappropriate in another setting. Among the factors to be considered are:
(1) The compatibility of the land use with other land in the vicinity;
(2) The degree of contrast and variety provided by the visual scene;
(3) The openness of the land (which would be a more significant factor in an urban or densely
populated setting or in a heavily wooded area);
(4) Relief from urban closeness;
(5) The harmonious variety of shapes and textures;
(6) The degree to which the land use maintains the scale and character of the urban landscape
to preserve open space, visual enjoyment, and sunlight for the surrounding area;
(7) The consistency of the proposed scenic view with a methodical state scenic identification
program, such as a state landscape inventory; and
(8) The consistency of the proposed scenic view with a regional or local landscape inventory
made pursuant to a sufficiently rigorous review process, especially if the donation is endorsed by
an appropriate state or local governmental agency.
(B) Access. To satisfy the requirement of scenic enjoyment by the general public, visual (rather
than physical) access to or across the property by the general public is sufficient. Under the terms
of an open space easement on scenic property, the entire property need not be visible to the
public for a donation to qualify under this section, although the public benefit from the donation
may be insufficient to qualify for a deduction if only a small portion of the property is visible to the
public.
(iii) Governmental conservation policy -- (A) In general. The requirement that the preservation
of open space be pursuant to a clearly delineated Federal, state, or local governmental policy is
intended to protect the types of property identified by representatives of the general public as
worthy of preservation or conservation. A general declaration of conservation goals by a single
official or legislative body is not sufficient. However, a governmental conservation policy need not
be a certification program that identifies particular lots or small parcels of individually owned
property. This requirement will be met by donations that further a specific, identified conservation
project, such as the preservation of land within a state or local landmark district that is locally
recognized as being significant to that district; the preservation of a wild or scenic river, the
preservation of farmland pursuant to a state program for flood prevention and control; or the
protection of the scenic, ecological, or historic character of land that is contiguous to, or an
integral part of, the surroundings of existing recreation or conservation sites. For example, the
donation of a perpetual conservation restriction to a qualified organization pursuant to a formal
resolution or certification by a local governmental agency established under state law specifically
identifying the subject property as worthy of protection for conservation purposes will meet the
requirement of this paragraph. A program need not be funded to satisfy this requirement, but the
program must involve a significant commitment by the government with respect to the
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conservation project. For example, a governmental program according preferential tax assessment
or preferential zoning for certain property deemed worthy of protection for conservation purposes
would constitute a significant commitment by the government.
(B) Effect of acceptance by governmental agency. Acceptance of an easement by an agency of
the Federal Government or by an agency of a state or local government (or by a commission,
authority, or similar body duly constituted by the state or local government and acting on behalf of
the state or local government) tends to establish the requisite clearly delineated governmental
policy, although such acceptance, without more, is not sufficient. The more rigorous the review
process by the governmental agency, the more the acceptance of the easement tends to establish
the requisite clearly delineated governmental policy. For example, in a state where the legislature
has established an Environmental Trust to accept gifts to the state which meet certain
conservation purposes and to submit the gifts to a review that requires the approval of the state's
highest officials, acceptance of a gift by the Trust tends to establish the requisite clearly delineated
governmental policy. However, if the Trust merely accepts such gifts without a review process, the
requisite clearly delineated governmental policy is not established.
(C) Access. A limitation on public access to property subject to a donation under this
paragraph (d)(4)(iii) shall not render the deduction nondeductible unless the conservation purpose
of the donation would be undermined or frustrated without public access. For example, a
donation pursuant to a governmental policy to protect the scenic character of land near a river
requires visual access to the same extent as would a donation under paragraph (d)(4)(ii) of this
section.
(iv) Significant public benefit -- (A) Factors. All contributions made for the preservation of open
space must yield a significant public benefit. Public benefit will be evaluated by considering all
pertinent facts and circumstances germane to the contribution. Factors germane to the evaluation
of public benefit from one contribution may be irrelevant in determining public benefit from
another contribution. No single factor will necessarily be determinative. Among the factors to be
considered are:
(1) The uniqueness of the property to the area;
(2) The intensity of land development in the vicinity of the property (both existing
development and foreseeable trends of development);
(3) The consistency of the proposed open space use with public programs (whether Federal,
state or local) for conservation in the region, including programs for outdoor recreation, irrigation
or water supply protection, water quality maintenance or enhancement, flood prevention and
control, erosion control, shoreline protection, and protection of land areas included in, or related
to, a government approved master plan or land management area;
(4) The consistency of the proposed open space use with existing private conservation
programs in the area, as evidenced by other land, protected by easement or fee ownership by
organizations referred to in § 1.170A-14(c)(1), in close proximity to the property;
(5) The likelihood that development of the property would lead to or contribute to
degradation of the scenic, natural, or historic character of the area;
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(6) The opportunity for the general public to use the property or to appreciate its scenic
values;
(7) The importance of the property in preserving a local or regional landscape or resource that
attracts tourism or commerce to the area;
(8) The likelihood that the donee will acquire equally desirable and valuable substitute
property or property rights;
(9) The cost to the donee of enforcing the terms of the conservation restriction;
(10) The population density in the area of the property; and
(11) The consistency of the proposed open space use with a legislatively mandated program
identifying particular parcels of land for future protection.
(B) Illustrations. The preservation of an ordinary tract of land would not in and of itself yield a
significant public benefit, but the preservation of ordinary land areas in conjunction with other
factors that demonstrate significant public benefit or the preservation of a unique land area for
public employment would yield a significant public benefit. For example, the preservation of a
vacant downtown lot would not by itself yield a significant public benefit, but the preservation of
the downtown lot as a public garden would, absent countervailing factors, yield a significant public
benefit. The following are other examples of contributions which would, absent countervailing
factors, yield a significant public benefit: The preservation of farmland pursuant to a state program
for flood prevention and control; the preservation of a unique natural land formation for the
enjoyment of the general public; the preservation of woodland along a public highway pursuant to
a government program to preserve the appearance of the area so as to maintain the scenic view
from the highway; and the preservation of a stretch of undeveloped property located between a
public highway and the ocean in order to maintain the scenic ocean view from the highway.
(v) Limitation. A deduction will not be allowed for the preservation of open space under
section 170(h)(4)(A)(iii), if the terms of the easement permit a degree of intrusion or future
development that would interfere with the essential scenic quality of the land or with the
governmental conservation policy that is being furthered by the donation. See § 1.170A-14(e)(2)
for rules relating to inconsistent use.
(vi) Relationship of requirements -- (A) Clearly delineated governmental policy and significant
public benefit. Although the requirements of "clearly delineated governmental policy" and
"significant public benefit" must be met independently, for purposes of this section the two
requirements may also be related. The more specific the governmental policy with respect to the
particular site to be protected, the more likely the governmental decision, by itself, will tend to
establish the significant public benefit associated with the donation. For example, while a statute
in State X permitting preferential assessment for farmland is, by definition, governmental policy, it
is distinguishable from a state statute, accompanied by appropriations, naming the X River as a
valuable resource and articulating the legislative policy that the X River and the relatively natural
quality of its surrounding be protected. On these facts, an open space easement on farmland in
State X would have to demonstrate additional factors to establish "significant public benefit." The
specificity of the legislative mandate to protect the X River, however, would by itself tend to
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establish the significant public benefit associated with an open space easement on land fronting
the X River.
(B) Scenic enjoyment and significant public benefit. With respect to the relationship between
the requirements of "scenic enjoyment" and "significant public benefit," since the degrees of
scenic enjoyment offered by a variety of open space easements are subjective and not as easily
delineated as are increasingly specific levels of governmental policy, the significant public benefit
of preserving a scenic view must be independently established in all cases.
(C) Donations may satisfy more than one test. In some cases, open space easements may be
both for scenic enjoyment and pursuant to a clearly delineated governmental policy. For example,
the preservation of a particular scenic view identified as part of a scenic landscape inventory by a
rigorous governmental review process will meet the tests of both paragraphs (d)(4)(i)(A) and
(d)(4)(i)(B) of this section.
(5) Historic preservation -- (i) In general. The donation of a qualified real property interest to
preserve an historically important land area or a certified historic structure will meet the
conservation purposes test of this section. When restrictions to preserve a building or land area
within a registered historic district permit future development on the site, a deduction will be
allowed under this section only if the terms of the restrictions require that such development
conform with appropriate local, state, or Federal standards for construction or rehabilitation
within the district. See also, § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(ii).
(ii) Historically important land area. The term historically important land area includes:
(A) An independently significant land area including any related historic resources (for
example, an archaeological site or a Civil War battlefield with related monuments, bridges,
cannons, or houses) that meets the National Register Criteria for Evaluation in 36 CFR 60.4 (Pub. L.
89-665, 80 Stat. 915);
(B) Any land area within a registered historic district including any buildings on the land area
that can reasonably be considered as contributing to the significance of the district; and
(C) Any land area (including related historic resources) adjacent to a property listed
individually in the National Register of Historic Places (but not within a registered historic district)
in a case where the physical or environmental features of the land area contribute to the historic
or cultural integrity of the property.
(iii) Certified historic structure. The term certified historic structure, for purposes of this
section, means any building, structure or land area which is -(A) Listed in the National Register, or
(B) Located in a registered historic district (as defined in section 48(g)(3)(B)) and is certified by
the Secretary of the Interior (pursuant to 36 CFR 67.4) to the Secretary of the Treasury as being of
historic significance to the district.
A structure for purposes of this section means any structure, whether or not it is depreciable.
Accordingly easements on private residences may qualify under this section. In addition, a
structure would be considered to be a certified historic structure if it were certified either at the
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time the transfer was made or at the due date (including extensions) for filing the donor's return
for the taxable year in which the contribution was made.
(iv) Access. (A) In order for a conservation contribution described in section 170(h)(4)(A)(iv)
and this paragraph (d)(5) to be deductible, some visual public access to the donated property is
required. In the case of an historically important land area, the entire property need not be visible
to the public for a donation to qualify under this section. However, the public benefit from the
donation may be insufficient to qualify for a deduction if only a small portion of the property is so
visible. Where the historic land area or certified historic structure which is the subject of the
donation is not visible from a public way (e.g., the structure is hidden from view by a wall or
shrubbery, the structure is too far from the public way, or interior characteristics and features of
the structure are the subject of the easement), the terms of the easement must be such that the
general public is given the opportunity on a regular basis to view the characteristics and features
of the property which are preserved by the easement to the extent consistent with the nature and
condition of the property.
(B) Factors to be considered in determining the type and amount of public access required
under paragraph (d)(5)(iv)(A) of this section include the historical significance of the donated
property, the nature of the features that are the subject of the easement, the remoteness or
accessibility of the site of the donated property, the possibility of physical hazards to the public
visiting the property (for example, an unoccupied structure in a dilapidated condition), the extent
to which public access would be an unreasonable intrusion on any privacy interests of individuals
living on the property, the degree to which public access would impair the preservation interests
which are the subject of the donation, and the availability of opportunities for the public to view
the property by means other than visits to the site.
(C) The amount of access afforded the public by the donation of an easement shall be
determined with reference to the amount of access permitted by the terms of the easement which
are established by the donor, rather than the amount of access actually provided by the donee
organization. However, if the donor is aware of any facts indicating that the amount of access that
the donee organization will provide is significantly less than the amount of access permitted under
the terms of the easement, then the amount of access afforded the public shall be determined
with reference to this lesser amount.
(v) Examples. The provisions of paragraph (d)(5)(iv) of this section may be illustrated by the
following examples:
Example 1. A and his family live in a house in a certified historic district in the State of X. The
entire house, including its interior, has architectural features representing classic Victorian period
architecture. A donates an exterior and interior easement on the property to a qualified
organization but continues to live in the house with his family. A's house is surrounded by a high
stone wall which obscures the public's view of it from the street. Pursuant to the terms of the
easement, the house may be opened to the public from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on one Sunday in
May and one Sunday in November each year for house and garden tours. These tours are to be
under the supervision of the donee and open to members of the general public upon payment of a
small fee. In addition, under the terms of the easement, the donee organization is given the right
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to photograph the interior and exterior of the house and distribute such photographs to
magazines, newsletters, or other publicly available publications. The terms of the easement also
permit persons affiliated with educational organizations, professional architectural associations,
and historical societies to make an appointment through the donee organization to study the
property. The donor is not aware of any facts indicating that the public access to be provided by
the donee organization will be significantly less than that permitted by the terms of the easement.
The 2 opportunities for public visits per year, when combined with the ability of the general public
to view the architectural characteristics and features that are the subject of the easement through
photographs, the opportunity for scholarly study of the property, and the fact that the house is
used as an occupied residence, will enable the donation to satisfy the requirement of public
access.
Example 2. B owns an unoccupied farmhouse built in the 1840's and located on a property
that is adjacent to a Civil War battlefield. During the Civil War the farmhouse was used as quarters
for Union troops. The battlefield is visited year round by the general public. The condition of the
farmhouse is such that the safety of visitors will not be jeopardized and opening it to the public
will not result in significant deterioration. The farmhouse is not visible from the battlefield or any
public way. It is accessible only by way of a private road owned by B. B donates a conservation
easement on the farmhouse to a qualified organization. The terms of the easement provide that
the donee organization may open the property (via B's road) to the general public on four
weekends each year from 8:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. The donation does not meet the public access
requirement because the farmhouse is safe, unoccupied, and easily accessible to the general
public who have come to the site to visit Civil War historic land areas (and related resources), but
will only be open to the public on four weekends each year. However, the donation would meet
the public access requirement if the terms of the easement permitted the donee organization to
open the property to the public every other weekend during the year and the donor is not aware
of any facts indicating that the donee organization will provide significantly less access than that
permitted.
(e) Exclusively for conservation purposes -- (1) In general. To meet the requirements of this
section, a donation must be exclusively for conservation purposes. See paragraphs (c)(1) and (g)(1)
through (g)(6)(ii) of this section. A deduction will not be denied under this section when incidental
benefit inures to the donor merely as a result of conservation restrictions limiting the uses to
which the donor's property may be put.
(2) Inconsistent use. Except as provided in paragraph (e)(4) of this section, a deduction will not
be allowed if the contribution would accomplish one of the enumerated conservation purposes
but would permit destruction of other significant conservation interests. For example, the
preservation of farmland pursuant to a State program for flood prevention and control would not
qualify under paragraph (d)(4) of this section if under the terms of the contribution a significant
naturally occurring ecosystem could be injured or destroyed by the use of pesticides in the
operation of the farm. However, this requirement is not intended to prohibit uses of the property,
such as selective timber harvesting or selective farming if, under the circumstances, those uses do
not impair significant conservation interests.
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(3) Inconsistent use permitted. A use that is destructive of conservation interests will be
permitted only if such use is necessary for the protection of the conservation interests that are the
subject of the contribution. For example, a deduction for the donation of an easement to preserve
an archaeological site that is listed on the National Register of Historic Places will not be
disallowed if site excavation consistent with sound archaeological practices may impair a scenic
view of which the land is a part. A donor may continue a pre-existing use of the property that does
not conflict with the conservation purposes of the gift.
(f) Examples. The provisions of this section relating to conservation purposes may be
illustrated by the following examples.
Example 1. State S contains many large tract forests that are desirable recreation and scenic
areas for the general public. The forests' scenic values attract millions of people to the State.
However, due to the increasing intensity of land development in State S, the continued existence
of forestland parcels greater than 45 acres is threatened. J grants a perpetual easement on a 100acre parcel of forestland that is part of one of the State's scenic areas to a qualifying organization.
The easement imposes restrictions on the use of the parcel for the purpose of maintaining its
scenic values. The restrictions include a requirement that the parcel be maintained forever as
open space devoted exclusively to conservation purposes and wildlife protection, and that there
be no commercial, industrial, residential, or other development use of such parcel. The law of
State S recognizes a limited public right to enter private land, particularly for recreational pursuits,
unless such land is posted or the landowner objects. The easement specifically restricts the
landowner from posting the parcel, or from objecting, thereby maintaining public access to the
parcel according to the custom of the State. J's parcel provides the opportunity for the public to
enjoy the use of the property and appreciate its scenic values. Accordingly, J's donation qualifies
for a deduction under this section.
Example 2. A qualified conservation organization owns Greenacre in fee as a nature preserve.
Greenacre contains a high quality example of a tall grass prairie ecosystem. Farmacre, an
operating farm, adjoins Greenacre and is a compatible buffer to the nature preserve. Conversion
of Farmacre to a more intense use, such as a housing development, would adversely affect the
continued use of Greenacre as a nature preserve because of human traffic generated by the
development. The owner of Farmacre donates an easement preventing any future development
on Farmacre to the qualified conservation organization for conservation purposes. Normal
agricultural uses will be allowed on Farmacre. Accordingly, the donation qualifies for a deduction
under this section.
Example 3. H owns Greenacre, a 900-acre parcel of woodland, rolling pasture, and orchards on
the crest of a mountain. All of Greenacre is clearly visible from a nearby national park. Because of
the strict enforcement of an applicable zoning plan, the highest and best use of Greenacre is as a
subdivision of 40-acre tracts. H wishes to donate a scenic easement on Greenacre to a qualifying
conservation organization, but H would like to reserve the right to subdivide Greenacre into 90acre parcels with no more than one single-family home allowable on each parcel. Random building
on the property, even as little as one home for each 90 acres, would destroy the scenic character
of the view. Accordingly, no deduction would be allowable under this section.
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Example 4. Assume the same facts as in example (3), except that not all of Greenacre is visible
from the park and the deed of easement allows for limited cluster development of no more than
five nine-acre clusters (with four houses on each cluster) located in areas generally not visible from
the national park and subject to site and building plan approval by the donee organization in order
to preserve the scenic view from the park. The donor and the donee have already identified sites
where limited cluster development would not be visible from the park or would not impair the
view. Owners of homes in the clusters will not have any rights with respect to the surrounding
Greenacre property that are not also available to the general public. Accordingly, the donation
qualifies for a deduction under this section.
Example 5. In order to protect State S's declining open space that is suited for agricultural use
from increasing development pressure that has led to a marked decline in such open space, the
Legislature of State S passed a statute authorizing the purchase of "agricultural land development
rights" on open acreage. Agricultural land development rights allow the State to place agricultural
preservation restrictions on land designated as worthy of protection in order to preserve open
space and farm resources. Agricultural preservation restrictions prohibit or limit construction or
placement of buildings except those used for agricultural purposes or dwellings used for family
living by the farmer and his family and employees; removal of mineral substances in any manner
that adversely affects the land's agricultural potential; or other uses detrimental to retention of
the land for agricultural use. Money has been appropriated for this program and some landowners
have in fact sold their "agricultural land development rights" to State S. K owns and operates a
small dairy farm in State S located in an area designated by the Legislature as worthy of
protection. K desires to preserve his farm for agricultural purposes in perpetuity. Rather than
selling the development rights to State S, K grants to a qualified organization an agricultural
preservation restriction on his property in the form of a conservation easement. K reserves to
himself, his heirs and assigns the right to manage the farm consistent with sound agricultural and
management practices. The preservation of K's land is pursuant to a clearly delineated
governmental policy of preserving open space available for agricultural use, and will yield a
significant public benefit by preserving open space against increasing development pressures.
(g) Enforceable in perpetuity -- (1) In general. In the case of any donation under this section,
any interest in the property retained by the donor (and the donor's successors in interest) must be
subject to legally enforceable restrictions (for example, by recordation in the land records of the
jurisdiction in which the property is located) that will prevent uses of the retained interest
inconsistent with the conservation purposes of the donation. In the case of a contribution of a
remainder interest, the contribution will not qualify if the tenants, whether they are tenants for
life or a term of years, can use the property in a manner that diminishes the conservation values
which are intended to be protected by the contribution.
(2) Protection of a conservation purpose in case of donation of property subject to a
mortgage. In the case of conservation contributions made after February 13, 1986, no deduction
will be permitted under this section for an interest in property which is subject to a mortgage
unless the mortgagee subordinates its rights in the property to the right of the qualified
organization to enforce the conservation purposes of the gift in perpetuity. For conservation
contributions made prior to February 14, 1986, the requirement of section 170 (h)(5)(A) is satisfied
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in the case of mortgaged property (with respect to which the mortgagee has not subordinated its
rights) only if the donor can demonstrate that the conservation purpose is protected in perpetuity
without subordination of the mortgagee's rights.
(3) Remote future event. A deduction shall not be disallowed under section 170(f)(3)(B)(iii)
and this section merely because the interest which passes to, or is vested in, the donee
organization may be defeated by the performance of some act or the happening of some event, if
on the date of the gift it appears that the possibility that such act or event will occur is so remote
as to be negligible. See paragraph (e) of § 1.170A-1. For example, a state's statutory requirement
that use restrictions must be rerecorded every 30 years to remain enforceable shall not, by itself,
render an easement nonperpetual.
(4) Retention of qualified mineral interest -- (i) In general. Except as otherwise provided in
paragraph (g)(4)(ii) of this section, the requirements of this section are not met and no deduction
shall be allowed in the case of a contribution of any interest when there is a retention by any
person of a qualified mineral interest (as defined in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section) if at any
time there may be extractions or removal of minerals by any surface mining method. Moreover, in
the case of a qualified mineral interest gift, the requirement that the conservation purposes be
protected in perpetuity is not satisfied if any method of mining that is inconsistent with the
particular conservation purposes of a contribution is permitted at any time. See also § 1.170A14(e)(2). However, a deduction under this section will not be denied in the case of certain
methods of mining that may have limited, localized impact on the real property but that are not
irremediably destructive of significant conservation interests. For example, a deduction will not be
denied in a case where production facilities are concealed or compatible with existing topography
and landscape and when surface alteration is to be restored to its original state.
(ii) Exception for qualified conservation contributions after July 1984. (A) A contribution made
after July 18, 1984, of a qualified real property interest described in section 170(h)(2)(A) shall not
be disqualified under the first sentence of paragraph (g)(4)(i) of this section if the following
requirements are satisfied.
(1) The ownership of the surface estate and mineral interest were separated before June 13,
1976, and remain so separated up to and including the time of the contribution.
(2) The present owner of the mineral interest is not a person whose relationship to the owner
of the surface estate is described at the time of the contribution in section 267(b) or section
707(b), and
(3) The probability of extraction or removal of minerals by any surface mining method is so
remote as to be negligible.
Whether the probability of extraction or removal of minerals by surface mining is so remote as to
be negligible is a question of fact and is to be made on a case by case basis. Relevant factors to be
considered in determining if the probability of extraction or removal of minerals by surface mining
is so remote as to be negligible include: Geological, geophysical or economic data showing the
absence of mineral reserves on the property, or the lack of commercial feasibility at the time of
the contribution of surface mining the mineral interest.
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(B) If the ownership of the surface estate and mineral interest first became separated after
June 12, 1976, no deduction is permitted for a contribution under this section unless surface
mining on the property is completely prohibited.
(iii) Examples. The provisions of paragraph (g)(4)(i) and (ii) of this section may be illustrated by
the following examples:
Example 1. K owns 5,000 acres of bottomland hardwood property along a major watershed
system in the southern part of the United States. Agencies within the Department of the Interior
have determined that southern bottomland hardwoods are a rapidly diminishing resource and a
critical ecosystem in the south because of the intense pressure to cut the trees and convert the
land to agricultural use. These agencies have further determined (and have indicated in
correspondence with K) that bottomland hardwoods provide a superb habitat for numerous
species and play an important role in controlling floods and purifying rivers. K donates to a
qualified organization his entire interest in this property other than his interest in the gas and oil
deposits that have been identified under K's property. K covenants and can ensure that, although
drilling for gas and oil on the property may have some temporary localized impact on the real
property, the drilling will not interfere with the overall conservation purpose of the gift, which is to
protect the unique bottomland hardwood ecosystem. Accordingly, the donation qualifies for a
deduction under this section.
Example 2. Assume the same facts as in example (1), except that in 1979, K sells the mineral
interest to A, an unrelated person, in an arm's-length transaction, subject to a recorded
prohibition on the removal of any minerals by any surface mining method and a recorded
prohibition against any mining technique that will harm the bottomland hardwood ecosystem.
After the sale to A, K donates a qualified real property interest to a qualified organization to
protect the bottomland hardwood ecosystem. Since at the time of the transfer, surface mining and
any mining technique that will harm the bottomland hardwood ecosystem are completely
prohibited, the donation qualifies for a deduction under this section.
(5) Protection of conservation purpose where taxpayer reserves certain rights. (i)
Documentation. In the case of a donation made after February 13, 1986, of any qualified real
property interest when the donor reserves rights the exercise of which may impair the
conservation interests associated with the property, for a deduction to be allowable under this
section the donor must make available to the donee, prior to the time the donation is made,
documentation sufficient to establish the condition of the property at the time of the gift. Such
documentation is designed to protect the conservation interests associated with the property,
which although protected in perpetuity by the easement, could be adversely affected by the
exercise of the reserved rights. Such documentation may include:
(A) The appropriate survey maps from the United States Geological Survey, showing the
property line and other contiguous or nearby protected areas;
(B) A map of the area drawn to scale showing all existing man-made improvements or
incursions (such as roads, buildings, fences, or gravel pits), vegetation and identification of flora
and fauna (including, for example, rare species locations, animal breeding and roosting areas, and
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migration routes), land use history (including present uses and recent past disturbances), and
distinct natural features (such as large trees and aquatic areas);
(C) An aerial photograph of the property at an appropriate scale taken as close as possible to
the date the donation is made; and
(D) On-site photographs taken at appropriate locations on the property. If the terms of the
donation contain restrictions with regard to a particular natural resource to be protected, such as
water quality or air quality, the condition of the resource at or near the time of the gift must be
established. The documentation, including the maps and photographs, must be accompanied by a
statement signed by the donor and a representative of the donee clearly referencing the
documentation and in substance saying "This natural resources inventory is an accurate
representation of [the protected property] at the time of the transfer.".
(ii) Donee's right to inspection and legal remedies. In the case of any donation referred to in
paragraph (g)(5)(i) of this section, the donor must agree to notify the donee, in writing, before
exercising any reserved right, e.g. the right to extract certain minerals which may have an adverse
impact on the conservation interests associated with the qualified real property interest. The
terms of the donation must provide a right of the donee to enter the property at reasonable times
for the purpose of inspecting the property to determine if there is compliance with the terms of
the donation. Additionally, the terms of the donation must provide a right of the donee to enforce
the conservation restrictions by appropriate legal proceedings, including but not limited to, the
right to require the restoration of the property to its condition at the time of the donation.
(6) Extinguishment. (i) In general. If a subsequent unexpected change in the conditions
surrounding the property that is the subject of a donation under this paragraph can make
impossible or impractical the continued use of the property for conservation purposes, the
conservation purpose can nonetheless be treated as protected in perpetuity if the restrictions are
extinguished by judicial proceeding and all of the donee's proceeds (determined under paragraph
(g)(6)(ii) of this section) from a subsequent sale or exchange of the property are used by the donee
organization in a manner consistent with the conservation purposes of the original contribution.
(ii) Proceeds. In case of a donation made after February 13, 1986, for a deduction to be
allowed under this section, at the time of the gift the donor must agree that the donation of the
perpetual conservation restriction gives rise to a property right, immediately vested in the donee
organization, with a fair market value that is at least equal to the proportionate value that the
perpetual conservation restriction at the time of the gift, bears to the value of the property as a
whole at that time. See § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(iii) relating to the allocation of basis. For purposes of
this paragraph (g)(6)(ii), that proportionate value of the donee's property rights shall remain
constant. Accordingly, when a change in conditions give rise to the extinguishment of a perpetual
conservation restriction under paragraph (g)(6)(i) of this section, the donee organization, on a
subsequent sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion of the subject property, must be entitled to
a portion of the proceeds at least equal to that proportionate value of the perpetual conservation
restriction, unless state law provides that the donor is entitled to the full proceeds from the
conversion without regard to the terms of the prior perpetual conservation restriction.

Appendix B
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384360

16

(h) Valuation -- (1) Entire interest of donor other than qualified mineral interest. The value of
the contribution under section 170 in the case of a contribution of a taxpayer's entire interest in
property other than a qualified mineral interest is the fair market value of the surface rights in the
property contributed. The value of the contribution shall be computed without regard to the
mineral rights. See paragraph (h)(4), example (1), of this section.
(2) Remainder interest in real property. In the case of a contribution of any remainder interest
in real property, section 170(f)(4) provides that in determining the value of such interest for
purposes of section 170, depreciation and depletion of such property shall be taken into account.
See § 1.170A-12. In the case of the contribution of a remainder interest for conservation
purposes, the current fair market value of the property (against which the limitations of § 1.170A12 are applied) must take into account any pre-existing or contemporaneously recorded rights
limiting, for conservation purposes, the use to which the subject property may be put.
(3) Perpetual conservation restriction -- (i) In general. The value of the contribution under
section 170 in the case of a charitable contribution of a perpetual conservation restriction is the
fair market value of the perpetual conservation restriction at the time of the contribution. See §
1.170A-7(c). If there is a substantial record of sales of easements comparable to the donated
easement (such as purchases pursuant to a governmental program), the fair market value of the
donated easement is based on the sales prices of such comparable easements. If no substantial
record of market-place sales is available to use as a meaningful or valid comparison, as a general
rule (but not necessarily in all cases) the fair market value of a perpetual conservation restriction is
equal to the difference between the fair market value of the property it encumbers before the
granting of the restriction and the fair market value of the encumbered property after the granting
of the restriction. The amount of the deduction in the case of a charitable contribution of a
perpetual conservation restriction covering a portion of the contiguous property owned by a
donor and the donor's family (as defined in section 267(c)(4)) is the difference between the fair
market value of the entire contiguous parcel of property before and after the granting of the
restriction. If the granting of a perpetual conservation restriction after January 14, 1986, has the
effect of increasing the value of any other property owned by the donor or a related person, the
amount of the deduction for the conservation contribution shall be reduced by the amount of the
increase in the value of the other property, whether or not such property is contiguous. If, as a
result of the donation of a perpetual conservation restriction, the donor or a related person
receives, or can reasonably expect to receive, financial or economic benefits that are greater than
those that will inure to the general public from the transfer, no deduction is allowable under this
section. However, if the donor or a related person receives, or can reasonably expect to receive, a
financial or economic benefit that is substantial, but it is clearly shown that the benefit is less than
the amount of the transfer, then a deduction under this section is allowable for the excess of the
amount transferred over the amount of the financial or economic benefit received or reasonably
expected to be received by the donor or the related person. For purposes of this paragraph
(h)(3)((i), related person shall have the same meaning as in either section 267(b) or section 707(b).
(See example (10) of paragraph (h)(4) of this section.)
(ii) Fair market value of property before and after restriction. If before and after valuation is
used, the fair market value of the property before contribution of the conservation restriction
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must take into account not only the current use of the property but also an objective assessment
of how immediate or remote the likelihood is that the property, absent the restriction, would in
fact be developed, as well as any effect from zoning, conservation, or historic preservation laws
that already restrict the property's potential highest and best use. Further, there may be instances
where the grant of a conservation restriction may have no material effect on the value of the
property or may in fact serve to enhance, rather than reduce, the value of property. In such
instances no deduction would be allowable. In the case of a conservation restriction that allows for
any development, however limited, on the property to be protected, the fair market value of the
property after contribution of the restriction must take into account the effect of the
development. In the case of a conservation easement such as an easement on a certified historic
structure, the fair market value of the property after contribution of the restriction must take into
account the amount of access permitted by the terms of the easement. Additionally, if before and
after valuation is used, an appraisal of the property after contribution of the restriction must take
into account the effect of restrictions that will result in a reduction of the potential fair market
value represented by highest and best use but will, nevertheless, permit uses of the property that
will increase its fair market value above that represented by the property's current use. The value
of a perpetual conservation restriction shall not be reduced by reason of the existence of
restrictions on transfer designed solely to ensure that the conservation restriction will be
dedicated to conservation purposes. See § 1.170A-14 (c)(3).
(iii) Allocation of basis. In the case of the donation of a qualified real property interest for
conservation purposes, the basis of the property retained by the donor must be adjusted by the
elimination of that part of the total basis of the property that is properly allocable to the qualified
real property interest granted. The amount of the basis that is allocable to the qualified real
property interest shall bear the same ratio to the total basis of the property as the fair market
value of the qualified real property interest bears to the fair market value of the property before
the granting of the qualified real property interest. When a taxpayer donates to a qualifying
conservation organization an easement on a structure with respect to which deductions are taken
for depreciation, the reduction required by this paragraph (h)(3)(ii) in the basis of the property
retained by the taxpayer must be allocated between the structure and the underlying land.
(4) Examples. The provisions of this section may be illustrated by the following examples. In
examples illustrating the value or deductibility of donations, the applicable restrictions and
limitations of § 1.170A-4, with respect to reduction in amount of charitable contributions of
certain appreciated property, and § 1.170A-8, with respect to limitations on charitable deductions
by individuals. must also be taken into account.
Example 1. A owns Goldacre, a property adjacent to a state park. A wants to donate Goldacre
to the state to be used as part of the park, but A wants to reserve a qualified mineral interest in
the property, to exploit currently and to devise at death. The fair market value of the surface rights
in Goldacre is $ 200,000 and the fair market value of the mineral rights in $ 100.000. In order to
ensure that the quality of the park will not be degraded, restrictions must be imposed on the right
to extract the minerals that reduce the fair market value of the mineral rights to $ 80,000. Under
this section, the value of the contribution is $ 200,000 (the value of the surface rights).
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Example 2. In 1984 B, who is 62, donates a remainder interest in Greenacre to a qualifying
organization for conservation purposes. Greenacre is a tract of 200 acres of undeveloped
woodland that is valued at $ 200,000 at its highest and best use. Under § 1.170A-12(b), the value
of a remainder interest in real property following one life is determined under § 25.2512-5 of this
chapter (Gift Tax Regulations). (See § 25.2512-5A of this chapter with respect to the valuation of
annuities, interests for life or term of years, and remainder or reversionary interests transferred
before May 1, 1999.) Accordingly, the value of the remainder interest, and thus the amount
eligible for an income tax deduction under section 170(f), is $ 55,996 ($ 200,000 x .27998).
Example 3. Assume the same facts as in example (2), except that Greenacre is B's 200-acre
estate with a home built during the colonial period. Some of the acreage around the home is
cleared; the balance of Greenacre, except for access roads, is wooded and undeveloped. See
section 170(f)(3)(B)(i). However, B would like Greenacre to be maintained in its current state after
his death, so he donates a remainder interest in Greenacre to a qualifying organization for
conservation purposes pursuant to section 170 (f)(3)(B)(iii) and (h)(2)(B). At the time of the gift the
land has a value of $ 200,000 and the house has a value of $ 100,000. The value of the remainder
interest, and thus the amount eligible for an income tax deduction under section 170(f), is
computed pursuant to § 1.170A-12. See § 1.170A-12(b)(3).
Example 4. Assume the same facts as in example (2), except that at age 62 instead of donating
a remainder interest B donates an easement in Greenacre to a qualifying organization for
conservation purposes. The fair market value of Greenacre after the donation is reduced to $
110,000. Accordingly, the value of the easement, and thus the amount eligible for a deduction
under section 170(f), is $ 90,000 ($ 200,000 less $ 110,000).
Example 5. Assume the same facts as in example (4), and assume that three years later, at age
65, B decides to donate a remainder interest in Greenacre to a qualifying organization for
conservation purposes. Increasing real estate values in the area have raised the fair market value
of Greenacre (subject to the easement) to $ 130,000. Accordingly, the value of the remainder
interest, and thus the amount eligible for a deduction under section 170(f), is $ 41,639 ($ 130,000
x .32030).
Example 6. Assume the same facts as in example (2), except that at the time of the donation
of a remainder interest in Greenacre, B also donates an easement to a different qualifying
organization for conservation purposes. Based on all the facts and circumstances, the value of the
easement is determined to be $ 100,000. Therefore, the value of the property after the easement
is $ 100,000 and the value of the remainder interest, and thus the amount eligible for deduction
under section 170(f), is $ 27,998 ($ 100,000 x .27998).
Example 7. C owns Greenacre, a 200-acre estate containing a house built during the colonial
period. At its highest and best use, for home development, the fair market value of Greenacre is $
300,000. C donates an easement (to maintain the house and Green acre in their current state) to a
qualifying organization for conservation purposes. The fair market value of Greenacre after the
donation is reduced to $ 125,000. Accordingly, the value of the easement and the amount eligible
for a deduction under section 170(f) is $ 175.000 ($ 300,000 less $ 125,000).
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Example 8. Assume the same facts as in example (7) and assume that three years later, C
decides to donate a remainder interest in Greenacre to a qualifying organization for conservation
purposes. Increasing real estate values in the area have raised the fair market value of Greenacre
to $ 180.000. Assume that because of the perpetual easement prohibiting any development of the
land, the value of the house is $ 120,000 and the value of the land is $ 60,000. The value of the
remainder interest, and thus the amount eligible for an income tax deduction under section 170(f),
is computed pursuant to § 1.170A-12. See § 1.170A-12(b)(3).
Example 9. D owns property with a basis of $ 20,000 and a fair market value of $ 80,000. D
donates to a qualifying organization an easement for conservation purposes that is determined
under this section to have a fair market value of $ 60,000. The amount of basis allocable to the
easement is $ 15,000 ($ 60,000/$ 80,000 = $ 15,000/$ 20,000). Accordingly, the basis of the
property is reduced to $ 5,000 ($ 20,000 minus $ 15,000).
Example 10. E owns 10 one-acre lots that are currently woods and parkland. The fair market
value of each of E's lots is $ 15,000 and the basis of each lot is $ 3,000. E grants to the county a
perpetual easement for conservation purposes to use and maintain eight of the acres as a public
park and to restrict any future development on those eight acres. As a result of the restrictions,
the value of the eight acres is reduced to $ 1,000 an acre. However, by perpetually restricting
development on this portion of the land, E has ensured that the two remaining acres will always
be bordered by parkland, thus increasing their fair market value to $ 22,500 each. If the eight acres
represented all of E's land, the fair market value of the easement would be $ 112,000, an amount
equal to the fair market value of the land before the granting of the easement (8 x $ 15,000 = $
120,000) minus the fair market value of the encumbered land after the granting of the easement
(8 x $ 1,000 = $ 8,000). However, because the easement only covered a portion of the taxpayer's
contiguous land, the amount of the deduction under section 170 is reduced to $ 97,000 ($ 150,000
- $ 53,000), that is, the difference between the fair market value of the entire tract of land before
($ 150,000) and after ((8 x $ 1,000) + (2 x $ 22,500)) the granting of the easement.
Example 11. Assume the same facts as in example (10). Since the easement covers a portion of
E's land, only the basis of that portion is adjusted. Therefore, the amount of basis allocable to the
easement is $ 22,400 ((8 x $ 3,000) x ($ 112,000/$ 120,000)). Accordingly, the basis of the eight
acres encumbered by the easement is reduced to $ 1,600 ($ 24,000 - $ 22,400), or $ 200 for each
acre. The basis of the two remaining acres is not affected by the donation.
Example 12. F owns and uses as professional offices a two-story building that lies within a
registered historic district. F's building is an outstanding example of period architecture with a fair
market value of $ 125,000. Restricted to its current use, which is the highest and best use of the
property without making changes to the facade, the building and lot would have a fair market
value of $ 100,000, of which $ 80,000 would be allocable to the building and $ 20,000 would be
allocable to the lot. F's basis in the property is $ 50,000, of which $ 40,000 is allocable to the
building and $ 10,000 is allocable to the lot. F's neighborhood is a mix of residential and
commercial uses, and it is possible that F (or another owner) could enlarge the building for more
extensive commercial use, which is its highest and best use. However, this would require changes
to the facade. F would like to donate to a qualifying preservation organization an easement
restricting any changes to the facade and promising to maintain the facade in perpetuity. The
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donation would qualify for a deduction under this section. The fair market value of the easement
is $ 25,000 (the fair market value of the property before the easement, $ 125,000, minus the fair
market value of the property after the easement, $ 100,000). Pursuant to § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(iii),
the basis allocable to the easement is $ 10,000 and the basis of the underlying property (building
and lot) is reduced to $ 40,000.
(i) Substantiation requirement. If a taxpayer makes a qualified conservation contribution and
claims a deduction, the taxpayer must maintain written records of the fair market value of the
underlying property before and after the donation and the conservation purpose furthered by the
donation and such information shall be stated in the taxpayer's income tax return if required by
the return or its instructions. See also § 1.170A-13(c) (relating to substantiation requirements for
deductions in excess of $ 5,000 for charitable contributions made after 1984), and section 6659
(relating to additions to tax in the case of valuation overstatements).
(j) Effective date. Except as otherwise provided in § 1.170A-14(g)(4)(ii), this section applies
only to contributions made on or after December 18, 1980.
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Appendix C
Table of § 170(h) Deduction Cases
I. Table Structure
The Table below lists the cases involving challenges to charitable income tax deductions
claimed with respect to conservation easement donations. Given that § 170(h) and the
Treasury Regulations are effective only for transfers made on or after December 18, 1980,1
the cases are separated into two groups:
1. those involving donations made before the effective date of § 170(h) (pre-§
170(h) cases) and
2. those involving donations made on or after the effective date of § 170(h) (post§ 170(h) cases).
Substantial changes were made to the deduction provision with the enactment of § 170(h)
in 1980. Accordingly, the law in effect on the date of the donation may be an important
factor in analyzing the relevance of an older case to a current controversy.2
II. Precedential Value of Tax Court Cases
The Tax Court issues several different types of opinions, the precedential value of which
differs.
1. Summary Opinions. Certain disputes (for example, disputes involving
deficiencies of $50,000 or less for each year at issue) qualify for simplified or “S
case” procedures. The Tax Court generally issues Summary Opinions in these
cases, and Summary Opinions cannot be relied on as precedent or appealed.
2. Regular Opinions and Memorandum Opinions. The Tax Court generally
issues two types of opinions in cases that are not “S” cases.
a. Opinions, sometimes referred to as “Regular Opinions,” (cited as “T.C.”)
are generally issued in cases that the Tax Court believes involve sufficiently

1
Pub. L. 96-541, 94 Stat. 3206, §6(d). Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(j). The mortgage subordination, division of proceeds,
baseline documentation, and donee notification, access, and enforcement rights requirements apply only to donations
made after February 13, 1986. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-14(g)(2), -14(g)(6)(ii), -14(g)(5)(i), -14(g)(5)(ii). The provision
requiring a reduction in amount of the donor’s deduction for any increase in the value of certain property owned by the
donor or a related person as a result of the donation applies only to donations made after January 14, 1986. See id. §
1.170A-14(h)(3)(i).
2
For example, cases involving interpretation of the deduction provision in effect before § 170(h) was enacted should not
be relied upon in interpreting new requirements added to the deduction provision in 1980 to curb abuses and ensure
protection of the federal investment, such as § 170(h)(5)(A)’s new “protected-in-perpetuity” requirement. On the other,
hand, some of the general rules governing valuation discussed in the older cases are still relevant to current controversies.
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important legal issues or principles. Regular Opinions can be cited as legal
authority and appealed, and the Tax Court treats them as binding precedent.
b. Memorandum Opinions (cited at “T.C. Memo.”) are generally issued in
cases that do not involve novel legal issues and, instead, address situations
where the law is settled or factually driven. Memorandum Opinions can be
cited as legal authority and appealed, but the Tax Court does not treat them
as binding precedent.
The Chief Judge of the Tax Court decides whether an opinion will be issued as a
Regular Opinion or a Memorandum Opinion.
3. Bench Opinions. A Tax Court judge is authorized to issue a Bench Opinion in
an S case or a regular case when the judge is “satisfied as to the factual conclusions
to be reached in the case and that the law to be applied thereto is clear.” To issue a
Bench Opinion, the judge orally states the findings of fact and the opinion in court
during the trial session and a transcript reflecting the findings of fact and opinion
is sent to the parties. Bench Opinions cannot be relied upon as precedent.
III. Tax Court Opinions
T.C. and T.C. Memo. Opinions starting 09/25/95 and Summary Opinions starting 01/01/01
are available at https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/UstcInOp/OpinionSearch.aspx.
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Date of
Donation

Holder

Thayer v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1977-370
Todd v. U.S., 617 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Pa. 1985)
Hilborn v. Comm'r, 85 T.C. 677 (1985)
Stanley Works v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 389 (1986)
Akers v. Comm’r, 799 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1986),
aff’g T.C. Memo. 1984-490
Symington v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 892 (1986)
Stotler v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1987-275

1969
1979
1979
1977
1977

VOF3
WPC4
VCC5
HVA6
TCL7

1979
1979

Fannon v. Comm'r, 842 F.2d 1290 (4th Cir. 1988) (unpublished),
modifying T.C. Memo. 1986-572
Fannon v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1989-136
Dennis v. U.S., 70 A.F.T.R. 2d 92-5946 (E.D. Va. 1992)

1979

VOF
Monterey
County, CA
VOF

Pre-§ 170(h) Cases (In Order of Final Opinion Date)

McLennan v. U.S., 994 F.2d 839 (Fed. Cir. 1993),
aff’g 24 Cl. Ct. 102 (1991) and 23 Cl. Ct. 99 (1991)

1978
Nov. 8,
1980
Nov. 10,
1980

VOF
VOF
WPC

Post-§ 170(h) Cases (In Order of Final Opinion Date)
§ 170(h) and the Treasury Regulations are effective
only for transfers made on or after Dec. 18, 1980.8
1988 through 2000
Nicoladis v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1988-163
Losch v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1988-230
Richmond v. U.S., 699 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. La. 1988)
Higgins v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1990-103
Dorsey v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1990-242
Griffin v. Comm’r, 911 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1990),
aff’g T.C. Memo. 1989-130
Schapiro v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1991-128; IRS AOD-1991-23
(nonacquiesence)
Clemens v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-436
Schwab v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-232

1981
Dec. 24,
1980
Dec. 29,
1980
1981
1981
1981

PANO9
NTHP10

1981
1984
1982
1983

MET

VCC
MET11
HFC12
HFC

VOLF13
AFT14

3

Virginia Outdoors Foundation.
Western Pennsylvania Conservancy.
5
Vieux Carre Commission.
6
Housatonic Valley Association.
7
Tennessee Conservation League.
8
See supra note 1 for exceptions to the effective date for some of the Treasury Regulation provisions.
9
Preservation Alliance of New Orleans.
10
National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States.
11
Maryland Environmental Trust.
12
Historic Faubourg Corporation (now Preservation Center of New Orleans).
13
Vineyard Open Land Foundation.
14
American Farmland Trust.
4
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Satullo v. Comm’r, 67 F.3d 314, 76 A.F.T.R.2d 6536 (11th Cir.
1995), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1993-614
Great Northern Nekoosa v. U.S., 38 Fed. Cl. 645 (1997)
Johnston v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1997-475
Browning v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 303 (1997)

1985

Strasburg v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2000-94

1993
1994

1981
1989
1990

Easements
Atlanta, Inc.
Maine
TNC15
Howard
County, MD
MLR16

2006
Turner v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 299 (2006)

1999

Ney v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2006-154 (2006)
Glass v. Comm’r, 471 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2006) (Glass II),
aff’g 124 T.C. 258 (2005) (Glass I)
Goldsby v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-274
2009
Bruzewicz v. U.S., 604 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
Hughes v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2009-94
Kiva Dunes v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2009-145
2010
Lord v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-196
Evans v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-207
2011
Schrimsher v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2011-71
Boltar v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 326 (2011)
1982 East LLC v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2011-84
Comm’r v. Simmons, 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Simmons II),
aff’g Simmons v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2009-208 (Simmons I)
Didonato v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2011-153

2001
1992
1993
2000

Herman v. Comm’r, T.C. Bench Op. (Sept. 22, 2011) (Herman II),
addressing remaining issues in T.C. Memo. 2009-205 (Herman I)
2012
Butler v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-72
Dunlap v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-126

Fairfax
County, VA
DALPF17
LTC18
MSLT19

2002
2000
2002

LPC of IL20
VLC21
NALT22

1999
2004

LPT23
CHT24

2004
2003
2004
2003
2004
2004

AHC25
SHLT26
NAT27
L'Enfant
Trust
Mercer
County, NJ

2003

NAT

2003
2004
2003

CVLT28
NAT

15

The Nature Conservancy.
Montana Land Reliance.
17
Delaware Agricultural Lands Preservation Foundation.
18
Little Traverse Conservancy.
19
Mississippi Land Trust.
20
Landmarks Preservation Council of Illinois
21
Valley Land Conservancy (now Black Canyon Regional Land Trust).
22
North American Land Trust.
23
Land Preservation Trust.
24
Capitol Historic Trust.
25
Alabama Historical Commission.
26
Shirley Heinze Land Trust, Inc.
27
National Architectural Trust (currently known as Trust for Architectural Easements).
28
Chattahoochee Valley Land Trust.
16
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Wall v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-169
Averyt v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-198
Rothman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-218 (Rothman II),
vacating in part T.C. Memo. 2012-163 (Rothman I)
Trout Ranch v. Comm’r, 493 Fed. Appx. 944 (10th Cir. 2012)
(unpublished) (Trout Ranch II), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2010-283 (Trout
Ranch I)
Foster v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2012-90

2003
2004
2004

LPC of IL
WAT29
NAT

2003

CBLT30

2003

Irby v. Comm’r, 139 T.C. 371 (2012)

2003
2004

L'Enfant
Trust
COL31

2013
Pollard v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-38
Pesky v. U.S., 2013 WL 12249656 (D. Idaho, July 17, 2013)
(unreported), 112 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-5222 (D. Idaho, July 8, 2013)
(unreported), 111 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-470 (D. Idaho, Jan. 7, 2013)
(unreported)
Carpenter v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-172 (Carpenter II),
denying reconsideration of and supplementing T.C. Memo. 2012-1
(Carpenter I)
Friedberg v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-224 (Friedberg II),
reversing in part and supplementing T.C. Memo. 2011-238
(Friedberg I)
Gorra v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-254
61 York Acquisition, LLC v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-266
2014
th
Esgar Corp. v. Comm’r, 744 F.3d 648 (10 Cir. 2014) (Esgar II),
aff’g T.C. Memo. 2012-35 (Esgar I) and Tempel v. Comm'r, 136
T.C. 341 (2011)
Wachter v. Comm’r, 142 T.C. 140 (2014)
Chandler v. Comm’r, 142 T.C. 279 (2014)
Whitehouse Hotel, LP v. Comm’r, 755 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2014)
(Whitehouse IV), aff’g in part and vacating in part 139 T.C. 304
(2012) (Whitehouse III), on remand from 615 F.3d 321 (5th Cir.
2010) (Whitehouse II), vacating and remanding 131 T.C. 112
(2008) (Whitehouse I)
Scheidelman v. Comm’r, 755 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2014)
(Scheidelman IV), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2013-18 (Scheidelman III), on
remand from 682 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012) (Scheidelman II),
vacating and remanding T.C. Memo. 2010-151 (Scheidelman I)

2003

Boulder
County, CO

2002

TNC

2003

Greenlands
Reserve

2003

NAT

2006
2006

NAT
NAT

2004

Greenlands
Reserve

2004
2005
2006
2004
2005

AFW32
NAT

1997

PANO

2004

NAT

29

Wetlands America Trust.
Crested Butte Land Trust.
31
Colorado Open Lands.
32
American Foundation for Wildlife.
30
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Seventeen Seventy Sherman Street v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2014124
Schmidt v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2014-159

2003

Zarlengo v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2014-161
Reisner v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2014-230
Belk v. Comm’r, 774 F.3d 221 (4th Cir. 2014) (Belk III),
aff’g T.C. Memo 2013-154 (Belk II), denying reconsideration of
and supplementing 140 T.C. 1 (2013) (Belk I)
2015
Mitchell v. Comm’r, 775 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2015) (Mitchell III),
aff’g T.C. Memo. 2013-204 (Mitchell II),
denying reconsideration and supplementing 138 T.C. 324 (2012)
(Mitchell I)
Balsam Mountain v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2015-43

2005
2004

Historic
Denver
El Paso
County, CO
NAT
NAT

2004

SMNLT33

2003

MLC34

2003

SWF Real Estate LLC v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2015-63

2005

NALT
Albemarle
County,
VA35

Kaufman v. Comm’r, 784 F.3d. 56 (1st Cir. 2015) (Kaufman V),
aff’g T.C. Memo. 2014-52 (Kaufman IV), on remand from 687
F.3d. 21 (1st Cir. 2012) (Kaufman III), vacating and remanding in
part 136 T.C. 294 (2011) (Kaufman II) and 134 T.C. 182 (2010)
(Kaufman I)
Costello v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2015-87
Minnick v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2015) (Minnick III)
and 611 Fed. Appx. 477 (9th Cir. 2015) (unpub) (Minnick II), aff’g
T.C. Memo. 2012-345 (Minnick I)
Legg v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 344 (2015)
Atkinson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2015-23638

2003

2003

NAT

2006

Howard
County, MD

2006

LTTV36

2007
2003
2005

CNLT37
NALT

2007
2004

LPC of IL
NAT

2006

Sarasota
County, FL

2005
2005

MLR
MET &
LPT

2016
Gemperle v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2016-1
Mecox v. U.S., 117 A.F.T.R.2d 2016-593 (S.D.N.Y.)
Palmer Ranch Holdings, Ltd. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2016-190
(Palmer Ranch III), supplementing T.C. Memo 2014-79 (Palmer
Ranch I), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 812 F.3d 982
(11th Cir. 2016) (Palmer Ranch II)
French v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2016-53
Carroll v. Comm’r, 146 T.C. 196 (2016)

33

Smokey Mountain National Land Trust.
Montezuma Land Conservancy.
35
Albemarle County Public Recreational Facilities Authority.
36
Land Trust of Treasure Valley.
37
Colorado Natural Land Trust.
38
On appeal in 4th Circuit.
34
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Mountanos v. Comm’r, 651 Fed. Appx. 592 (9th Cir. 2016)
(unpublished) (Mountanos III), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2013-138
(Mountanos I), reconsideration denied and opinion supplemented in
T.C. Memo. 2014-38 (Mountanos II).
15 West 17th St. LLC v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. 557 (2016)
McGrady v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2016-233
2017
Ten Twenty Six Investors v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2017-115
RP Golf, LLC v. Comm’r, 860 F.3d 1096 (8th Cir. 2017) (RP Golf
III), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2016-80 (RP Golf II) and T.C. Memo. 2012282 (RP Golf I)
Partita Partners LLC v. U.S., 266 F.Supp.3d 683 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(Partita Partners II) and 216 F.Supp.3d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(Partita Partners I)
Rutkoske v. Comm’r, 149 T.C. No. 6 (2017)
Bosque Canyon Ranch, 867 F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 2017) (Bosque
Canyon Ranch II), vacating and remanding T.C. Memo. 2015-130
(Bosque Canyon Ranch I)
310 Retail LLC v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2017-164
Big River Development, LP v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2017-166
Salt Point Timber, T.C. Memo. 2017-245
Graev v. Comm’r, 149 T.C. No. 23 (2017) (Graev III),
supplementing vacated opinion in 147 T.C. 460 (2016) (Graev II),
supplementing 140 T.C. 377 (2013) (Graev I)
2018
PBBM-Rose Hill v. Comm’r, Bench Op. (Sept. 9, 2016) (PBBMRose Hill I), aff’d 900 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2018) (PBBM-Rose Hill
II), petition for rehearing en banc denied, Doc. 00514755950 (5th
Cir., Dec. 11, 2018)
Harbor Lofts Associates v. Comm’r, 151 T.C. No. 3 (2018)
Champions Retreat Golf Founders, LLC v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo 2018-146
Belair Woods, LLC v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2018-159
Wendell Falls Development v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2018-193
(Wendell Falls II), denying reconsideration of and supplementing
T.C. Memo. 2018-45 (Wendell Falls I)
Pine Mountain Preserve, LLLP v. Comm’r, 151 T.C. No. 14
(2018) (Pine Mountain II) and T.C. Memo. 2018-214 (Pine
Mountain I)

2005

GSLC39

2007

NAT
Township,
Bucks
County, PA

2007

2004

NAT

2003

PCLT40

2008

NAT

2009
2005
2007

ESLC41

2005
2005
2009

LPC of IL
PHLF42
LBCT43

2004

NAT

2007

NALT

2009
2010

ENHC44
NALT

2009

GA LT45

2007

SMNLT

2005
2006
2007

NALT

NALT

39

Golden State Land Conservancy.
Platte County Land Trust.
41
Eastern Shore Land Conservancy.
42
Pittsburgh History and Landmarks Foundation.
43
Lord Berkeley Conservation Trust.
44
Essex National Heritage Commission.
45
Georgia Land Trust.
40
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2019
Palmolive Building Investors, v. Comm’r, 152 T.C. No. 4 (2019)
(Palmolive II) and 149 T.C. No. 380 (2017) (Palmolive I)
Roth v .Comm’r, _ F.3d. _, 2019 WL 1890976 (10th Cir. 2019)
(Roth II), aff’ing T.C. Memo. 2017-248 (Roth I)

2004

LPC of IL

2007

CNLT
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Appendix D
Internal Revenue Code § 170(f)(11)
IRC § 170 Charitable, etc., contributions and gifts.
...
(f) Disallowance of deduction in certain cases and special rules.
...
(11) Qualified appraisal and other documentation for certain contributions.
(A) In general.
(i) Denial of deduction. In the case of an individual, partnership, or
corporation, no deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any
contribution of property for which a deduction of more than $500 is
claimed unless such person meets the requirements of subparagraphs
(B), (C), and (D), as the case may be, with respect to such contribution.
(ii) Exceptions.
(I) Readily valued property. Subparagraphs (C) and (D) shall not
apply to cash, property described in subsection (e)(1)(B)(iii) or
section 1221(a)(1), publicly traded securities (as defined in section
6050L(a)(2)(B)), and any qualified vehicle described in paragraph
(12)(A)(ii) for which an acknowledgement under paragraph
(12)(B)(iii) is provided.
(II) Reasonable cause. Clause (i) shall not apply if it is shown that
the failure to meet such requirements is due to reasonable cause
and not to willful neglect.
(B) Property description for contributions of more than $500. In the case of
contributions of property for which a deduction of more than $500 is claimed,
the requirements of this subparagraph are met if the individual, partnership or
corporation includes with the return for the taxable year in which the
contribution is made a description of such property and such other information
as the Secretary may require. The requirements of this subparagraph shall not
apply to a C corporation which is not a personal service corporation or a closely
held C corporation.
(C) Qualified appraisal for contributions of more than $5,000. In the case of
contributions of property for which a deduction of more than $5,000 is claimed,
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the requirements of this subparagraph are met if the individual, partnership, or
corporation obtains a qualified appraisal of such property and attaches to the
return for the taxable year in which such contribution is made such information
regarding such property and such appraisal as the Secretary may require.
(D) Substantiation for contributions of more than $500,000. In the case of
contributions of property for which a deduction of more than $500,000 is
claimed, the requirements of this subparagraph are met if the individual,
partnership, or corporation attaches to the return for the taxable year a qualified
appraisal of such property.
(E) Qualified appraisal and appraiser. For purposes of this paragraph(i) Qualified appraisal. The term ‘qualified appraisal‘ means, with respect
to any property, an appraisal of such property which(I) is treated for purposes of this paragraph as a qualified appraisal
under regulations or other guidance prescribed by the Secretary,
and
(II) is conducted by a qualified appraiser in accordance with
generally accepted appraisal standards and any regulations or
other guidance prescribed under subclause (I).
(ii) Qualified appraiser. Except as provided in clause (iii), the term
‘qualified appraiser‘ means an individual who(I) has earned an appraisal designation from a recognized
professional appraiser organization or has otherwise met
minimum education and experience requirements set forth in
regulations prescribed by the Secretary,
(II) regularly performs appraisals for which the individual receives
compensation, and
(III) meets such other requirements as may be prescribed by the
Secretary in regulations or other guidance.
(iii) Specific appraisals. An individual shall not be treated as a qualified
appraiser with respect to any specific appraisal unless(I) the individual demonstrates verifiable education and
experience in valuing the type of property subject to the
appraisal, and
(II) the individual has not been prohibited from practicing before
the Internal Revenue Service by the Secretary under section
330(c) of title 31, United States Code, at any time during the 3year period ending on the date of the appraisal.
(F) Aggregation of similar items of property. For purposes of determining
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thresholds under this paragraph, property and all similar items of property
donated to 1 or more donees shall be treated as 1 property.
(G) Special rule for pass-thru entities. In the case of a partnership or S
corporation, this paragraph shall be applied at the entity level, except that the
deduction shall be denied at the partner or shareholder level.
(H) Regulations. The Secretary may prescribe such regulations as may be
necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this paragraph, including
regulations that may provide that some or all of the requirements of this
paragraph do not apply in appropriate cases.
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system. The Department has written the
regulation so as to minimize litigation
and provide a clear legal standard for
affected conduct, and the Department
has reviewed the regulation carefully to
eliminate drafting errors and
ambiguities.

1.170A–14(j), 1.170A–15(h), 1.170A–
16(g), 1.170A–17(c), 1.170A–18(d),
1.664–1(f), and 1.6050L–1(h).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Charles Gorham at (202) 317–7003 (not
a toll-free number).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Executive Order 13211

Paperwork Reduction Act

This rule is not subject to E.O. 13211,
because it will not have a significant
adverse effect on the supply,
distribution, or use of energy.

26 CFR Parts 1 and 602

The collections of information
contained in these final regulations have
been reviewed and approved by the
Office of Management and Budget in
accordance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
3507(d)) under control number 1545–
1953.
The collections of information in
these final regulations are in §§ 1.170A–
15(a) and (d)(1); 1.170A–16(a), (b), (c),
(d), (e), and (f); and 1.170A–18(a)(2) and
(b). These collections of information are
required to obtain a benefit and will
enable the IRS to determine if a taxpayer
is entitled to a claimed deduction for a
charitable contribution.
An agency may not conduct or
sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a collection of information
unless it displays a valid control
number.
Books or records relating to a
collection of information must be
retained as long as their contents may
become material in the administration
of any internal revenue law. Generally,
tax returns and return information are
confidential, as required by section
6103.

[TD 9836]

Background

RIN 1545–BH62

This document contains amendments
to the Income Tax Regulations, 26 CFR
parts 1 and 602, relating to
substantiating and reporting deductions
for charitable contributions under
section 170 of the Internal Revenue
Code. These final regulations reflect
amendments to section 170 made by
section 883 of the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004, Public Law 108–
357 (118 Stat. 1418, 1631) (Jobs Act),
and sections 1216, 1217, and 1219 of the
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Public
Law 109–280 (120 Stat. 780, 1079–83)
(PPA), which added new rules for
substantiating charitable contributions.
The final regulations also update crossreferences to the section 170 regulations
in other regulations.
Section 170(f)(8), which has been in
the Code since 1993, provides that no
deduction shall be allowed for any
contribution of $250 or more, cash or
noncash, unless the taxpayer
substantiates the contribution with a
contemporaneous written
acknowledgment of the contribution by

Plain Language
The Department drafted this IFR in
plain language.
List of Subjects in 20 CFR Part 641
Aged, Employment, Government
contracts, Grant programs-labor,
Privacy, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
■ Accordingly, the IFR amending 20
CFR part 641 which was published at 82
FR 56869 on December 1, 2017, is
adopted as final without change.
Rosemary Lahasky,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Employment
and Training, Labor.
[FR Doc. 2018–16216 Filed 7–27–18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510–FN–P

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Internal Revenue Service

Substantiation and Reporting
Requirements for Cash and Noncash
Charitable Contribution Deductions
AGENCY:

Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
Treasury.
ACTION: Final regulations.

daltland on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with RULES

SUMMARY:

These final regulations
provide guidance concerning
substantiation and reporting
requirements for cash and noncash
charitable contributions. The final
regulations reflect the enactment of
provisions of the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004 and the Pension
Protection Act of 2006. These
regulations provide guidance to
individuals, partnerships, and
corporations that make charitable
contributions.

DATES:

Effective date: These regulations
are effective on July 30, 2018.
Applicability dates: For dates of
applicability, see §§ 1.170A–1(k),

the donee organization. The
contemporaneous written
acknowledgment must include: (1) The
amount of cash and a description (but
not value) of any property other than
cash contributed; (2) a statement of
whether the donee organization
provided any goods or services in
consideration, in whole or in part, for
any such cash or property; and (3) a
description and good faith estimate of
the value of any such goods or services
or, if such goods or services consist
solely of intangible religious benefits, a
statement to that effect.
Section 170(f)(11), as added by
section 883 of the Jobs Act, restates, in
part, section 155(a) of the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984 and contains
reporting and substantiation
requirements relating to the allowance
of deductions for noncash charitable
contributions. Under section
170(f)(11)(C), taxpayers are required to
obtain a qualified appraisal for donated
property for which a deduction of more
than $5,000 is claimed.
Under section 170(f)(11)(D), a
qualified appraisal must be attached to
any tax return claiming a deduction of
more than $500,000. Section
170(h)(4)(B), as added by section 1213
of the PPA, adds the requirement that a
qualified appraisal must be included
with the taxpayer’s return for the
taxable year of the contribution for any
contribution of a qualified real property
interest that is a restriction as to the
exterior of a building described in
section 170(h)(4)(C)(ii).
Section 170(f)(11)(E), as amended by
section 1219 of the PPA, provides
statutory definitions of qualified
appraisal and qualified appraiser for
appraisals prepared with respect to
returns filed after August 17, 2006.
Section 170(f)(11)(E)(i) provides that
the term qualified appraisal means an
appraisal that is (1) treated as a qualified
appraisal under regulations or other
guidance prescribed by the Secretary,
and (2) conducted by a qualified
appraiser in accordance with generally
accepted appraisal standards and any
regulations or other guidance prescribed
by the Secretary.
Section 170(f)(11)(E)(ii) provides that
the term qualified appraiser means an
individual who (1) has earned an
appraisal designation from a recognized
professional appraiser organization or
has otherwise met minimum education
and experience requirements set forth in
regulations prescribed by the Secretary,
(2) regularly performs appraisals for
which the individual receives
compensation, and (3) meets such other
requirements as may be prescribed by
the Secretary in regulations or other
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guidance. Section 170(f)(11)(E)(iii)
provides that an individual will not be
treated as a qualified appraiser with
respect to any specific appraisal unless
that individual (1) demonstrates
verifiable education and experience in
valuing the type of property subject to
the appraisal, and (2) has not been
prohibited from practicing before the
IRS by the Secretary under section
330(c) of Title 31 of the United States
Code at any time during the 3-year
period ending on the date of the
appraisal.
On October 19, 2006, the Treasury
Department and the IRS released Notice
2006–96, 2006–2 CB 902 (see
§ 601.601(d)(2)(ii)(b)), which provides
transitional guidance on the definitions
of qualified appraisal and qualified
appraiser that apply on and after the
effective date of the PPA definitions.
Section 170(f)(16) as added by section
1216 of the PPA generally provides that
no deduction is allowed for a
contribution of clothing or a household
item unless the clothing or household
item is in good used condition or better.
Section 170(f)(17) as added by section
1217 of the PPA imposes a
recordkeeping requirement for all cash
contributions, regardless of amount.
Specifically, section 170(f)(17) requires
a donor to maintain as a record of any
cash, check, or other monetary gift (1) a
bank record, or (2) a written
communication from the donee. The
record must show the name of the donee
organization, the date of the
contribution, and the amount of the
contribution.
On December 2, 2006, the Treasury
Department and the IRS released Notice
2006–110, 2006–2 CB 1127 (see
§ 601.601(d)(2)(ii)(b)), which provides
rules under section 170(f)(17) for
substantiating charitable contributions
made by payroll deduction.
On January 8, 2008, the Treasury
Department and the IRS released Notice
2008–16, 2008–1 CB 315 (see
§ 601.601(d)(2)(ii)(b)), which provides
rules under section 170(f)(17) for
substantiating a one-time, lump-sum
charitable contribution of a cash, check,
or other monetary gift made through the
Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) or a
similar program. Taxpayers may rely on
Notice 2006–96, Notice 2006–110, and
Notice 2008–16 prior to the effective
date of these final regulations.
On August 7, 2008, the Treasury
Department and the IRS provided
guidance on complying with section 170
as amended by the Jobs Act and the PPA
in a notice of proposed rulemaking
(REG–140029–07) in the Federal
Register (73 FR 45908). The Treasury
Department and the IRS received
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comments responding to the notice of
proposed rulemaking, and a public
hearing was held on January 23, 2009.
Copies of the comments received are
available for public inspection at
www.regulations.gov or upon request.
After consideration of the comments
received, the Treasury Department and
the IRS adopt the proposed regulations
as revised by this Treasury decision.
The revisions are discussed in this
preamble.
Explanation of Provisions and
Summary of Comments
The final regulations implement
changes made by the Jobs Act and PPA
to the substantiation and reporting rules
for charitable contributions under
section 170. The final regulations set
forth the substantiation requirements for
contributions of more than $500 under
section 170(f)(11)(B) through (D) (added
by the Jobs Act); the new definitions of
qualified appraisal and qualified
appraiser applicable to noncash
contributions under section
170(f)(11)(E) (added by the PPA);
substantiation requirements for
contributions of clothing and household
items under section 170(f)(16) (added by
the PPA); and recordkeeping
requirements for all cash contributions
under section 170(f)(17) (added by the
PPA).
In addition, these final regulations
amend the heading of § 1.170A–13 to
alert readers to the updated regulations.
The final regulations also update crossreferences to the section 170 regulations
in other regulations.
I. Cash, Check, or Other Monetary Gift
Substantiation Requirements
Section 1.170A–15 implements the
requirements of section 170(f)(17) for
cash, check, or other monetary gift
contributions, as added by the PPA, and
clarifies that these rules supplement the
substantiation rules in section 170(f)(8).
A. Contributions Made to a Distributing
Organization
A donor may make a charitable
contribution of cash, check, or other
monetary gift to an organization that
collects contributions and distributes
them to ultimate recipient organizations
(pursuant to the donor’s instructions or
otherwise). The final regulations adopt
the general rule of the proposed
regulations that treats as a donee for
purposes of sections 170(f)(8) and
170(f)(17) an organization described in
section 170(c) or a Principal Combined
Fund Organization (PCFO) for purposes
of the Combined Federal Campaign
(CFC) and acting in that capacity. The
CFC is a workplace giving campaign
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established by Executive Order 10728,
as amended by Executive Orders 10927,
12353, and 12404, and administered by
the United States Office of Personnel
Management (OPM). A PCFO
administers the local campaign and acts
as a fiscal agent for the CFC.
1. Blank Pledge Card Is Not
Substantiation
Some commenters asked whether a
blank pledge card provided by a donee
organization but filled out by the donor
constitutes adequate substantiation for a
contribution of cash to a distributing
organization. Section 170(f)(17) requires
a taxpayer to maintain as a record of a
contribution of a cash, check, or other
monetary gift either a bank record or a
written communication from the donee
that shows the name of the donee
organization, the date of the
contribution, and the amount of the
contribution. The proposed and final
regulations at § 1.170A–15(b)(2) provide
that a bank record includes a statement
from a financial institution, an
electronic fund transfer receipt, a
canceled check, a scanned image of both
sides of a canceled check obtained from
a bank website, or a credit card
statement. In addition, the proposed and
final regulations provide that a written
communication includes an email.
Because a blank pledge card provided
by the donee organization to a donor
does not show the information required
under section 170(f)(17), it is not
sufficient substantiation for a cash,
check, or other monetary gift.
2. Name of Donee for Purposes of CFC
One commenter noted that because
the CFC generally does not include the
name of the donee organization on its
pledge cards, and a PCFO for purposes
of the CFC often is a potential ultimate
recipient of a contribution to the CFC,
including the name of the PCFO on the
pledge card could unduly influence
donors to contribute to the PCFO rather
than to other eligible donees. The
commenter asked that the name of the
local CFC campaign be treated as the
name of the donee organization. The
Treasury Department and the IRS agree
with this comment. Accordingly,
§ 1.170A–15(d)(2)(ii) provides that the
name of the local CFC may be used
instead of the name of the PCFO and
may be treated as the donee
organization for purposes of sections
170(f)(8) and 170(f)(17) and § 1.170A–
15(d)(1)(ii).
B. Compliance With 170(f)(8) and
170(f)(17) in a Single Document
Some commenters asked if a single
written acknowledgment can be used to
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satisfy the substantiation rules under
sections 170(f)(8) and 170(f)(17). Section
170(f)(8) does not require that a
contemporaneous written
acknowledgment by the donee
organization include the date of the
contribution. In addition, section
170(f)(17) does not require that a written
communication from the donee include
a statement of whether any goods or
services were provided in exchange for
the contribution. Although there are
different requirements under sections
170(f)(8) and 170(f)(17), § 1.170A–
15(a)(3) of the final regulations provides
that a single written acknowledgment
that satisfies all substantiation
requirements under both sections
170(f)(8) and 170(f)(17) is adequate
substantiation for contributions of a
cash, check, or other monetary gift.
II. Noncash Substantiation
Requirements
Section 1.170A–16 implements the
requirements of section 170(f)(11) for
noncash contributions, as added by the
Jobs Act, and clarifies that these rules
are in addition to the requirements in
section 170(f)(8).
Proposed and final § 1.170A–16
provide that a donor who claims a
deduction for a noncash contribution of
less than $250 is required only to obtain
a receipt from the donee or keep reliable
records. A donor who claims a noncash
contribution of at least $250 but not
more than $500 is required only to
obtain a contemporaneous written
acknowledgment, as provided under
section 170(f)(8) and § 1.170A–13(f). For
claimed noncash contributions of more
than $500 but not more than $5,000, the
donor must obtain a contemporaneous
written acknowledgment and must also
file a completed Form 8283 (Section A),
‘‘Noncash Charitable Contributions,’’
with the return on which the deduction
is claimed. For claimed noncash
contributions of more than $5,000, in
addition to a contemporaneous written
acknowledgment, the donor generally
must obtain a qualified appraisal and
must also complete and file either
Section A or Section B of Form 8283
(depending on the type of property
contributed) with the return on which
the deduction is claimed. For claimed
noncash contributions of more than
$500,000, the donor must also attach a
copy of the qualified appraisal to the
return for the taxable year in which the
contribution is made.
Section 170(f)(11)(F) provides that for
purposes of the $500, $5,000, and
$500,000 thresholds in section
170(f)(11), similar items contributed
during the taxable year are treated as
one property. In determining whether a
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contribution meets the $250 threshold,
§ 1.170A–13(f)(1) provides that separate
contributions made during the tax year,
regardless of whether the sum of those
contributions equal or exceed $250, are
not combined. The proposed and final
regulations also provide that the
requirements for substantiation that
must be submitted with a return also
apply to the return for any carryover
year under section 170(d).
A. Reasonable Cause Exception
In light of recent case law (see Crimi
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013–51),
the paragraph relating to the reasonable
cause exception set forth in proposed
regulation § 1.170A–16(f)(6) has been
deleted from the final regulations
because it is inconsistent with the Tax
Court’s position. In Crimi, the IRS
argued that there was no qualified
appraisal. The Tax Court discussed the
doctrine of substantial compliance with
respect to the qualified appraisal
regulation, but stated that it was
unnecessary to decide whether it was
applicable to the petitioners’ case
because they established that the failure
was due to reasonable cause.
Specifically, the court stated that a
reasonable cause inquiry is ‘‘inherently
a fact-intensive one, and facts and
circumstances must be judged on a caseby-case basis.’’ Id. at *99. The court
found that petitioners reasonably and in
good faith relied on their long-time
certified public accountant’s advice that
their appraisal met all the legal
requirements to claim the deduction.
Thus, the final regulations do not
contain a standard for the reasonable
cause exception.
B. Appraiser Privacy Concerns
A number of commenters expressed
concern over appraisers’ privacy if the
appraiser’s social security number is
required on qualified appraisals and
Forms 8283 (Section B). This concern
was addressed by the proposed
regulations. Both the proposed and final
regulations require an appraiser to use
a taxpayer identification number on an
appraisal, but that number does not
need to be the appraiser’s social security
number. An appraiser may use an
employer identification number, which
may be obtained by: (1) Applying on the
IRS website (www.regulationsgov); or (2)
filing a completed Form SS–4,
Application for Employer Identification
Number, by mail or by fax. The IRS has
modified the instructions to Form 8283
to make clear that an appraiser may use
either a social security number or an
employer identification number.
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C. Form 8283 Is Not a Contemporaneous
Written Acknowledgment
One commenter asked whether a
Form 8283 can satisfy the requirement
for a contemporaneous written
acknowledgment under section
170(f)(8). Although no format is
prescribed for a contemporaneous
written acknowledgment (for example,
an email may qualify), a
contemporaneous written
acknowledgment of a contribution by
the donee organization must contain all
of the information required by section
170(f)(8)(B). Moreover, section
170(f)(8)(A) states that the
acknowledgment is made ‘‘by the donee
organization.’’ Only Section B, part IV of
Form 8283, completed for property
valued at over $5,000, is a donee
acknowledgment, and this
acknowledgment only contains some of
the information required by section
170(f)(8)(B). Accordingly, even a fullycompleted Form 8283 does not satisfy
the requirements of section 170(f)(8).
D. Form 8283 (Section B) Provided to
Donee
Another commenter suggested that
the Form 8283 (Section B) should be
required to be fully completed,
including the appraiser information and
the appraised or claimed value of the
property, before the donor obtains the
donee’s signature. Section 1.170A–
16(d)(5)(iii) of the proposed regulations
provides that specific portions of the
Form 8283 (Section B) must be
completed before it is signed by the
donee, but that the Form 8283 (Section
B) does not need to contain certain other
information, such as the appraiser
information and the appraised or
claimed value of the property, before the
donee signs the form. Regardless of any
benefits that may result from additional
information sharing, the public should
have the opportunity to comment on
any proposed requirement to share
additional information with the donee.
Accordingly, the final regulations adopt
the proposed regulation language
without adoption of this suggestion.
E. Attaching Appraisal to Carryover
Year Returns
One commenter suggested deleting
the requirement in the regulations to
attach an appraisal to the tax returns for
carryover years. Because the need for
the IRS to have the appraisal attached to
each return reflecting a contribution in
excess of $500,000 outweighs the
burden on taxpayers to supply it, the
final regulations retain this requirement.
Accordingly, if the appraisal is required
to be attached to the return for the
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contribution year, it must also be
attached to the returns for the carryover
years.
III. New Requirements for Qualified
Appraisals and Qualified Appraisers
As prescribed in section 170(f)(11)(E),
as amended by the PPA, § 1.170A–17 of
the proposed and final regulations
provides definitions for qualified
appraisal and qualified appraiser.
A. Transitional Rule
One commenter suggested that a
transitional rule be included for
§ 1.170A–17 because additional time
may be needed to meet the education
and experience requirements in
§ 1.170A–17 for qualified appraisers. In
order to provide appraisers with a
reasonable amount of time to meet the
new education and experience
requirements, the final rules under
§ 1.170A–17 apply only to contributions
made on or after January 1, 2019.
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B. Definition of Generally Accepted
Appraisal Standards
Section 170(f)(11)(E)(i)(II) provides
that the term qualified appraisal means
an appraisal that is conducted by a
qualified appraiser in accordance with
generally accepted appraisal standards.
Generally accepted appraisal standards
are defined in the proposed regulations
at § 1.170A–17(a)(2) as the ‘‘substance
and principles of the Uniform Standards
of Professional Appraisal Practice
[USPAP], as developed by the Appraisal
Standards Board of the Appraisal
Foundation.’’ Several commenters
recommended that the final regulations
require appraisal documents to be
prepared ‘‘in accordance with USPAP’’
and not merely in accordance with the
‘‘substance and principles of USPAP.’’
Other commenters indicated that strict
compliance with USPAP would
eliminate use of all other appraisal
standards, including some that are
generally accepted in the appraisal
industry. The Treasury Department and
the IRS agree that it is beneficial to
provide some flexibility by requiring
conformity with appraisal standards
that are consistent with the substance
and principles of USPAP rather than
requiring that all appraisals be prepared
strictly in accordance with USPAP.
Accordingly, the final regulations do not
adopt the recommendation to require
strict compliance with USPAP and
retain the requirement of consistency
with the substance and principles of
USPAP.
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C. Education and Experience
Requirement for Qualified Appraisers
Section 170(f)(11)(E)(ii)(I) and (iii)(I)
and § 1.170A–17(b) of the proposed
regulations provide that a qualified
appraiser is an individual with
verifiable education and experience in
valuing the type of property for which
the appraisal is performed. Some
commenters reiterated suggestions made
in response to Notice 2006–96 that the
final regulations interpret the
requirement in section 170(f)(11)(E) that
a qualified appraiser have verifiable
‘‘education and experience’’ as
requiring verifiable ‘‘education or
experience.’’ The Treasury Department
and the IRS did not adopt this
suggestion in the proposed regulations,
and do not do so in the final regulations,
because it would be contrary to the clear
language of the statute.
Section 1.170A–17(b)(4) of the
proposed regulations requires an
appraiser to specify in the appraisal the
appraiser’s education and experience in
valuing the type of property and to
make a declaration in the appraisal that,
because of the appraiser’s education and
experience, the appraiser is qualified to
make appraisals of the type of property
being valued. A commenter suggested
that, to meet the ‘‘verifiable’’
requirement in § 1.170A–17(b), the
appraiser should be required to specify
in the appraisal only that the appraiser
is a qualified appraiser under § 1.170A–
17(b) and that the appraisal was
prepared in accordance with the
substance and principles of USPAP. The
general statement of qualification
suggested by the commenter does not
demonstrate, as required under section
170(f)(11)(E)(iii)(I), that the appraiser
has verifiable education and experience
that qualifies the appraiser to prepare
the appraisal for that type of property.
Accordingly, the final regulations do not
adopt this suggestion.
D. Parity Between ‘‘Designation’’ and
‘‘Education and Experience’’
Section 1.170A–17(b)(2)(i) of the
proposed regulations provides that an
individual is treated as having
education and experience in valuing the
type of property if, as of the date the
individual signs the appraisal, the
individual has satisfied the following
requirements: (A) Successfully
completed professional or college-level
coursework in valuing the type of
property and has two or more years of
experience in valuing the type of
property; or (B) earned a recognized
appraiser designation for the type of
property. One commenter suggested that
it is much more difficult to earn a
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designation from a generally recognized
professional appraiser organization
under § 1.170A–17(b)(2)(i)(B) than to
satisfy the education and experience
requirements under § 1.170A–
17(b)(2)(i)(A). The commenter suggested
that the education and experience
requirements be made more stringent. In
enacting section 170(f)(11)(E), Congress
intended to improve the accuracy of
deductions claimed for noncash
contributions by requiring qualified
appraisers to meet more stringent
qualification standards, including by
requiring that both education and
experience requirements be met. See
H.R. Rep. No. 108–548, pt. 1, at 356
(2004). The requirements for education
and experience in the proposed
regulations are sufficiently stringent as
intended by Congress. Accordingly, the
final regulations do not adopt this
suggestion and retain without
modification the requirements for
education and experience in the
proposed regulations.
E. Satisfying Verifiable Education
Requirement
Section 170(f)(11)(E)(iii)(I) requires
verifiable education and experience in
valuing the type of property subject to
the appraisal. Section 1.170A–
17(b)(2)(i)(A) of the proposed
regulations provides that an individual
is treated as having education and
experience in valuing the type of
property if, as of the date the individual
signs the appraisal, the individual has
successfully completed (for example,
received a passing grade on a final
examination) professional or collegelevel coursework in valuing the type of
property, and has two or more years of
experience in valuing the type of
property. One commenter asked
whether attendance at a training event
that does not include a final
examination meets the requirement of
successful completion of coursework.
The reference to a passing grade on a
final examination in § 1.170A–
17(b)(2)(i)(A) is merely an example of
what is considered successful
completion of professional or collegelevel coursework, and other evidence of
successful completion may be sufficient.
However, mere attendance at a training
event is not sufficient, and evidence of
successful completion of coursework is
necessary under the final regulations.
F. Education Provided by Trade
Organization
Two commenters pointed out that, in
addition to generally recognized
professional appraiser organizations, a
generally recognized professional trade
organization may provide coursework
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that satisfies the requirement for
verifiable education in valuing the type
of property under § 1.170A–
17(b)(2)(i)(A) and (ii)(B). The Treasury
Department and the IRS agree with this
comment, and the final regulations
provide that an appraiser also can
satisfy § 1.170A–17(b)(2)(i)(A) and
(ii)(B) by successfully completing
coursework in valuing the type of
property from a generally recognized
professional trade organization.
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G. Examples of Generally Recognized
Professional Appraiser Organizations
Some commenters objected to the
references in the proposed regulations
to designations conferred by one
particular organization as examples of
recognized appraiser designations. The
Treasury Department and the IRS do not
require or prefer the designation of any
particular appraiser organization, and,
therefore, the final regulations do not
contain examples of any designations.
IV. Additional Comments
A number of commenters requested
that the Treasury Department and the
IRS provide that the final regulations
apply to charitable contributions for all
federal tax purposes, including estate
and gift tax. These regulations are
promulgated under Jobs Act and PPA
provisions that apply only to income tax
deductions for charitable contributions
under section 170. No substantive
changes were made to the proposed
regulations in response to these
comments because these comments
were beyond the scope of the proposed
regulations.
Some commenters suggested that
appraisers be allowed to use certain IRS
valuation tables, such as those for
charitable remainder trusts, other
remainder interests in property, and life
insurance policies, instead of a qualified
appraisal. These tables may be used to
value property in certain other contexts,
but they do not necessarily provide a
fair market value of the property
contributed. Therefore, these tables are
not acceptable substitutes for a qualified
appraisal to substantiate deductions for
charitable contributions under section
170.
Another commenter suggested that
taxpayers should not be required to
substantiate their charitable
contribution deduction with a qualified
appraisal when they purchase medical
equipment, such as a Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (MRI) machine, and
donate the equipment to a qualified
organization. The purchase price of the
medical equipment may differ from its
fair market value. A qualified appraisal
prepared by a qualified appraiser is
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required to determine the fair market
value at the time of contribution.
Therefore, no changes were made to the
proposed regulations in response to this
comment.
Effect on Other Documents
Notice 2006–96 provides transitional
guidance on the definitions of qualified
appraisal and qualified appraiser under
section 170(f)(11). Notice 2006–110
provides transitional guidance under
section 170(f)(17) for substantiating
charitable contributions made by
payroll deduction. Notice 2008–16
provides transitional guidance under
section 170(f)(17) for substantiating a
one-time, lump-sum charitable
contribution of a cash, check, or other
monetary gift made through the CFC or
a similar program. All three notices
provide that taxpayers may rely on the
notices until final regulations are
effective. Accordingly, Notice 2006–110
and Notice 2008–16 are obsolete as of
July 30, 2018 and Notice 2006–96 is
obsolete as of January 1, 2019.
V. Applicability Dates
In general, §§ 1.170A–15, 1.170A–16,
and 1.170A–18 apply to contributions
made after July 30, 2018. Section
1.170A–17 applies to contributions
made on or after January 1, 2019.
Taxpayers are reminded that the
effective dates of the Jobs Act and the
PPA relating to substantiating and
reporting charitable contributions
precede the effective date of these final
regulations, and the Jobs Act and the
PPA apply in accordance with their
applicability dates. See Notice 2006–96.
Special Analyses
This regulation is not subject to
review under section 6(b) of Executive
Order 12866 pursuant to the
Memorandum of Agreement (April 11,
2018) between the Department of the
Treasury and the Office of Management
and Budget regarding review of tax
regulations. Further it is hereby certified
that these regulations will not have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
Accordingly, a Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis under the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6) is
not required. Although this rule could
affect a substantial number of small
entities, any economic impact is
expected to be minimal. The final rule
provides clarifications and
simplifications to the existing
substantiation and reporting
requirements for charitable
contributions and are designed to
reduce the burden on taxpayers.
Further, any substantiation and
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reporting rules contained in these final
regulations that are in addition to the
rules in current regulations reflect
statutory substantiation and reporting
requirements. Pursuant to section
7805(f) of the Internal Revenue Code,
the notice of proposed rulemaking
preceding this regulation was submitted
to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the
Small Business Administration for
comment on its impact on small
business, and no comments were
received.
Drafting Information
The principal author of these
regulations is Charles Gorham of the
Office of Associate Chief Counsel
(Income Tax and Accounting). Other
personnel from the Treasury
Department and the IRS participated in
their development.
List of Subjects
26 CFR Part 1
Income taxes, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
26 CFR Part 602
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
Adoption of Amendments to the
Regulations
Accordingly, 26 CFR parts 1 and 602
are amended as follows:
PART 1—INCOME TAXES
Paragraph 1. The authority citation
for part 1 amended by adding sectional
authorities for §§ 1.170A–15 through
1.170A–18 in numerical order to read in
part as follows:

■

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

§ 1.170A–15 also issued under 26 U.S.C.
170(a)(1).
§ 1.170A–16 also issued under 26 U.S.C.
170(a)(1) and 170(f)(11).
§ 1.170A–17 also issued under 26 U.S.C.
170(a)(1) and 170(f)(11).
§ 1.170A–18 also issued under 26 U.S.C.
170(a)(1).
§§ 1.170–0, 1.170–1, and 1.170–2
[Removed]

Par. 2. Sections 1.170–0, 1.170–1, and
1.170–2 are removed.
■ Par. 3. Section 1.170A–1 is amended
by revising the third sentence of
paragraph (a) and adding two sentences
to the end of paragraph (k) to read as
follows:
■

§ 1.170A–1 Charitable, etc., contributions
and gifts; allowance of deduction.

(a) * * * For rules relating to record
keeping and return requirements in
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support of deductions for charitable
contributions (whether by an itemizing
or nonitemizing taxpayer), see
§§ 1.170A–13, 1.170A–14, 1.170A–15,
1.170A–16, 1.170A–17, and
1.170A–18. * * *
*
*
*
*
*
(k) * * * The third sentence of
paragraph (a) applies as provided in the
sections referenced in that sentence.
Par. 4. Section 1.170A–13 is amended
by revising the heading to read as
follows:

■

§ 1.170A–13 Recordkeeping and return
requirements for deductions for charitable
contributions.

*

*

*

*

*

Par. 5. Section 1.170A–14 is amended
by revising paragraphs (i) and (j) to read
as follows:

■

§ 1.170A–14. Qualified conservation
contributions.

daltland on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with RULES

*

*
*
*
*
(i) Substantiation requirement. If a
taxpayer makes a qualified conservation
contribution and claims a deduction,
the taxpayer must maintain written
records of the fair market value of the
underlying property before and after the
donation and the conservation purpose
furthered by the donation, and such
information shall be stated in the
taxpayer’s income tax return if required
by the return or its instructions. See also
§ 1.170A–13(c) (relating to
substantiation requirements for
deductions in excess of $5,000 for
charitable contributions made on or
before July 30, 2018); § 1.170A–16(d)
(relating to substantiation of charitable
contributions of more than $5,000 made
after July 30, 2018); § 1.170A–17
(relating to the definitions of qualified
appraisal and qualified appraiser for
substantiation of contributions made on
or after January 1, 2019); and section
6662 (relating to the imposition of an
accuracy-related penalty on
underpayments). Taxpayers may rely on
the rules in § 1.170A–16(d) for
contributions made after June 3, 2004,
or appraisals prepared for returns or
submissions filed after August 17, 2006.
Taxpayers may rely on the rules in
§ 1.170A–17 for appraisals prepared for
returns or submissions filed after
August 17, 2006.
(j) Effective/applicability dates.
Except as otherwise provided in
§ 1.170A–14(g)(4)(ii) and § 1.170A–14(i),
this section applies only to
contributions made on or after
December 18, 1980.
Par. 6. Section 1.170A–15 is added to
read as follows:

■

VerDate Sep<11>2014

17:02 Jul 27, 2018

Jkt 244001

§ 1.170A–15 Substantiation requirements
for charitable contribution of a cash, check,
or other monetary gift.

(a) In general—(1) Bank record or
written communication required. No
deduction is allowed under sections
170(a) and 170(f)(17) for a charitable
contribution in the form of a cash,
check, or other monetary gift, as
described in paragraph (b)(1) of this
section, unless the donor substantiates
the deduction with a bank record, as
described in paragraph (b)(2) of this
section, or a written communication, as
described in paragraph (b)(3) of this
section, from the donee showing the
name of the donee, the date of the
contribution, and the amount of the
contribution.
(2) Additional substantiation required
for contributions of $250 or more. No
deduction is allowed under section
170(a) for any contribution of $250 or
more unless the donor substantiates the
contribution with a contemporaneous
written acknowledgment, as described
in section 170(f)(8) and § 1.170A–13(f),
from the donee.
(3) Single document may be used. The
requirements of paragraphs (a)(1) and
(2) of this section may be met by a single
document that contains all the
information required by paragraphs
(a)(1) and (2) of this section, if the
document is obtained by the donor no
later than the date prescribed by
paragraph (c) of this section.
(b) Terms—(1) Monetary gift includes
a transfer of a gift card redeemable for
cash, and a payment made by credit
card, electronic fund transfer (as
described in section 5061(e)(2)), an
online payment service, or payroll
deduction.
(2) Bank record includes a statement
from a financial institution, an
electronic fund transfer receipt, a
canceled check, a scanned image of both
sides of a canceled check obtained from
a bank website, or a credit card
statement.
(3) Written communication includes
email.
(c) Deadline for receipt of
substantiation. The substantiation
described in paragraph (a) of this
section must be received by the donor
on or before the earlier of—
(1) The date the donor files the
original return for the taxable year in
which the contribution was made; or
(2) The due date, including any
extension, for filing the donor’s original
return for that year.
(d) Special rules—(1) Contributions
made by payroll deduction. In the case
of a charitable contribution made by
payroll deduction, a donor is treated as
meeting the requirements of section
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170(f)(17) and paragraph (a) of this
section if, no later than the date
described in paragraph (c) of this
section, the donor obtains—
(i) A pay stub, Form W–2, ‘‘Wage and
Tax Statement,’’ or other employerfurnished document that sets forth the
amount withheld during the taxable
year for payment to a donee; and
(ii) A pledge card or other document
prepared by or at the direction of the
donee that shows the name of the
donee.
(2) Distributing organizations as
donees. The following organizations are
treated as donees for purposes of section
170(f)(17) and paragraph (a) of this
section, even if the organization
(pursuant to the donor’s instructions or
otherwise) distributes the amount
received to one or more organizations
described in section 170(c):
(i) An organization described in
section 170(c).
(ii) An organization described in 5
CFR 950.105 (a Principal Combined
Fund Organization (PCFO) for purposes
of the Combined Federal Campaign
(CFC)) and acting in that capacity. For
purposes of the requirement for a
written communication under section
170(f)(17), if the donee is a PCFO, the
name of the local CFC campaign may be
treated as the name of the donee
organization.
(e) Substantiation of out-of-pocket
expenses. Paragraph (a)(1) of this
section does not apply to a donor who
incurs unreimbursed expenses of less
than $250 incident to the rendition of
services, within the meaning of
§ 1.170A–1(g). For substantiation of
unreimbursed out-of-pocket expenses of
$250 or more, see § 1.170A–13(f)(10).
(f) Charitable contributions made by
partnership or S corporation. If a
partnership or an S corporation makes
a charitable contribution, the
partnership or S corporation is treated
as the donor for purposes of section
170(f)(17) and paragraph (a) of this
section.
(g) Transfers to certain trusts. The
requirements of section 170(f)(17) and
paragraphs (a)(1) and (3) of this section
do not apply to a transfer of a cash,
check, or other monetary gift to a trust
described in section 170(f)(2)(B); a
charitable remainder annuity trust, as
described in section 664(d)(1) and the
corresponding regulations; or a
charitable remainder unitrust, as
described in section 664(d)(2) or (d)(3)
and the corresponding regulations. The
requirements of section 170(f)(17) and
paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of this section
do apply, however, to a transfer to a
pooled income fund, as defined in
section 642(c)(5).
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(h) Effective/applicability date. This
section applies to contributions made
after July 30, 2018. Taxpayers may rely
on the rules of this section for
contributions made in taxable years
beginning after August 17, 2006.
■ Par. 7. Section 1.170A–16 is added to
read as follows:
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§ 1.170A–16 Substantiation and reporting
requirements for noncash charitable
contributions.

(a) Substantiation of charitable
contributions of less than $250—(1)
Individuals, partnerships, and certain
corporations required to obtain receipt.
Except as provided in paragraph (a)(2)
of this section, no deduction is allowed
under section 170(a) for a noncash
charitable contribution of less than $250
by an individual, partnership, S
corporation, or C corporation that is a
personal service corporation or closely
held corporation unless the donor
maintains for each contribution a
receipt from the donee showing the
following information:
(i) The name and address of the
donee;
(ii) The date of the contribution;
(iii) A description of the property in
sufficient detail under the
circumstances (taking into account the
value of the property) for a person who
is not generally familiar with the type of
property to ascertain that the described
property is the contributed property;
and
(iv) In the case of securities, the name
of the issuer, the type of security, and
whether the securities are publicly
traded securities within the meaning of
§ 1.170A–13(c)(7)(xi).
(2) Substitution of reliable written
records—(i) In general. If it is
impracticable to obtain a receipt (for
example, where a donor deposits
property at a donee’s unattended drop
site), the donor may satisfy the
recordkeeping rules of this paragraph (a)
by maintaining reliable written records,
as described in paragraphs (a)(2)(ii) and
(iii) of this section, for the contributed
property.
(ii) Reliable written records. The
reliability of written records is to be
determined on the basis of all of the
facts and circumstances of a particular
case, including the proximity in time of
the written record to the contribution.
(iii) Contents of reliable written
records. Reliable written records must
include—
(A) The information required by
paragraph (a)(1) of this section;
(B) The fair market value of the
property on the date the contribution
was made;

(C) The method used in determining
the fair market value; and
(D) In the case of a contribution of
clothing or a household item as defined
in § 1.170A–18(c), the condition of the
item.
(3) Additional substantiation rules
may apply. For additional
substantiation rules, see paragraph (f) of
this section.
(b) Substantiation of charitable
contributions of $250 or more but not
more than $500. No deduction is
allowed under section 170(a) for a
noncash charitable contribution of $250
or more but not more than $500 unless
the donor substantiates the contribution
with a contemporaneous written
acknowledgment, as described in
section 170(f)(8) and § 1.170A–13(f).
(c) Substantiation of charitable
contributions of more than $500 but not
more than $5,000—(1) In general. No
deduction is allowed under section
170(a) for a noncash charitable
contribution of more than $500 but not
more than $5,000 unless the donor
substantiates the contribution with a
contemporaneous written
acknowledgment, as described in
section 170(f)(8) and § 1.170A–13(f), and
meets the applicable requirements of
this section.
(2) Individuals, partnerships, and
certain corporations also required to file
Form 8283 (Section A). No deduction is
allowed under section 170(a) for a
noncash charitable contribution of more
than $500 but not more than $5,000 by
an individual, partnership, S
corporation, or C corporation that is a
personal service corporation or closely
held corporation unless the donor
completes Form 8283 (Section A),
‘‘Noncash Charitable Contributions,’’ as
provided in paragraph (c)(3) of this
section, or a successor form, and files it
with the return on which the deduction
is claimed.
(3) Completion of Form 8283 (Section
A). A completed Form 8283 (Section A)
includes—
(i) The donor’s name and taxpayer
identification number (for example, a
social security number or employer
identification number);
(ii) The name and address of the
donee;
(iii) The date of the contribution;
(iv) The following information about
the contributed property:
(A) A description of the property in
sufficient detail under the
circumstances, taking into account the
value of the property, for a person who
is not generally familiar with the type of
property to ascertain that the described
property is the contributed property;

(B) In the case of real or tangible
personal property, the condition of the
property;
(C) In the case of securities, the name
of the issuer, the type of security, and
whether the securities are publicly
traded securities within the meaning of
§ 1.170A–13(c)(7)(xi);
(D) The fair market value of the
property on the date the contribution
was made and the method used in
determining the fair market value;
(E) The manner of acquisition (for
example, by purchase, gift, bequest,
inheritance, or exchange), and the
approximate date of acquisition of the
property by the donor (except that in the
case of a contribution of publicly traded
securities as defined in § 1.170A–
13(c)(7)(xi), a representation that the
donor held the securities for more than
one year is sufficient) or, if the property
was created, produced, or manufactured
by or for the donor, the approximate
date the property was substantially
completed;
(F) The cost or other basis, adjusted as
provided by section 1016, of the
property (except that the cost or basis is
not required for contributions of
publicly traded securities (as defined in
§ 1.170A–13(c)(7)(xi)) that would have
resulted in long-term capital gain if sold
on the contribution date, unless the
donor has elected to limit the deduction
to basis under section 170(b)(1)(C)(iii));
(G) In the case of tangible personal
property, whether the donee has
certified it for a use related to the
purpose or function constituting the
donee’s basis for exemption under
section 501, or in the case of a
governmental unit, an exclusively
public purpose; and
(v) Any other information required by
Form 8283 (Section A) or the
instructions to Form 8283 (Section A).
(4) Additional requirement for certain
vehicle contributions. In the case of a
contribution of a qualified vehicle
described in section 170(f)(12)(E) for
which an acknowledgment by the donee
organization is required under section
170(f)(12)(D), the donor must attach a
copy of the acknowledgment to the
Form 8283 (Section A) for the return on
which the deduction is claimed.
(5) Additional substantiation rules
may apply. For additional
substantiation rules, see paragraph (f) of
this section.
(d) Substantiation of charitable
contributions of more than $5,000—(1)
In general. Except as provided in
paragraph (d)(2) of this section, no
deduction is allowed under section
170(a) for a noncash charitable
contribution of more than $5,000 unless
the donor—
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(i) Substantiates the contribution with
a contemporaneous written
acknowledgment, as described in
section 170(f)(8) and § 1.170A–13(f);
(ii) Obtains a qualified appraisal, as
defined in § 1.170A–17(a)(1), prepared
by a qualified appraiser, as defined in
§ 1.170A–17(b)(1); and
(iii) Completes Form 8283 (Section B),
as provided in paragraph (d)(3) of this
section, or a successor form, and files it
with the return on which the deduction
is claimed.
(2) Exception for certain noncash
contributions. A qualified appraisal is
not required, and a completed Form
8283 (Section A) containing the
information required in paragraph (c)(3)
of this section meets the requirements of
paragraph (d)(1)(iii) of this section for
contributions of—
(i) Publicly traded securities as
defined in § 1.170A–13(c)(7)(xi);
(ii) Property described in section
170(e)(1)(B)(iii) (certain intellectual
property);
(iii) A qualified vehicle described in
section 170(f)(12)(A)(ii) for which an
acknowledgment under section
170(f)(12)(B)(iii) is provided; and
(iv) Property described in section
1221(a)(1) (inventory and property held
by the donor primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of the
donor’s trade or business).
(3) Completed Form 8283 (Section B).
A completed Form 8283 (Section B)
includes—
(i) The donor’s name and taxpayer
identification number (for example, a
social security number or employer
identification number);
(ii) The donee’s name, address,
taxpayer identification number,
signature, the date signed by the donee,
and the date the donee received the
property;
(iii) The appraiser’s name, address,
taxpayer identification number,
appraiser declaration, as described in
paragraph (d)(4) of this section,
signature, and the date signed by the
appraiser;
(iv) The following information about
the contributed property:
(A) The fair market value on the
valuation effective date, as defined in
§ 1.170A–17(a)(5)(i).
(B) A description in sufficient detail
under the circumstances, taking into
account the value of the property, for a
person who is not generally familiar
with the type of property to ascertain
that the described property is the
contributed property.
(C) In the case of real property or
tangible personal property, the
condition of the property;
(v) The manner of acquisition (for
example, by purchase, gift, bequest,

inheritance, or exchange), and the
approximate date of acquisition of the
property by the donor, or, if the
property was created, produced, or
manufactured by or for the donor, the
approximate date the property was
substantially completed;
(vi) The cost or other basis of the
property, adjusted as provided by
section 1016;
(vii) A statement explaining whether
the charitable contribution was made by
means of a bargain sale and, if so, the
amount of any consideration received
for the contribution; and
(viii) Any other information required
by Form 8283 (Section B) or the
instructions to Form 8283 (Section B).
(4) Appraiser declaration. The
appraiser declaration referred to in
paragraph (d)(3)(iii) of this section must
include the following statement: ‘‘I
understand that my appraisal will be
used in connection with a return or
claim for refund. I also understand that,
if there is a substantial or gross
valuation misstatement of the value of
the property claimed on the return or
claim for refund that is based on my
appraisal, I may be subject to a penalty
under section 6695A of the Internal
Revenue Code, as well as other
applicable penalties. I affirm that I have
not been at any time in the three-year
period ending on the date of the
appraisal barred from presenting
evidence or testimony before the
Department of the Treasury or the
Internal Revenue Service pursuant to 31
U.S.C. 330(c).’’
(5) Donee signature—(i) Person
authorized to sign. The person who
signs Form 8283 (Section B) for the
donee must be either an official
authorized to sign the tax or information
returns of the donee, or a person
specifically authorized to sign Forms
8283 (Section B) by that official. In the
case of a donee that is a governmental
unit, the person who signs Form 8283
(Section B) for the donee must be an
official of the governmental unit.
(ii) Effect of donee signature. The
signature of the donee on Form 8283
(Section B) does not represent
concurrence in the appraised value of
the contributed property. Rather, it
represents acknowledgment of receipt of
the property described in Form 8283
(Section B) on the date specified in
Form 8283 (Section B) and that the
donee understands the information
reporting requirements imposed by
section 6050L and § 1.6050L–1.
(iii) Certain information not required
on Form 8283 (Section B) before donee
signs. Before Form 8283 (Section B) is
signed by the donee, Form 8283
(Section B) must be completed (as

described in paragraph (d)(3) of this
section), except that it is not required to
contain the following:
(A) The appraiser declaration or
information about the qualified
appraiser.
(B) The manner or date of acquisition.
(C) The cost or other basis of the
property.
(D) The appraised fair market value of
the contributed property.
(E) The amount claimed as a
charitable contribution.
(6) Additional substantiation rules
may apply. For additional
substantiation rules, see paragraph (f) of
this section.
(7) More than one appraiser. More
than one appraiser may appraise the
donated property. If more than one
appraiser appraises the property, the
donor does not have to use each
appraiser’s appraisal for purposes of
substantiating the charitable
contribution deduction under this
paragraph (d). If the donor uses the
appraisal of more than one appraiser, or
if two or more appraisers contribute to
a single appraisal, each appraiser shall
comply with the requirements of this
paragraph (d) and the requirements in
§ 1.170A–17, including signing the
qualified appraisal and appraisal
summary.
(e) Substantiation of noncash
charitable contributions of more than
$500,000—(1) In general. Except as
provided in paragraph (e)(2) of this
section, no deduction is allowed under
section 170(a) for a noncash charitable
contribution of more than $500,000
unless the donor—
(i) Substantiates the contribution with
a contemporaneous written
acknowledgment, as described in
section 170(f)(8) and § 1.170A–13(f);
(ii) Obtains a qualified appraisal, as
defined in § 1.170A–17(a)(1), prepared
by a qualified appraiser, as defined in
§ 1.170A–17(b)(1);
(iii) Completes, as described in
paragraph (d)(3) of this section, Form
8283 (Section B) and files it with the
return on which the deduction is
claimed; and
(iv) Attaches the qualified appraisal of
the property to the return on which the
deduction is claimed.
(2) Exception for certain noncash
contributions. For contributions of
property described in paragraph (d)(2)
of this section, a qualified appraisal is
not required, and a completed Form
8283 (Section A), containing the
information required in paragraph (c)(3)
of this section, meets the requirements
of paragraph (e)(1)(iii) of this section.
(3) Additional substantiation rules
may apply. For additional
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substantiation rules, see paragraph (f) of
this section.
(f) Additional substantiation rules—
(1) Form 8283 (Section B) furnished by
donor to donee. A donor who presents
a Form 8283 (Section B) to a donee for
signature must furnish to the donee a
copy of the Form 8283 (Section B).
(2) Number of Forms 8283 (Section A
or Section B)—(i) In general. For each
item of contributed property for which
a Form 8283 (Section A or Section B) is
required under paragraphs (c), (d), or (e)
of this section, a donor must attach a
separate Form 8283 (Section A or
Section B) to the return on which the
deduction for the item is claimed.
(ii) Exception for similar items. The
donor may attach a single Form 8283
(Section A or Section B) for all similar
items of property, as defined in
§ 1.170A–13(c)(7)(iii), contributed to the
same donee during the donor’s taxable
year, if the donor includes on Form
8283 (Section A or Section B) the
information required by paragraph (c)(3)
or (d)(3) of this section for each item of
property.
(3) Substantiation requirements for
carryovers of noncash contribution
deductions. The rules in paragraphs (c),
(d), and (e) of this section (regarding
substantiation that must be submitted
with a return) also apply to the return
for any carryover year under section
170(d).
(4) Partners and S corporation
shareholders—(i) Form 8283 (Section A
or Section B) must be provided to
partners and S corporation
shareholders. If the donor is a
partnership or S corporation, the donor
must provide a copy of the completed
Form 8283 (Section A or Section B) to
every partner or shareholder who
receives an allocation of a charitable
contribution deduction under section
170 for the property described in Form
8283 (Section A or Section B). Similarly,
a recipient partner or shareholder that is
a partnership or S corporation must
provide a copy of the completed Form
8283 (Section A or Section B) to each of
its partners or shareholders who
receives an allocation of a charitable
contribution deduction under section
170 for the property described in Form
8283 (Section A or Section B).
(ii) Partners and S corporation
shareholders must attach Form 8283
(Section A or Section B) to return. A
partner of a partnership or shareholder
of an S corporation who receives an
allocation of a charitable contribution
deduction under section 170 for
property to which paragraph (c), (d), or
(e) of this section applies must attach a
copy of the partnership’s or S
corporation’s completed Form 8283
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(Section A or Section B) to the return on
which the deduction is claimed.
(5) Determination of deduction
amount for purposes of substantiation
rules—(i) In general. In determining
whether the amount of a donor’s
deduction exceeds the amounts set forth
in section 170(f)(11)(B) (noncash
contributions exceeding $500),
170(f)(11)(C) (noncash contributions
exceeding $5,000), or 170(f)(11)(D)
(noncash contributions exceeding
$500,000), the rules of paragraphs
(f)(5)(ii) and (iii) of this section apply.
(ii) Similar items of property must be
aggregated. Under section 170(f)(11)(F),
the donor must aggregate the amount
claimed as a deduction for all similar
items of property, as defined in
§ 1.170A–13(c)(7)(iii), contributed
during the taxable year. For rules
regarding the number of qualified
appraisals and Forms 8283 (Section A or
Section B) required if similar items of
property are contributed, see § 1.170A–
13(c)(3)(iv)(A) and (4)(iv)(B).
(iii) For contributions of certain
inventory and scientific property, excess
of amount claimed over cost of goods
sold taken into account—(A) In general.
In determining the amount of a donor’s
contribution of property to which
section 170(e)(3) (relating to
contributions of inventory and other
property) or (e)(4) (relating to
contributions of scientific property used
for research) applies, the donor must
take into account only the excess of the
amount claimed as a deduction over the
amount that would have been treated as
the cost of goods sold if the donor had
sold the contributed property to the
donee.
(B) Example. The following example
illustrates the rule of this paragraph
(f)(5)(iii):
Example. X Corporation makes a
contribution of inventory described in
section 1221(a)(2). The contribution,
described in section 170(e)(3), is for the care
of the needy. The cost of the property to X
Corporation is $5,000 and the fair market
value of the property at the time of the
contribution is $11,000. Pursuant to section
170(e)(3)(B), X Corporation claims a
charitable contribution deduction of $8,000
($5,000 + 1⁄2 × ($11,000 ¥ 5,000) = $8,000).
The amount taken into account for purposes
of determining the $5,000 threshold of
paragraph (d) of this section is $3,000
($8,000¥$5,000).

(g) Effective/applicability date. This
section applies to contributions made
after July 30, 2018. Taxpayers may rely
on the rules of this section for
contributions made after June 3, 2004,
or appraisals prepared for returns or
submissions filed after August 17, 2006.
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Par. 8. Section 1.170A–17 is added to
read as follows:

■

§ 1.170A–17 Qualified appraisal and
qualified appraiser.

(a) Qualified appraisal—(1)
Definition. For purposes of section
170(f)(11) and § 1.170A–16(d)(1)(ii) and
(e)(1)(ii), the term qualified appraisal
means an appraisal document that is
prepared by a qualified appraiser (as
defined in paragraph (b)(1) of this
section) in accordance with generally
accepted appraisal standards (as defined
in paragraph (a)(2) of this section) and
otherwise complies with the
requirements of this paragraph (a).
(2) Generally accepted appraisal
standards defined. For purposes of
paragraph (a)(1) of this section,
generally accepted appraisal standards
means the substance and principles of
the Uniform Standards of Professional
Appraisal Practice, as developed by the
Appraisal Standards Board of the
Appraisal Foundation.
(3) Contents of qualified appraisal. A
qualified appraisal must include—
(i) The following information about
the contributed property:
(A) A description in sufficient detail
under the circumstances, taking into
account the value of the property, for a
person who is not generally familiar
with the type of property to ascertain
that the appraised property is the
contributed property.
(B) In the case of real property or
tangible personal property, the
condition of the property.
(C) The valuation effective date, as
defined in paragraph (a)(5)(i) of this
section.
(D) The fair market value, within the
meaning of § 1.170A–1(c)(2), of the
contributed property on the valuation
effective date;
(ii) The terms of any agreement or
understanding by or on behalf of the
donor and donee that relates to the use,
sale, or other disposition of the
contributed property, including, for
example, the terms of any agreement or
understanding that—
(A) Restricts temporarily or
permanently a donee’s right to use or
dispose of the contributed property;
(B) Reserves to, or confers upon,
anyone, other than a donee or an
organization participating with a donee
in cooperative fundraising, any right to
the income from the contributed
property or to the possession of the
property, including the right to vote
contributed securities, to acquire the
property by purchase or otherwise, or to
designate the person having income,
possession, or right to acquire; or
(C) Earmarks contributed property for
a particular use;
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(iii) The date, or expected date, of the
contribution to the donee;
(iv) The following information about
the appraiser:
(A) Name, address, and taxpayer
identification number.
(B) Qualifications to value the type of
property being valued, including the
appraiser’s education and experience.
(C) If the appraiser is acting in his or
her capacity as a partner in a
partnership, an employee of any person,
whether an individual, corporation, or
partnership, or an independent
contractor engaged by a person other
than the donor, the name, address, and
taxpayer identification number of the
partnership or the person who employs
or engages the qualified appraiser;
(v) The signature of the appraiser and
the date signed by the appraiser
(appraisal report date);
(vi) The following declaration by the
appraiser: ‘‘I understand that my
appraisal will be used in connection
with a return or claim for refund. I also
understand that, if there is a substantial
or gross valuation misstatement of the
value of the property claimed on the
return or claim for refund that is based
on my appraisal, I may be subject to a
penalty under section 6695A of the
Internal Revenue Code, as well as other
applicable penalties. I affirm that I have
not been at any time in the three-year
period ending on the date of the
appraisal barred from presenting
evidence or testimony before the
Department of the Treasury or the
Internal Revenue Service pursuant to 31
U.S.C. 330(c)’’;
(vii) A statement that the appraisal
was prepared for income tax purposes;
(viii) The method of valuation used to
determine the fair market value, such as
the income approach, the market-data
approach, or the replacement-cost-lessdepreciation approach; and
(ix) The specific basis for the
valuation, such as specific comparable
sales transactions or statistical
sampling, including a justification for
using sampling and an explanation of
the sampling procedure employed.
(4) Timely appraisal report. A
qualified appraisal must be signed and
dated by the qualified appraiser no
earlier than 60 days before the date of
the contribution and no later than—
(i) The due date, including
extensions, of the return on which the
deduction for the contribution is first
claimed;
(ii) In the case of a donor that is a
partnership or S corporation, the due
date, including extensions, of the return
on which the deduction for the
contribution is first reported; or

(iii) In the case of a deduction first
claimed on an amended return, the date
on which the amended return is filed.
(5) Valuation effective date—(i)
Definition. The valuation effective date
is the date to which the value opinion
applies.
(ii) Timely valuation effective date.
For an appraisal report dated before the
date of the contribution, as described in
§ 1.170A–1(b), the valuation effective
date must be no earlier than 60 days
before the date of the contribution and
no later than the date of the
contribution. For an appraisal report
dated on or after the date of the
contribution, the valuation effective
date must be the date of the
contribution.
(6) Exclusion for donor knowledge of
falsity. An appraisal is not a qualified
appraisal for a particular contribution,
even if the requirements of this
paragraph (a) are met, if the donor either
failed to disclose or misrepresented
facts, and a reasonable person would
expect that this failure or
misrepresentation would cause the
appraiser to misstate the value of the
contributed property.
(7) Number of appraisals required. A
donor must obtain a separate qualified
appraisal for each item of property for
which an appraisal is required under
section 170(f)(11)(C) and (D) and
paragraph (d) or (e) of § 1.170A–16 and
that is not included in a group of similar
items of property, as defined in
§ 1.170A–13(c)(7)(iii). For rules
regarding the number of appraisals
required if similar items of property are
contributed, see section 170(f)(11)(F)
and § 1.170A–13(c)(3)(iv)(A).
(8) Time of receipt of qualified
appraisal. The qualified appraisal must
be received by the donor before the due
date, including extensions, of the return
on which a deduction is first claimed,
or reported in the case of a donor that
is a partnership or S corporation, under
section 170 with respect to the donated
property, or, in the case of a deduction
first claimed, or reported, on an
amended return, the date on which the
return is filed.
(9) Prohibited appraisal fees. The fee
for a qualified appraisal cannot be based
to any extent on the appraised value of
the property. For example, a fee for an
appraisal will be treated as based on the
appraised value of the property if any
part of the fee depends on the amount
of the appraised value that is allowed by
the Internal Revenue Service after an
examination.
(10) Retention of qualified appraisal.
The donor must retain the qualified
appraisal for so long as it may be

relevant in the administration of any
internal revenue law.
(11) Effect of appraisal disregarded
pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 330(c). If an
appraiser has been prohibited from
practicing before the Internal Revenue
Service by the Secretary under 31 U.S.C.
330(c) at any time during the three-year
period ending on the date the appraisal
is signed by the appraiser, any appraisal
prepared by the appraiser will be
disregarded as to value, but could
constitute a qualified appraisal if the
requirements of this section are
otherwise satisfied, and the donor had
no knowledge that the signature, date,
or declaration was false when the
appraisal and Form 8283 (Section B)
were signed by the appraiser.
(12) Partial interest. If the contributed
property is a partial interest, the
appraisal must be of the partial interest.
(b) Qualified appraiser—(1)
Definition. For purposes of section
170(f)(11) and § 1.170A–16(d)(1)(ii) and
(e)(1)(ii), the term qualified appraiser
means an individual with verifiable
education and experience in valuing the
type of property for which the appraisal
is performed, as described in paragraphs
(b)(2) through (4) of this section.
(2) Education and experience in
valuing the type of property—(i) In
general. An individual is treated as
having education and experience in
valuing the type of property within the
meaning of paragraph (b)(1) of this
section if, as of the date the individual
signs the appraisal, the individual has—
(A) Successfully completed (for
example, received a passing grade on a
final examination) professional or
college-level coursework, as described
in paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section, in
valuing the type of property, as
described in paragraph (b)(3) of this
section, and has two or more years of
experience in valuing the type of
property, as described in paragraph
(b)(3) of this section; or
(B) Earned a recognized appraiser
designation, as described in paragraph
(b)(2)(iii) of this section, for the type of
property, as described in paragraph
(b)(3) of this section.
(ii) Coursework must be obtained from
an educational organization, generally
recognized professional trade or
appraiser organization, or employer
educational program. For purposes of
paragraph (b)(2)(i)(A) of this section, the
coursework must be obtained from—
(A) A professional or college-level
educational organization described in
section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii);
(B) A generally recognized
professional trade or appraiser
organization that regularly offers
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educational programs in valuing the
type of property; or
(C) An employer as part of an
employee apprenticeship or educational
program substantially similar to the
educational programs described in
paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A) and (B) of this
section.
(iii) Recognized appraiser designation
defined. A recognized appraiser
designation means a designation
awarded by a generally recognized
professional appraiser organization on
the basis of demonstrated competency.
(3) Type of property defined—(i) In
general. The type of property means the
category of property customary in the
appraisal field for an appraiser to value.
(ii) Examples. The following
examples illustrate the rule of
paragraphs (b)(2)(i) and (b)(3)(i) of this
section:

daltland on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with RULES

Example (1). Coursework in valuing type of
property. There are very few professionallevel courses offered in widget appraising,
and it is customary in the appraisal field for
personal property appraisers to appraise
widgets. Appraiser A has successfully
completed professional-level coursework in
valuing personal property generally but has
completed no coursework in valuing widgets.
The coursework completed by Appraiser A is
for the type of property under paragraphs
(b)(2)(i) and (b)(3)(i) of this section.
Example (2). Experience in valuing type of
property. It is customary for professional
antique appraisers to appraise antique
widgets. Appraiser B has 2 years of
experience in valuing antiques generally and
is asked to appraise an antique widget.
Appraiser B has obtained experience in
valuing the type of property under
paragraphs (b)(2)(i) and (b)(3)(i) of this
section.
Example (3). No experience in valuing type
of property. It is not customary for
professional antique appraisers to appraise
new widgets. Appraiser C has experience in
appraising antiques generally but no
experience in appraising new widgets.
Appraiser C is asked to appraise a new
widget. Appraiser C does not have
experience in valuing the type of property
under paragraphs (b)(2)(i) and (b)(3)(i) of this
section.

(4) Verifiable. For purposes of
paragraph (b)(1) of this section,
education and experience in valuing the
type of property are verifiable if the
appraiser specifies in the appraisal the
appraiser’s education and experience in
valuing the type of property, as
described in paragraphs (b)(2) and (3) of
this section, and the appraiser makes a
declaration in the appraisal that,
because of the appraiser’s education and
experience, the appraiser is qualified to
make appraisals of the type of property
being valued.
(5) Individuals who are not qualified
appraisers. The following individuals

are not qualified appraisers for the
appraised property:
(i) An individual who receives a fee
prohibited by paragraph (a)(9) of this
section for the appraisal of the
appraised property.
(ii) The donor of the property.
(iii) A party to the transaction in
which the donor acquired the property
(for example, the individual who sold,
exchanged, or gave the property to the
donor, or any individual who acted as
an agent for the transferor or for the
donor for the sale, exchange, or gift),
unless the property is contributed
within 2 months of the date of
acquisition and its appraised value does
not exceed its acquisition price.
(iv) The donee of the property.
(v) Any individual who is either—
(A) Related, within the meaning of
section 267(b), to, or an employee of, an
individual described in paragraph
(b)(5)(ii), (iii), or (iv) of this section;
(B) Married to an individual described
in paragraph (b)(5)(v)(A) of this section;
or
(C) An independent contractor who is
regularly used as an appraiser by any of
the individuals described in paragraph
(b)(5)(ii), (iii), or (iv) of this section, and
who does not perform a majority of his
or her appraisals for others during the
taxable year.
(vi) An individual who is prohibited
from practicing before the Internal
Revenue Service by the Secretary under
31 U.S.C. 330(c) at any time during the
three-year period ending on the date the
appraisal is signed by the individual.
(c) Effective/applicability date. This
section applies to contributions made
on or after January 1, 2019. Taxpayers
may rely on the rules of this section for
appraisals prepared for returns or
submissions filed after August 17, 2006.
■ Par. 9. Section 1.170A–18 is added to
read as follows:

which a deduction of more than $500 is
claimed, if the donor submits with the
return on which the deduction is
claimed a qualified appraisal, as defined
in § 1.170A–17(a)(1), of the property
prepared by a qualified appraiser, as
defined in § 1.170A–17(b)(1), and a
completed Form 8283 (Section B),
‘‘Noncash Charitable Contributions,’’ as
described in § 1.170A–16(d)(3).
(c) Definition of household items. For
purposes of section 170(f)(16) and this
section, the term household items
includes furniture, furnishings,
electronics, appliances, linens, and
other similar items. Food, paintings,
antiques, and other objects of art,
jewelry, gems, and collections are not
household items.
(d) Effective/applicability date. This
section applies to contributions made
after July 30, 2018. Taxpayers may rely
on the rules of this section for
contributions made after August 17,
2006.
■ Par. 10. § 1.664–1 is amended by
revising paragraph (a)(7)(i)(b) and
adding a sentence to the end of
paragraph (f)(1) to read as follows:
§ 1.664–1.

Charitable remainder trusts.

(a) * * *
(7) * * *
(i) * * *
(b) Determined by a current qualified
appraisal from a qualified appraiser, as
those terms are defined in—
(1) Section 1.170A–13(c)(3) and
1.170A–13(c)(5), respectively, for
appraisals prepared for returns or
submissions filed on or before August
17, 2006;
(2) Section 3 of Notice 2006–96,
2006–2 CB 902, for appraisals prepared
for returns or submissions filed after
August 17, 2006, if the donations are
made before January 1, 2019; or
(3) Section 1.170A–17(a) and 1.170A–
17(b), respectively, for appraisals
§ 1.170A–18 Contributions of clothing and
prepared for returns or submissions for
household items.
donations made on or after January 1,
(a) In general. Except as provided in
2019.
paragraph (b) of this section, no
*
*
*
*
*
deduction is allowed under section
(f)
*
*
*
170(a) for a contribution of clothing or
(1) * * * The provisions of paragraph
a household item (as described in
§
1.664–1(a)(7)(i)(b)
apply as provided
paragraph (c) of this section) unless—
(1) The item is in good used condition in that paragraph.
*
*
*
*
*
or better at the time of the contribution;
and
■ Par. 10. § 1.6050L–1 is amended by:
(2) The donor meets the
■ 1. Revising the first two sentences of
substantiation requirements of
paragraph (a)(2)(i).
§ 1.170A–16.
■ 2. Revising paragraphs (c)(4)(i)
(b) Certain contributions of clothing or introductory text and (d)(2).
household items with claimed value of
■ 3. Revising the first sentences of
more than $500. The rule described in
paragraphs (e) and (f)(2)(ii).
paragraph (a)(1) of this section does not
■ 4. Adding paragraph (h).
apply to a contribution of a single item
The revisions and addition read as
of clothing or a household item for
follows:
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§ 1.6050L–1. Information return by donees
relating to certain dispositions of donated
property.

(a) * * *
(2) * * *
(i) In general. Paragraph (a)(1) of this
section shall not apply with respect to
an item of charitable deduction property
disposed of by sale if the Form 8283
appraisal summary (as described in
§ 1.170A–13(c)(4) for contributions
made on or before July 30, 2018 and
§ 1.170A–16(d)(3) for contributions
made after July 30, 2018), or a successor
form, signed by the donee with respect
to the item contains, at the time of the
donee’s signature, a statement signed by
the donor that the appraised value of the
item does not exceed $500. In the case
of a Form 8283 appraisal summary that
describes more than one item, this
exception shall apply only with respect
to an item clearly identified as having
an appraised value of $500 or
less. * * *
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(4) * * *
(i) Shall provide its name, address,
and employer identification number and
a copy of the Form 8283 appraisal
summary (as described in § 1.170A–
13(c)(4) for contributions made on or
before July 30, 2018 and § 1.170A–
16(d)(3) for contributions made after
July 30, 2018) relating to the transferred
property to the successor donee on or
before the 15th day after the latest of—
*
*
*
*
*
(d) * * *
(2) Retention of Form 8283 appraisal
summary. Every donee shall retain the
Form 8283 appraisal summary (as
described in § 1.170A–13(c)(4) for
contributions made on or before July 30,
2018 and § 1.170A–16(d)(3) for
contributions made after July 30, 2018)
in the donee’s records for so long as it
may be relevant in the administration of
any internal revenue law.
*
*
*
*
*
(e) Charitable deduction property. For
purposes of this section, the term
charitable deduction property means
any property (other than money and
publicly traded securities to which
§ 1.170A–13(c)(7)(xi)(B) does not apply)
contributed after December 31, 1984,
with respect to which the donee signs
(or is presented with for signature in
cases described in § 1.170A–
13(c)(4)(iv)(C)(2)) a Form 8283 appraisal
summary (as described in § 1.170A–
13(c)(4) for contributions made on or
before July 30, 2018 and § 1.170A–
16(d)(3) for contributions made after
July 30, 2018). * * *
*
*
*
*
*
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(f) * * *
(2) * * *
(ii) Exception. Notwithstanding
paragraph (f)(2)(i) of this section, in the
case of a donee who, on the date of
receipt of the transferred property, had
no reason to believe that the
substantiation requirements of
§ 1.170A–13(c) or § 1.170A–16(d) apply
with respect to the property, the donee
information return is not required to be
filed until the 60th day after the date on
which such donee has reason to believe
that the substantiation requirements of
§ 1.170A–13(c) or § 1.170A–16(d) apply
with respect to the property. * * *
*
*
*
*
*
(h) Effective/applicability dates. The
first two sentences of paragraph (a)(2)(i),
paragraphs (c)(4)(i) and (d)(2), and the
first sentences of paragraphs (e) and
(f)(2)(ii) apply to contributions made
after July 30, 2018.
PART 602—OMB CONTROL NUMBERS
UNDER THE PAPERWORK
REDUCTION ACT
Par. 11. The authority citation for part
602 continues to read as follows:

■

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805.

Par. 12. In § 602.101, paragraph (b) is
amended by adding in numerical order
entries for 1.170A–15 through 1.170A–
18 to read as follows:

■

§ 602.101 OMB

*

*
*
(b) * * *

Control numbers.

*

*

CFR part or section where
identified and described
1.170A–15
1.170A–16
1.170A–17
1.170A–18

............................
............................
............................
............................

Current OMB
control No.
1545–1953
1545–1953
1545–1953
1545–1953

Kirsten Wielobob,
Deputy Commissioner for Services and
Enforcement.
Approved: April 23, 2018.
David J. Kautter,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Tax
Policy).
[FR Doc. 2018–15734 Filed 7–27–18; 8:45 am]
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Coast Guard
33 CFR Part 117
[Docket No. USCG–2018–0730]

Drawbridge Operation Regulation; Gulf
Intracoastal Waterway, South
Pasadena, FL
AGENCY:

Coast Guard, DHS.
Notice of deviation from
drawbridge regulation.

ACTION:

SUMMARY:

The Coast Guard has issued a
temporary deviation from the operating
schedule that governs the Corey
Causeway (SR693) Bridge across the
Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (GICW),
mile 117.7, South Pasadena, FL. The
deviation is necessary to accommodate
repairs to the Bridge. This deviation
allows the bridge open at requested
times a single leaf and with a 6 hour
notice for double leaf openings.
DATES: This deviation is effective from
7 a.m. on August 1, 2018 to 7 a.m. on
February 28, 2019.
ADDRESSES: The docket for this
deviation, USCG–2018–0730 is available
at http://www.regulations.gov. Type the
docket number in the ‘‘SEARCH’’ box
and click ‘‘SEARCH’’. Click on Open
Docket Folder on the line associated
with this deviation.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If
you have questions on this temporary
deviation, call or email MST1 Deborah
A. Schneller, U.S. Coast Guard Sector
Saint Petersburg, Waterways
Management Division, telephone (813)
228–2194 x 8133, email
Deborah.A.Schneller@uscg.mil.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Florida
Department of Transportation (FDOT)
via Quinn Construction Inc, has
requested a temporary deviation from
the operation that govern the Corey
Causeway Bridge across the Gulf
Intracoastal Waterway, mile 117.7. This
deviation is necessary to facilitate
mechanical and electrical repairs,
painting, roadway and sidewalk grating
replacement which includes concrete
removal, spall repair and tender house
replacement. The bridge is a double-leaf
bascule bridge and has a vertical
clearance in the closed to navigation
position of 23 feet at mean high water.
The current operating schedule is set
out in 33 CFR 117.287(f). Under this
temporary deviation, the bridge will
operate per the listed schedule but
single leaf only and with a 6 hour notice
for double leaf openings. This section of
the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway is
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Appendix F
Name(s) shown on tax return
Cartwright Holdings, LLC

Identifying number

IRS FORM 8283
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT
DONATION OF CONSERVATION EASEMENT1
On December 8, 2017, Cartwright Holdings, LLC, a Nevada limited liability
company, the owner of record (the “LLC,” or the “donor”), with a mailing address
______________________________, donated a conservation easement (the “Easement”)
under Section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and the
regulations thereunder (the “Code”), on approximately 38 acres (the “Property”) out of a
larger parcel of 45+/- contiguous acres owned by the LLC in East Standwich, Open Space
County, [State]. A resolution dated December 1, 2017, and signed by all of the members
of the LLC, authorized the LLC to convey a conservation easement to the Town of East
Standwich, as a gift and for no consideration, on 38 acres of the property owned by the
LLC in East Standwich.
Pursuant to Chief Counsel Advice No. 201334039 (release date August 23, 2013),
and Treas. Reg. Section 1.170A-14(h), the appraiser has valued all of the donor’s
contiguous property before the Easement and all of the donor’s contiguous property after
the Easement.2 Accordingly, for purposes of the qualified appraisal report filed herewith,
the entire 45+/- acre contiguous parcel owned by the donor is valued both before and after
the conveyance of the Easement.
The donation of the Easement was made to the Town of East Standwich, a [State]
municipal corporation (“Grantee”), a government agency having an address at 445
Blooming Ave., East Standwich, [State] [zip] (“Grantee”). Grantee has the commitment
and the resources to enforce the terms of the Easement and is a “qualified organization”
under Section 170(h) of the Code.
The Easement was recorded on December 8, 2017, at Book _______, Page _____,
in the Recorder’s Office in Open Space County, [State]. Accordingly, as the appraiser’s

1

This document is not and does not offer legal advice. Use at your own risk. There is no guarantee
whatsoever that if you use this language, or something close to it, you will not be audited on this issue,
and there is no guarantee that if you are audited on this issue your deduction will not be denied. In
that regard, the Internal Revenue Service has not recommended, ruled on, endorsed, or otherwise,
formally or informally, liked this language. Copyright 2019 by Stephen J. Small, Esq., all rights reserved.
2
Determining exactly what to appraise requires (i) an understanding of the specific conservation easement
valuation rules (including but not limited to the definition of “contiguous” in your state), and (ii) knowledge
of what if any property that might be relevant to the appraisal is owned by the donor, members of the donor’s
family, and “related persons,” as defined by the Treasury Regulations.
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certification in the qualified appraisal was signed on April 16, 2018,3 the effective date for
purposes of determining the value of the Easement under Section 170(h) of the Code is
December 8, 2017.
The Easement allows public access to and across a designated portion of the
Property, referred to as the “Trail” in the Easement, for passive pedestrian outdoor
recreation. No motorized vehicles are permitted on the Trail. In addition, the Trail will
provide for enhanced public access to and the use of the greater trail network that extends
through East Standwich’s Historic District and ridgelines. On November 29, 2017, the
Town of East Standwich, the Grantee, in a public session, unanimously approved the
acquisition of this Easement, citing the importance of maintaining the Property in a scenic,
natural, and permitting access along the Trail.
As discussed above and below, by retaining the Property in perpetuity in its current
open and undeveloped state, the Easement donation allows for public outdoor recreation,
yields a significant public benefit, protects important scenic open space, important habitat
and other natural and scientific resources, and is pursuant to clearly delineated government
policy.
THE PROPERTY AND ITS CONSERVATION VALUES
The Property has the following conservation values, which are covered in greater
detail in the Easement and in the Baseline Documentation Report (as hereinafter defined):
(i) protection of land areas for public outdoor recreation and education; (ii) protection of
significant habitat; (iii) preservation of open space for the scenic enjoyment of the general
public, which yields a significant public benefit; and (iv) preservation of open space
pursuant to clearly delineated governmental policy, including historic preservation value,
which yields a significant public benefit.
This Easement protects land areas for public outdoor recreation and education and
therefore this Easement meets the requirements of Section 170(h)(4)(A)(i) of the Code:
As previously noted, the Easement allows public access along a Trail into
and across the Property. In addition, the Trail will provide for enhanced
public access to and the use of the greater trail network that extends through
East Standwich’s Historic District and ridgelines.
Protection of the Property will preserve significant relatively natural habitat and
therefore this Easement meets the requirements of Section 170(h)(4)(A)(ii) of the Code:
The Property has native vegetation, including forestland comprised of
Quaking Aspen Groves, Bigtooth Maple and Gambel Oak. The Property is
habitat for a wildlife including large game, ground mammals including
marmot, squirrel, ermine and birds (ruffed grouse). Mule Deer, Elk, and
3

If more than one appraiser signed the appraisal and appraisal certificate, and accordingly the Form 8283,
this should be adjusted.
2
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Moose frequent the Property year-round. The Property is adjacent to protected
open space and open public lands that extend to larger mountainous areas that
provide quality habitat for wildlife, and protection of the Property will create
a larger contiguous bloc of habitat. Preservation of the Property will
contribute to the ecological viability of native plants and
wildlife.
Protection of the Property is for the scenic enjoyment of the general public and will
yield a significant public benefit, and therefore this Easement meets the requirements of
Section 170(h)(4)(A)(iii)(I) of the Code:
The hillside on the Property continues a natural scenic barrier between
the East Standwich Historic District and the Hummer Hill
development, contributing to the quiet semi-rural town feel. The
Property’s protected hillside can be viewed from the Hummer Hill
neighborhood, including Cartwright Ave, and Antelope Valley Drive;
the Property can be viewed from public trails located on the adjacent
____________ easement and a parcel owned by the Bureau of Land
Management;
the Property is within the viewshed of the East Standwich Historic District,
a nationally recognized Historic District. The Property is within a
neighborhood with multiple properties and structures listed on the National
Register of Historic Places. Preserving the Property contributes to the feel
and character of the historic neighborhood, and prevents development that is
incongruous to the historic aspect;
the Property is visible from public access trails on adjacent land owned by
the Town of East Standwich and permanently protected by a conservation
easement, and said public access trails may extend to the Property in the
future. The Property is part of a natural and scenic open space buffer between
the East Standwich Historic District and the Antelope Valley development.
Protection of the Property is pursuant to clearly delineated federal, state, and local
governmental conservation policies, and will yield a significant public benefit, and
therefore this Easement meets the requirements of Section 170(h)(4)(a)(iii)(II) of the Code:
as previously noted, on November 29, 2017, the Town Board of East
Standwich unanimously approved the acquisition of this Easement, and
cited the importance of maintaining the Property in a scenic, natural, and
pedestrian accessible condition, and commending Grantor for making this
commitment;
as noted above, the Property is within the viewshed of the East Standwich,
Historic District. The Property is adjacent to a zoned Historic District, and
is within a neighborhood with multiple properties and structures listed on
the National Register of Historic Places. Preserving the Property
3
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contributes to the feel and character of the historic neighborhood, and
prevents development that is incongruous to the historic aspect; and
the public benefits from preserving open space in the bordering areas of
historic main street by creating a more substantial buffer zone between new
residential development and the classic character of the Historic District. In
addition, the Property is located on a narrow road with large vehicles and
increased traffic that has resulted in recent years from the construction of
new homes on Hummer Hill. Preventing residential development will
mitigate future traffic impacts in an already heavily-travelled area.
THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT
The Easement is very restrictive. It prohibits the division of the Property and
prohibits residential construction, commercial activities, and industrial activities on the
Property, thereby extinguishing almost all of the Property’s development rights potentially
allowable under applicable zoning regulations. The Easement prohibits any activity on the
Property that would interfere with the perpetual protection of the Property’s conservation
values, as those are defined in the Easement and set forth above. The Easement allows
public access to and across a designated portion of the Property, referred to as the “Trail”
in the Easement, for passive pedestrian outdoor recreation, and prohibits the use of
motorized vehicles on the Trail. In addition, the Trail will connect to and therefore provide
for enhanced public access to and use of the greater trail network that extends through East
Standwich’s Historic District and surrounding property.
VALUATION AND RELATED MATTERS
Applying the sales comparison approach, the appraiser concluded that the fair
market value of the Easement is determined as follows:
a. Fair market value of the entire contiguous property owned by the donor
before donation of the Easement: $3,800,000
b. Fair market value of the entire contiguous property owned by the donor after
donation of the Easement: $1,700,000
c. Fair market value of the Easement: $2,100,000
The donor’s basis in the entire contiguous property is $3,374,779. A copy of the
qualified appraisal report dated April 16, 2018, that substantiates these values is filed with
this Form 8283. A copy of the recorded Easement is included in the qualified appraisal
report. As noted above, the Easement was recorded on December 8, 2017 (the effective
date of the Easement), at Book ______, Page: ______, in the Recorder’s Office in Open
Space County, [State].
As described in greater detail in the attached qualified appraisal, neither the donor
nor related family members or related persons (as defined by the Treasury Regulations)
4
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own any other property the value of which is increased by the Easement, so no further
adjustment is required to the conclusion of value. The donation of the Easement was not
made to obtain a permit or other approval from a local or other governing authority, nor
was the donation required by any contractual obligation.
The condition of the Property at the time of the donation was documented and
established through extensive documentation in a contemporaneous Baseline Documentation
Report, dated November 25, 2017, and acknowledged by the parties to the donation in
accordance with Treas. Reg. Section 1.170A-14(g)(5). A copy of the Baseline Documentation
Report is filed herewith. A copy of the contemporaneous written acknowledgement of the
gift of the Easement required by Section 170(f)(8) of the Code is also filed herewith.
Attachments
Copies of the following are filed with this Form 8283:
Qualified appraisal report dated April 16, 2018, with effective date December 8, 2017
(date of recording of the Easement) (appraisal report includes copy of
recorded Easement)
Code Section 170(f)(8) donation acknowledgement letter from Grantee East Standwich
Municipal Corporation.
Contemporaneous Baseline Documentation Report dated November 25, 2017
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Appendix G
Limited Amendment Provision
*******This is not legal advice. There is no guarantee whatsoever that if you use this language,
or something close to it, you will not be audited on this issue, and there is no guarantee that if
you are audited on this issue your deduction will not be denied. In that regard, the Internal
Revenue Service has not recommended, ruled on, endorsed, or otherwise, formally or
informally, liked this language. Given the still unsettled law on the issue of amending
conservation easements, some practitioners will prefer to use different language or to draft
conservation easements with no amendment provision whatsoever. Use or modify at your own
risk. And I really mean it.
Law Office of Stephen J. Small, Esq., P.C.
4/19/19 draft

5.03

Limitations on Amendment
(a)

Background; Acting in Good Faith Grantor and Grantee have been informed

that the Internal Revenue Service has been concerned about the possibility of the parties thereto
amending conservation easements in the future in a manner that fails to protect the conservation
values of the subject property in perpetuity. Accordingly, Grantor and Grantee have agreed to
include a suitably restrictive amendment clause in this Easement, to address IRS concerns.
(b)

In General Grantor and Grantee recognize that natural conditions, landscapes,

and technologies change over time (including best practices of open space stewardship
techniques), and, in an abundance of caution, have determined, in good faith, to articulate herein
the limited parameters of any permissible amendment hereto. The intent of Grantor and Grantee
is that (except in a case involving solely the correction of a drafting mistake, or mapping error, or
in a situation involving solely adding additional property to the existing encumbered property or
otherwise eliminating or further restricting previously reserved rights) any such amendment would

1
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be executed only in rare instances and unusual circumstances not envisioned by either party at the
time of this grant, consistent with and true to the perpetual protection of the Conservation Values,
and consistent with the goals and provisions of [citation to state statute] and the goals and
provisions of Section 170(h) of the Code. Further, it may be necessary at some point to amend
this Easement in response to changes over time specifically to ensure the perpetual protection of
the Conservation Values. This Section 5.03 is accordingly carefully limited so as to ensure that
no amendment shall in any way impair the perpetual protection of the Conservation Values.
Nothing in this Section 5.03 shall require Grantor or Grantee to agree to any amendment or to
consult or negotiate regarding any amendment.
(c)

Limitations on Amendment This Easement shall be amended only upon the

written agreement of Grantee and Grantor, at Grantee’s sole and absolute discretion, but only if
such amendment: (i) does not constitute private inurement or give rise to an impermissible private
benefit under Section 501(c)(3) and other applicable provisions of the Code or the law of [state],
based on an appraisal of the economic impact of the proposed amendment by an appraiser selected
by Grantee; (ii) has a neutral or positive effect on the Conservation Values*, based on an evaluation
of the effect of the proposed amendment on the Conservation Values by an independent qualified
person selected by Grantee; (iii) is consistent with the purpose of this Easement and the perpetual
protection of the Conservation Values; (iv) does not affect the perpetual nature of this Easement;
and (v) complies with [state statute] and Section 170(h) of the Code. Further, no amendment shall
be permitted that (vi) causes the provisions of this Section 5.03 to be less restrictive, (vii) does not
comply with the provisions of this Section 5.03, (viii) would involve the removal of any of the
Property from the Easement, or (ix) would alter or remove the restrictions on assignment of this
Easement under the provisions of Section ____, or the provisions on extinguishment, percentage
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interests, or condemnation under Section ____. In the case of any amendment, all of the
requirements and restrictions in this Section 5.03 must be satisfied.
(d)

Updated Baseline Documentation Report

In the event Grantor and Grantee

agree to an amendment pursuant to the provisions of this Section 5.03, an addendum to the Baseline
Documentation Report shall be prepared and shall be acknowledged by Grantor and Grantee as
memorializing the condition of the Property as of the date the amendment is delivered for recording
to the [name of recording office]. Notwithstanding the foregoing, an addendum to the Baseline
Documentation Report shall not be required for any amendment that involves solely the correction
of a drafting mistake or mapping error.
(e)

Costs If Grantor is the party requesting an amendment of this Easement, Grantor

shall be responsible for all reasonable and customary costs related to Grantee’s evaluation of said
request and the amendment’s execution, including but not limited to (i) any costs incurred in
connection with the requirements of paragraphs 5.03(c)(i) and, if applicable, (ii) any agency or
judicial proceeding referred to in Section 5.03(f), including reasonable attorney’s fees and staff,
contractor, legal, and consultant costs incurred in connection therewith by Grantee, and (iii) any
costs associated with the preparation of the updated Baseline Documentation Report prepared
pursuant to the provisions of Section 5.03(d).
(f)

Court Approval Required A proposed amendment that is agreed to by Grantor

and Grantee but nevertheless exceeds the scope of the limited discretion granted under this Section
5.03 is not permitted except by a final non-appealable judgment of a court having jurisdiction in a
proceeding to which the Attorney General of the [state] was given written notice and an
opportunity to participate to represent the public interest in ensuring the continued perpetual
protection of the Conservation Values and the purpose of this Easement. [italicized language is
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optional, but if the state AG is knowledgeable about conservation easement, parties may want to
leave it in.]

*As noted, the law on amending conservation easements is unsettled. One of the more
difficult issues is the so-called “four corners” question: if you are amending a conservation
easement, and, for example, there would be prohibited private economic benefit to the landowner
as a result of the proposed amendment, is it permissible to go “outside” the four corners of the
easement document (and, in fact, outside the four corners of the property encumbered by the
easement), and encumber other property (and take no income tax deduction for same) so there is
a net loss of economic value to the landowner. Some would argue that this is tantamount to buying
one’s way out of a perpetual conservation easement. Others would argue that if there is an
important net conservation gain, an easement holder should at least be free to consider such a
transaction.
At least as problematic as the “netting” of economic benefit is this: what if the proposed
conservation easement amendment has a negative impact on the Conservation Values of the
Property under easement (capitalized terms used and defined in the easement document)?
Arguably, under Section 170(h) and the regulations, this is prohibited. On these facts, the
Conservation Values are not protected in perpetuity. Can a loss of Conservation Values on the
eased property be supportable if there is a significant net conservation gain by virtue of easing or
gifting other property with important conservation values (that is, outside the four corners)? The
answer to that may be “no.” So it is quite possible that a proposed amendment that would have an
adverse impact on the Conservation Values of the eased property is stopped dead in its tracks, and
the landowner cannot “net out” that conservation loss by encumbering or gifting other property
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(and taking no income tax deduction). The provision in paragraph 5.03(c)(ii) text accompanying
the asterisk takes that position, that is, if one starts with a proposed amendment that has an adverse
impact on the Conservation Values of the eased property, the Easement may not be amended under
the provisions included above. However, recognizing that in some rare and unusual cases, a case
can be made for netting out a loss of Conservation Values by filling the cup with substantially
more protected conservation values (for which no income tax deduction is taken), the reader is
referred to paragraph 5.03(f), above.
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